Day: February 2, 2022
Dialogue will work when people support it
Koha today published an interview I gave yesterday to Besjana Bajrami:
Q: Do you think that this year will bring the final recognition between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: No, I don’t. I don’t see any sign the leadership in either country is preparing for a final recognition agreement.
Why is it stuck?
Q: Where do you think the dialogue is stuck?
A: It’s stuck in the domestic politics of both countries. Neither President Vucic nor Prime Minister Kurti sees the benefit of agreements, especially a comprehensive one.
Mutual benefit is the way forward
Q: Emissaries from the US and the EU are staying in Kosovo for dialogue. The same after the meetings with Prime Minister Kurti and President Osmani have stated that a solution must be found for dialogue. Where do you think the solution should be sought in Kosovo or Serbia?
A: I think the way forward now is what worked in the past: focus on issues with real benefits to citizens in both countries. That worked before 2013. I also think there is a big need for monitoring of implementation of past agreements. The EU and US should do that together.
Q: Do you think that Kosovo is being pressured regarding the dialogue?
A: Of course. Serbia will also be pressured. But I don’t think pressure is the key. Mutual benefit is the key.
Missing persons should not be stalled
Q: The topic of missing persons has somehow stalled in dialogue. Should Kosovo continue the dialogue if the issue of missing persons is not resolved?
A: I do not understand why the issue of missing persons has not been resolved. It is standard procedure to resolve such issues after war. It is best done promptly. Twenty years is not prompt.
The Association depends on context
Q: Should the Association of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo be allowed? The answer to this question depends on context. If Serbia were prepared to recognize Kosovo and advocate its UN membership, an association consistent with the Kosovo constitution would not, I think, look as troubling as it does today.
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Stevenson’s army, February 2
– Senate Democrats have lost their majority for the time being. Sen. Lujan [D-NM] is hospitalized following a stroke. Since the Senate, unlike the House, does not allow remote voting, at most 49 Democrats can vote on any measure. This complicates passage of appropriations packages [Feb 18 deadline] as well as other Biden proposals.
-China weighs in — supporting Russia over Ukraine and seeking to gain influence in the Middle East.
– Stimson Center has a report on US military aid to Ukraine.
– The scathing George Packer article on the withdrawal from Afghanistan, The Betrayal, is mainly a story about the botched efforts to arrange evacuation of former Afghan employees. Axios has a leaked memo of a last-minute Deputies Committee meeting on the topic, showing how far behind the curve the USG was as Kabul fell.
-Lawfare has interesting legal analyses: how Congress has limited the use of special envoys for diplomacy and how the US can still assert legal principles in the South China Sea despite failure to ratify UNCLOS.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Time is running out but it is not over yet
President Putin has four objectives in deploying Russian troops to Ukraine’s borders:
- Get the US to pay attention to him and his demands.
- Prevent Ukraine from ever joining NATO.
- Split the Alliance.
- Distract domestic attention from his economic failures and corrupt behavior.
How is he doing?
US attention
He has succeeded in getting US attention. Washington and Moscow are now exchanging papers addressing European security issues. That’s good from Putin’s perspective, as he regards Russia and the US as first-rank powers. Everyone else in Europe is a bit player. The Russians have succeeded in setting part of the agenda for bilateral talks. For Putin, that signals the return of Russia to great power status.
But it also alerts the US and Europe to Russia’s broader objectives. Moscow seeks to reverse 30 years of eastward movement of Western democracy and values. It wants a neutralized sphere of influence surrounding Russia. Its neighbors should present no models of successful governance that might inspire rebellion inside the Russian Federation. We used to call such states “satellites.”
Ukraine NATO membership
On Ukrainian membership in NATO, the results so far (and likely in the future) are mixed. Many NATO members are more reluctant to consider Ukraine for membership with a Russian invasion force now poised on Kiev’s borders. NATO defense of Ukraine would not be an easy task. But the Ukrainian population, at least those not under Russian rule in Donbas and Crimea, has become far more pro-NATO. Ukraine will not get membership anytime soon. But it will be coordinating its defense plans with the Alliance for at least a generation to come, unless Moscow were to be successful in again installing a puppet regime in Kiev.
Splitting the Alliance
Alliance members are not opening their arms to Ukrainian membership, but they are lining up solidly in favor of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The only visible split in the Alliance is Germany’s reluctance to allow arms it manufactures to be transferred to Ukraine from third countries. This is a product of German internal politics. The Berlin government, which includes parties friendly to Russia and reluctant about arms trade, also fears war will interfere with putting the Nordstream 2 pipeline from Russia into operation. Nordstream 2 is vital to German’s future gas supplies and its ability to meet climate change goals. Washington has explicitly said an invasion would end the hopes of bringing Nordstream 2 on line.
Despite the German reservations, the Alliance has held together pretty well. If there is a major Russian intervention, Putin can anticipate a firm response focused on economic sanctions. His best bet for splitting the Alliance is a more modest intervention. As President Biden inopportunely said in his last press conference, the Alliance would then face dissension on the strength of the sanctions. A Russian push along the coast of the Sea of Azov towards Crimea could both gain territory and split the Alliance.
Domestic politics
Putin needs some sort of military move to distract domestic attention. Russians aren’t supportive of war against Ukraine, but Putin hopes they will rally around the flag if an intervention is successful. What Putin needs to worry about domestically is not war but failure. If he moves on Mariulpol but is not be able to take it, Russians could turn on him, especially if he gets a lot of young men killed. Putin will use “hybrid war” maneuvers to increase the odds of military success. Among his options are protests and bombings throughout Ukraine, cyberattacks on vital infrastructure, financial manipulation against the Ukrainian hryvnia, and massive propaganda about Ukrainian malfeasance.
Time is running out, but it’s not over yet
There is little visible progress in the diplomacy, but the Russians are still hesitating. They won’t want to keep their troops mobilized and ready for an invasion too long. It’s expensive, tiring for the troops, and logistically challenging. The Americans say they are trying to given the Russians an “off ramp.” But there is little they can do to satisfy Putin’s demand for a legally binding commitment that Ukraine will never join NATO. Nor will they want to reverse NATO’s three decades of expansion eastward.
The main question now is whether deterrence will work. Has the West done enough to ensure doubt about whether Russia will win a war with Ukraine? Is the prospect of sanctions sufficiently daunting for Moscow to prefer standing down? Can Putin back down without suffering serious domestic political consequences?
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