Time is running out but it is not over yet
President Putin has four objectives in deploying Russian troops to Ukraine’s borders:
- Get the US to pay attention to him and his demands.
- Prevent Ukraine from ever joining NATO.
- Split the Alliance.
- Distract domestic attention from his economic failures and corrupt behavior.
How is he doing?
US attention
He has succeeded in getting US attention. Washington and Moscow are now exchanging papers addressing European security issues. That’s good from Putin’s perspective, as he regards Russia and the US as first-rank powers. Everyone else in Europe is a bit player. The Russians have succeeded in setting part of the agenda for bilateral talks. For Putin, that signals the return of Russia to great power status.
But it also alerts the US and Europe to Russia’s broader objectives. Moscow seeks to reverse 30 years of eastward movement of Western democracy and values. It wants a neutralized sphere of influence surrounding Russia. Its neighbors should present no models of successful governance that might inspire rebellion inside the Russian Federation. We used to call such states “satellites.”
Ukraine NATO membership
On Ukrainian membership in NATO, the results so far (and likely in the future) are mixed. Many NATO members are more reluctant to consider Ukraine for membership with a Russian invasion force now poised on Kiev’s borders. NATO defense of Ukraine would not be an easy task. But the Ukrainian population, at least those not under Russian rule in Donbas and Crimea, has become far more pro-NATO. Ukraine will not get membership anytime soon. But it will be coordinating its defense plans with the Alliance for at least a generation to come, unless Moscow were to be successful in again installing a puppet regime in Kiev.
Splitting the Alliance
Alliance members are not opening their arms to Ukrainian membership, but they are lining up solidly in favor of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The only visible split in the Alliance is Germany’s reluctance to allow arms it manufactures to be transferred to Ukraine from third countries. This is a product of German internal politics. The Berlin government, which includes parties friendly to Russia and reluctant about arms trade, also fears war will interfere with putting the Nordstream 2 pipeline from Russia into operation. Nordstream 2 is vital to German’s future gas supplies and its ability to meet climate change goals. Washington has explicitly said an invasion would end the hopes of bringing Nordstream 2 on line.
Despite the German reservations, the Alliance has held together pretty well. If there is a major Russian intervention, Putin can anticipate a firm response focused on economic sanctions. His best bet for splitting the Alliance is a more modest intervention. As President Biden inopportunely said in his last press conference, the Alliance would then face dissension on the strength of the sanctions. A Russian push along the coast of the Sea of Azov towards Crimea could both gain territory and split the Alliance.
Domestic politics
Putin needs some sort of military move to distract domestic attention. Russians aren’t supportive of war against Ukraine, but Putin hopes they will rally around the flag if an intervention is successful. What Putin needs to worry about domestically is not war but failure. If he moves on Mariulpol but is not be able to take it, Russians could turn on him, especially if he gets a lot of young men killed. Putin will use “hybrid war” maneuvers to increase the odds of military success. Among his options are protests and bombings throughout Ukraine, cyberattacks on vital infrastructure, financial manipulation against the Ukrainian hryvnia, and massive propaganda about Ukrainian malfeasance.
Time is running out, but it’s not over yet
There is little visible progress in the diplomacy, but the Russians are still hesitating. They won’t want to keep their troops mobilized and ready for an invasion too long. It’s expensive, tiring for the troops, and logistically challenging. The Americans say they are trying to given the Russians an “off ramp.” But there is little they can do to satisfy Putin’s demand for a legally binding commitment that Ukraine will never join NATO. Nor will they want to reverse NATO’s three decades of expansion eastward.
The main question now is whether deterrence will work. Has the West done enough to ensure doubt about whether Russia will win a war with Ukraine? Is the prospect of sanctions sufficiently daunting for Moscow to prefer standing down? Can Putin back down without suffering serious domestic political consequences?
RSS - Posts
