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Convergence is desirable but not magical

My SAIS colleague Ed Joseph argues that recognition of Kosovo by the four NATO member non-recognizers would weaken Serbia’s position and improve the negotiating position of Pristina in its dialogue with Belgrade. He is correct about that. Even one or two additional recognitions would be helpful. All four would open the door of NATO membership to Kosovo.

Wrong about Serbia’s reaction

But he is unfortunately wrong about Serbia’s reaction to such recognitions. They will not happen in a “big bang,” all together. At best they will happen over several years. And NATO membership won’t be feasible until 2027 at the earliest, when Kosovo is scheduled to have a fully qualified army. As recognitions happen, Belgrade will stiffen its resistance, not soften it.

The evidence for this is plain and apparent. As Ed emphasizes, Serbia regards Kosovo as its most important security risk. Each additional recognition will raise the alarm level in Belgrade. Serbia will intensify its opposition to recognition with the remaining non-recognizers. Russia and China will back this resistance. The EU will do nothing to soften it, as there will still be one hardline non-recognizer member state, Cyprus. Nicosia will prevent any consensus within the EU to shift away from its “status-neutral” position on Kosovo, which in any case is essential if the EU is to continue convening the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue.

NATO membership is not more important to Kosovo than UN membership

Ed also states that “A pathway to NATO membership is far more meaningful for Kosovo than UN membership.” It is unquestionably easier, since Cyprus is not a member of NATO. But it is just as unquestionably not more meaningful. Remember: NATO-led forces already guarantee Kosovo’s sovereignty and terrritorial integrity, which is what NATO is all about. This seems to be the crux of Ed’s argument:

Without the leverage to sustain its isolation of Kosovo, Belgrade’s strategic calculus will change. The Russian and Chinese vetoes of Kosovo at the United Nations Security Council will be of negligible value on what Belgrade deems its “main political-security challenge.” No longer will the Vucic regime be able to prosecute its aggressive “non-recognition” campaign against Kosovo, or leverage Kosovo to advance ‘Serb World’, or dodge accountability for the regime’s assault on Serbian democracy. With no express demand from the West to recognize Kosovo – and no meaningful backing from Moscow or Beijing on Belgrade’s most important issue – the regime will struggle to exploit convergence domestically, and struggle to explain to citizens how it squandered Serbian leverage.

Even if Serbia were not the home of inat (read “spite, stubborness, persistence”), this would be fantasy. Belgrade’s strategic calculus will not change, at least so long as it is governed by people who claim sovereignty over Kosovo. The Russian and Chinese vetoes will increase in value, as they will be the only insurance against UN membership, which is the universally established symbol of sovereignty in our world. I can’t see any reason why Belgrade would drop its nonrecognition campaign, but even if it did that would make no difference. Serbia’s claim to sovereignty over Kosovo would not be abandoned. NATO troops in Kosovo haven’t changed Belgrade’s attitude, so why would a few more NATO member recognitions or even NATO membership for Kosovo?

Recognitions are desirable but not magical

Let me make clear. I’m all in favor of getting non-recognizers to recognize Kosovo, especially the NATO and EU non-recognizers. Each recognition will improve Kosovo’s position, including in the dialogue with Serbia. But Belgrade will not drop its antirecognition campaign or its opposition to Kosovo membership in the UN. To the contrary, those efforts will be redoubled. What Ed calls “convergence” is desirable, but not magical.