The better answer to the Dayton question is bankruptcy now

Thank you for the map, Gerard Toal!

Last week I engaged in the following exchange with Marko Atila Hoare (@markoah). He knows much more about Bosnia and Herzegovina than I ever will:

Marko: But do you think additional EUFOR troops would be a good thing ? I am concerned that if and when R[epublika S[rspska] finally secedes, EUFOR troops would protect it from pro-state BiH forces (in the name of ‘peace’). Even if they just reinforced the Dayton order, that would not be good.

Me: Dayton>secession, at least for now

Marko: Yes; maintenance of Dayton, potentially indefinitely, is a worse danger than an RS secession bid, which could at least be resisted and would allow BiH to repudiate the Dayton straitjacket. Better that RS becomes Transnistria than that it remains a pillar of an apartheid BiH.

We are now in the third decade since then of efforts to govern Bosnia and Herzegovina through dysfunctional powersharing arrangements. It is reasonable for people to ask whether continuing is better than the alternative.

The Dayton question

That is the Dayton question. Is it better to maintain the peaceful but unsatisfying status quo? Or would it be better to let Dayton go and see what will happen? The RS has already salami-sliced its way more than halfway there. It recently passed a law negating the authority of Bosnian Constitutional Court.

Of course the RS might not become a new Transnistria. It might instead become independent or the westernmost province of Serbia. Its secession might also precipitate a series of ethnic rebellions in Kosovo, Macedonia, and even in Serbia. That could be disastrous.

But the more immediate question is what would happen inside Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Brcko

The northeastern town of Brcko was the center of gravity of the last Bosnian war. The reason there was a Dayton negotiation was that the US forced a ceasefire to prevent the Bosnian Federation (Bosniak and Croat) forces from taking it in the fall of 1995. Banja Luka was about to fall. Ten days more would have decided the fate of Brcko.

Answering the Dayton question requires imagining what would happen with RS secession. My guess is that the RS sooner rather than later will try to take over Brcko, because it can’t survive intact without the northeast Bosnian town that links its two wings.

The EUFOR troops responsible for preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity lack the capability to prevent an RS takeover. It is not clear whether forces loyal to the Sarajevo government would be able to do so. That is a vital factor. If they can, then the RS will suffer a terminal defeat and a new negotiation for a more functional constitution would become feasible.

If Sarajevo can’t prevent an RS takeover of Brcko, the RS could secede but the World Bank, IMF, Western governments and investors would cut it off, forcing it into bankruptcy and further into the arms of Russia and Serbia. That would be a source of Schadenfreude for some, but it is not what I would call a winning wicket.

Win win

Far better would be an outcome that blocks secession but still forces a renegotiation of the Dayton agreements. The West should bankrupt the RS before it secedes rather than after. All Western assistance to the RS should come to a halt until all RS moves towards secession, including its law negating the authority of the Bosnian Constitutional Court, are reversed. That would open an opportunity for a rescue effort, executed through Sarajevo, on condition that the constitution be renegotiated.

The EU and US would need to insist on a new constitution that eliminates the elaborate powersharing arrangements in the Dayton version. One person one vote and strong protection for individual political and economic rights are the ideal. But a new constitution should also provide strong protection for group rights when it comes to education, language, religion, and culture. I might prefer a constitution that eliminates the two entities and cantons in the Federation, but that is for Bosnians to decide.