Israel may win the war but lose strategic high ground

It’s been hard to write more about Gaza, both because I’ve been busy with professorial responsibilities this week and because so much has already been said. But a few points merit reiteration:

• The fighting is not really about Gaza. Israeli moves against Palestinians in East Jerusalem and on the Haram al Sharif triggered the Hamas rocket barrages. Hamas gains by claiming the mantle of resistance in Jerusalem. Netanyahu gains by creating an emergency situation that may give him another lease on the prime ministry.
• American influence is marginal. Biden doesn’t want to leave his right flank open to Republican criticism. Washington doesn’t talk with Hamas but may exert some pressure via Qatar or Egypt. Having paid a price in international opinion, Israel will want to meet its military objectives before stopping.
• Israeli measures to minimize civilian casualties are grossly insufficient. Some think they target civilians. I can’t really say they don’t, but it is also possible the damage is collateral. They do warn before bombing civilian structures, but Gaza is such a densely populated place even the best-intentioned belligerent would likely kill civilians. The bombing of Hamas’ underground tunnels in populated areas ensures that above-ground structures will collapse.
• The fighting inside Israel between Arab and Jewish citizens is new and important. The center of gravity of this conflict has moved from Gaza and the West Bank to Israel inside the Green Line and East Jerusalem. The successful Israeli efforts to mitigate threat by fencing off the former cannot be applied to the latter. Only ethnic cleansing will rid Israel of its own Palestinian population. That is precisely what Netanyahu and his extremist supporters want to do.
• The Palestinian Authority and the Gulf States are more irrelevant than ever. Mahmoud Abbas disappointed Palestinians by postponing long-postponed elections. Pleased to see Hamas hammered, the Gulf states have failed to use their new-found relations with Israel to protect Palestinians. Iran will gain sway with Palestinians for its support of resistance.
• The fighting has undermined American support for Israel. Already in trouble with Democrats because of his blatant preference for the Republicans, Netanyahu has managed to provoke even stalwart backers to object to what Israel is doing in Gaza. Biden gave Netanyahu lots of room to maneuver, but even he is now insisting on a ceasefire.
• Liberal American Jews (that’s most of us) are fed up. They don’t like Hamas but also do not want to support an Israel that causes dozens of civilian casualties in Gaza every day, treats Jewish and Arab citizens differently, attacks worshippers on the Temple Mount, and coddles right-wing Jewish supremacist thugs.

Israel will benefit from destroying Hamas leadership, infrastructure, and hardware in Gaza, but most of the points above suggest that the political terrain is shifting against Netanyahu, if not Israel per se. Things will not be the same after this war: Palestinian citizens of Israel, liberal Jews in the US, Democratic leadership in the White House and congress, Gulf states, and others will have shifted their sympathies noticeably in the Palestinian direction, even if not towards Hamas.

There is no sign of a similar shift inside Israel. Netanyahu’s buildup of siege mentality among its Jewish citizens has worked well in his favor. Hamas’ rockets help. The gulf between Israeli Jewish public opinion and the rest of the world is widening. Israel may win the war but lose strategic high ground.