The path to ending the Kosovo conundrum
With apologies for the delay and thanks to Adam DuBard for getting it done, I am posting the report my students presented on Zoom Tuesday: Ending the Kosovo Conundrum (it is also now available on the SAIS website here). While our SAISers offered lots of interesting ideas about ways in which the EU-sponsored Belgrade/Pristina dialogue could be improved, they are not optimistic about the kind of comprehensive solution that the EU says is the objective of its Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. There is a stalemate, but it is hurting Kosovo more than Serbia, which is prepared to postpone–maybe forever–recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state.
This is understandable. Serbian President Vucic does not welcome the kind of rule of law and uncorrupt government the EU is demanding ever more insistently from potential new member states. Serbia got everything it asked for from Kosovo in the UN’s Ahtisaari Plan, which was intended as a prelude to Kosovo’s independence. Belgrade pocketed the concessions but refused recognition, even after the International Court of Justice advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law. Without the EU “carrot,” which Vucic is now disdaining, there is little hope of his changing his mind. Good neighborly relations are not going to be written on Vucic’s epitaph.
This leaves Kosovo in limbo, but not without a course of action: NATO membership is the key next step. This will require convincing four of the five EU countries that do not recognize Kosovo at least to accept it into the Alliance. Greece, Slovakia, Romania, and Spain are the holdouts, more or less in ascending order of difficulty. Cyprus is not a NATO member but cannot be entirely ignored because of its influence on Greece. That is the tail wagging the dog and will require a courageous Greek Prime Minister to get it to stop, but Greece already maintains an ambassadorial-level representative in Pristina and an office that is an embassy in all but name.
Kosovo is slated to complete the transformation of its security forces, a few of which have already deployed to Kuwait with the Iowa National Guard, into an army by 2027, with assistance from the US and UK. So there is ample time for the US and UK to convince the non-recognizing allies to accept Kosovo, even if they do not formally recognize it. NATO membership will require in addition that Kosovo meet the Alliance’s criteria:
a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority
populations; a commitment to resolve conflicts peacefully; an ability and willingness to make a military
contribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutions.
These criteria are entirely compatible with EU membership, which is further off because Kosovo will have to in addition adopt and implement the acquis communautaire, an elaborate and extensive set of legal requirements.
This then is the strategy I would propose for the Kosovo government:
- focus on preparation for NATO membership, including resolution of conflicts with Serbia on issues like missing people and financial settlements but without expecting recognition anytime soon;
- improve relations with the Kosovo Serb community, whose interests are not identical with Belgrade’s, throughout Kosovo, including by providing it with access to the dialogue with Serbia for those who are not tied to Belgrade, better economic opportunities, protection of property rights, and continued efforts to recruit Serbs for the Kosovo armed forces;
- disavow any prospect of union with Albania, because it is incompatible with NATO membership, as Ed Joseph suggests;
- build capable state institutions, including a Defense Ministry committed to civilian control;
- protect media freedom, continue cooperation with civil society, and ensure an independent judiciary;
- begin to examine objectively the pre-independence fight for liberation from Serbian rule.
Many Kosovo Albanians are disappointed in the fruits of their efforts since declaring independence in 2008. But the distance ahead to NATO membership is far shorter than the time since independence. The government now has what should be a stable majority. Sovereignty depends on governing capacity. It is time to intensify efforts to build a worthy state, leaving the question of Serbian recognition to the day there is leadership in Belgrade that really cares about EU membership and realizes its own European future depends on it. Because it does.
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Stevenson’s army, May 19
-WH is letting it be known that Biden was tougher in call to Netanyahu than he has been in public. NYT says this is a Biden pattern. Politico says US officials claim they blocked ground invasion.
-Axios says Biden will waive NordStream 2 sanctions.
– European Parliament is freezing investment deal with China.
– Lobbyist’s delight: NYT says bipartisan bill for science investments to counter China is becoming vehicle for grabbag of special projects.
-Newsweek says US has 60,000-person force of undercover operators doing “signature reduction.”
-Reports: CFR has new study of major power rivalry in Africa. Georgetown group says AI can power disinformation operations.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, May 18
Sally Quinn says there’s not much left of the DC social scene.
Dan Drezner explains the lack of leaks from the Biden WH
Politico says DOD may keep Trump boost in DOD psyops.
Administration approves new arms for Israel, probably too late for Congress to block.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Israel may win the war but lose strategic high ground
It’s been hard to write more about Gaza, both because I’ve been busy with professorial responsibilities this week and because so much has already been said. But a few points merit reiteration:
- The fighting is not really about Gaza. Israeli moves against Palestinians in East Jerusalem and on the Haram al Sharif triggered the Hamas rocket barrages. Hamas gains by claiming the mantle of resistance in Jerusalem. Netanyahu gains by creating an emergency situation that may give him another lease on the prime ministry.
- American influence is marginal. Biden doesn’t want to leave his right flank open to Republican criticism. Washington doesn’t talk with Hamas but may exert some pressure via Qatar or Egypt. Having paid a price in international opinion, Israel will want to meet its military objectives before stopping.
- Israeli measures to minimize civilian casualties are grossly insufficient. Some think they target civilians. I can’t really say they don’t, but it is also possible the damage is collateral. They do warn before bombing civilian structures, but Gaza is such a densely populated place even the best-intentioned belligerent would likely kill civilians. The bombing of Hamas’ underground tunnels in populated areas ensures that above-ground structures will collapse.
- The fighting inside Israel between Arab and Jewish citizens is new and important. The center of gravity of this conflict has moved from Gaza and the West Bank to Israel inside the Green Line and East Jerusalem. The successful Israeli efforts to mitigate threat by fencing off the former cannot be applied to the latter. Only ethnic cleansing will rid Israel of its own Palestinian population. That is precisely what Netanyahu and his extremist supporters want to do.
- The Palestinian Authority and the Gulf States are more irrelevant than ever. Mahmoud Abbas disappointed Palestinians by postponing long-postponed elections. Pleased to see Hamas hammered, the Gulf states have failed to use their new-found relations with Israel to protect Palestinians. Iran will gain sway with Palestinians for its support of resistance.
- The fighting has undermined American support for Israel. Already in trouble with Democrats because of his blatant preference for the Republicans, Netanyahu has managed to provoke even stalwart backers to object to what Israel is doing in Gaza. Biden gave Netanyahu lots of room to maneuver, but even he is now insisting on a ceasefire.
- Liberal American Jews (that’s most of us) are fed up. They don’t like Hamas but also do not want to support an Israel that causes dozens of civilian casualties in Gaza every day, treats Jewish and Arab citizens differently, attacks worshippers on the Temple Mount, and coddles right-wing Jewish supremacist thugs.
Israel will benefit from destroying Hamas leadership, infrastructure, and hardware in Gaza, but most of the points above suggest that the political terrain is shifting against Netanyahu, if not Israel per se. Things will not be the same after this war: Palestinian citizens of Israel, liberal Jews in the US, Democratic leadership in the White House and congress, Gulf states, and others will have shifted their sympathies noticeably in the Palestinian direction, even if not towards Hamas.
There is no sign of a similar shift inside Israel. Netanyahu’s buildup of siege mentality among its Jewish citizens has worked well in his favor. Hamas’ rockets help. The gulf between Israeli Jewish public opinion and the rest of the world is widening. Israel may win the war but lose strategic high ground.
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Stevenson’s army, May 17
– Jonathan Swan of Axios has Politishocking story of how, right after the election, President Trump used his personnel office to prepare a memo ordering US troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Somalia, Germany, Iraq & Syria by January 20. The memo, never shown to NSA O’Brien or WH Counsel Cipollone, was sent to newly installed acting SecDef Miller. Pushback from O’Brien and CJCS Milley led to a meeting where Trump agreed to less drastic withdrawals.
-NYT reports that Biden, in private meetings, is often deliberative, temperamental, demanding of information, slow to decide. Sounds pretty normal to me.
-Politico questions whether Biden has too many Special Envoys.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Peace Picks | May 17 – May 21
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream
1. Migration and Displacement in Libya: Converging Challenges and Pathways Forward | May 18, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Speakers
Mohamed Abu Araba: Program Manager, Bawader Foundation
Malak Edoudi: Livelihoods officer, Danish Refugee Council
Mohamed Hmouma: Program manager, Almotawaset Organization for Migration and Relief
Mohamed Saad: Lecturer, faculty in Chemical Engineering, University of Sirte
Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux (moderator): Director and co-founder, NAPI
This event will feature several of NAPI’s Young Policy Leaders and NAPI affiliates, who will discuss their research on the impact of migration and forced displacement in Libya. There are currently an estimated 12.4 million displaced people across the MENA region: a tremendous humanitarian emergency that is compounded by various environmental and governance factors. In Libya, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) accounted for 245,000 IDPs in February 2021, and over 620,000 returnees since 2016. Together, they make up close to 900,000 displaced Libyans in five years, which is approximately 14% of the Libyan population. In addition to IDPs, IOM tracked 576,000 migrants in Libya in February 2021, although these do not include migrants in movement and those in the hands of people traffickers. The speakers’ research spans intersections such as the economic recovery of people impacted by conflict, the state of migrant detention centers, the rights of migrant workers, the experiences of IDPs in establishing livelihoods, and the connection between climate change and displacement.
2. The Marine Corps and the future of warfare | May 18, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Speakers
Gen. David H. Berger: Commandant, Marine Corps
Michael E. O’Hanlon (moderator): Director of Research, Foreign Policy
The Marine Corps is pursuing significant changes to address the realities of great power competition, including implementing a new force design. Evolving technology, uncertainty about the budgetary and fiscal environment, and accelerating innovation by America’s emerging competitors have forced the Marine Corps to adapt by reconfiguring itself to better address the nation’s future defense outlook. Much work, though, remains to be done. On May 18, Foreign Policy at Brookings will host Commandant of the Marine Corps General David H. Berger to discuss Marine Corps modernization, the budgetary environment, and the challenges of great power competition.
3. After the pandemic: Health security and multilateralism at work | May 19, 2021 | 8:00 AM – 9:30 AM ET | European Council on Foreign Relations | Register Here
Speakers
Werner Baumann: CEO, Bayer
Gunilla Carlsson: Vice-Chair, Global Fund Strategy Committee
Sergio Dompé: President of Dompé Farmaceutici
Anthony Dworkin: Research Director and Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR
Alessandro Speciale (moderator): Rome Bureau Chief, Bloomberg
The covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the vulnerabilities of an interconnected world, but it has also created a new sense of urgency behind the need for multilateral action, which has been shown to be directly connected to the health and well-being of individuals in every country.
4. What is the road ahead for Colombia? | May 19, 2021 | 9:30 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
Speakers
Adriana Mejía Hernández: Vice Minister of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Colombia
Jason Marczak (moderator): Director, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council
Amid the third peak of the pandemic, over 400,000 people took to the streets in Colombia to protest a now-withdrawn tax-reform bill proposed by the government to address the country’s economic crisis. In some cities, protests were permeated by criminal acts, vandalism, and blockades. What steps is the Colombian government taking to address social and political tensions? How will Colombia stabilize its fiscal deficit and public debt? How can the United States support its longstanding ally at this critical moment?
5. Yezidis in Iraq & Syria: Genocide, Recovery & Geopolitical Challenges | May 19, 2021 | 1:00 PM – 2:30 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Speakers
James F. Jeffrey: Chair, Middle East Program
Amy Austin Holmes: Public policy fellow, Harvard University
Pari Ibrahim: Executive Director, Free Yazidi Foundation
Murad Ismael: President, Sinjar Academy
Nadine Maenza: Commissioner, US Commission on International Religious Freedom
Merissa Khurma (moderator): Program Director, Middle East Program
The Biden Administration must develop policies for Iraq and Syria that prioritize Yezidi and minority rights and must ensure that Yezidis do not suffer persecution and further marginalization even after the military defeat of ISIS. This panel will discuss the challenges and opportunities for Yezidis, the geopolitical terrain, and possible paths forward for the United States.
6. Economic Security of the Black Sea Region: Internal and External Challenges | May 19, 2021 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Speakers
Altay Atli: Founder, Atli Global
The emerging market economies of the Black Sea – including Turkey, Ukraine, and Georgia – are facing significant economic challenges, amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic. Such challenges are impacting the overall security of these countries, and the security of the wider region. The Middle East Institute’s (MEI) Frontier Europe Initiative is pleased to host a panel event to explore these challenges. What are the internal economic dynamics of Turkey, Ukraine, and Georgia? How can they adequately manage a post-pandemic recovery, both as individual states and through cooperation with regional neighbors?
7. Calibrated Resistance: The Political Dynamics of Iran’s Nuclear Policymaking under Trump | May 20, 2021 | 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM ET | Belfer Center | Register Here
Speakers
Abolghasem Bayyenat: Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow
Drawing parallel with domestic and international conditions leading to the successful conclusion of the JCPOA in 2015, this research seeks to put Iran’s nuclear policymaking during the Trump administration into perspective and explain why Iran pursued the strategy of calibrated resistance, how this strategy became possible, and why alternative policies became unthinkable or impossible.
8. Elections and crises in Somalia and Ethiopia | May 20, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Speakers
Abdirahmen Aynte: Co-Founder, Laasfort Consulting Group
Bronwen Morrison: Senior Director, Dexis Consulting Group
Lidet Tadesse: Policy Officer, European Centre for Development Policy Management
Vanda Felbab-Brown (moderator): Director, Initiative on Non-State Actors
For over a year, Somalia and Ethiopia have faced severe crises in governance and security. As Ethiopia heads into elections in early June, the Tigray insurrection against the central government has metamorphosed into an entrenched insurgency, even as external powers such as Eritrea have reinforced the Ethiopian military. Dangerous tensions have also escalated between Ethiopia and Sudan. In Somalia, an effort by President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed to delay presidential and parliamentary elections and extend his rule has brought the country to the edge of a civil war. Intersecting with complex rivalries in the Red Sea region and the Middle East, tensions between Somalia’s federal government and federal member states risk wiping out a decade of stabilization efforts. Meanwhile, the terrorist group al-Shabab has been growing stronger over the past four years. On May 20, Foreign Policy at Brookings will convene a panel to discuss these internal crises, their regional complexities and repercussions, and June elections in Ethiopia and Somaliland — a state within Somalia. After their remarks, panelists will take questions from the audience.
9. The Role of Integrated Air and Missile Defense for Strategic Deterrence | May 21, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:15 AM ET | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
Speakers
LTG Daniel Karbler: Commander, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
Tom Karako: Senior Fellow, International Security Program and Director, Missile Defense Project
Please join the CSIS Missile Defense Project on Friday, May 21 for a conversation on the U.S. Army’s space and air and missile defense plans with Lieutenant General Daniel Karbler, Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command.
10. After Navalny’s Arrest: Whither the Russian Opposition | May 21, 2021 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here
Speakers
Leonid Volkov: Head, Network of Regional Headquarters for Alexei Navalny
Matthew Rojansky (moderator): Director, Kennan Institute
The return to Russia and subsequent imprisonment of Alexei Navalny represents a possible turning point in Russian domestic politics. Navalny’s reappearance on the Russian stage sparked a series of large protests and a predictable sharp reaction from authorities. Can the opposition remain organized and united in light of this crackdown, or will Putin’s authoritarian turn be sufficient to maintain his grip on power?
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