Live from Cairo: tomorrow is Egypt’s big day
Rashad Mahmood, an American currently living in Cairo, sent me this dispatch today (mostly drafted yesterday):
Looking at the big picture, I think one can trace the current protests to two events. There is obviously the example of Tunisia which showed that protests and demonstrations were a viable means of changing the status quo. Less appreciated is the impact of the last round of parliamentary elections in November. In the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections, the government had provided an opening, convincing many of the more apathetic members of society that Egypt was on track for slow but steady reform, which suited them fine. However, after the 2010 round of elections, which resulted in the complete domination of the NDP, it became clear that the government was once again clamping down, and that any hope of a gradual transition to some form of democracy was dead.
I hate to invoke the cliched talk with a taxi driver, but here I go. On my way in to work Wednesday I asked the driver what he thought of the protests on the 25th. He said they were like a flower. They had blossomed, but would now go away. “What did they accomplish?” he asked. I was in almost total agreement. Although they had been the largest protests probably since the 1970s, it seemed likely that until a new flash-point came, they would have no lasting impact. Now, I’m not so sure.
At my work, people who had earlier told me they would never consider voting because of how useless it is were avidly following news of the protests. One colleague from a fairly wealthy family was out in the thick of things, and had a friend of his shot in the leg with some kind of bullet. Meanwhile, another colleague said that she had better things to do than waste her time with demonstrations. Perhaps the most enthusiastic was one of the security guards, whose Facebook page had been filled with news of Tunisia in the last couple weeks. When asked if he was out on the streets he said, “Of COURSE I didn’t protest,” with a not-so-subtle wink and a look towards the security camera recording the lobby.
The government response to the second day of protest seemed almost schizophrenic. The Foreign Ministry put out a statement affirming the right of the protesters to express themselves, while early Wednesday the Ministry of Interior declared that no further protests would be allowed. Despite this statement, the 26th saw smaller protests continue throughout Cairo, and especially in surrounding cities. While hard factual reporting out of Suez is hard to come by, the fact that at least four protesters have been killed highlights the more confrontational attitude that security forces have pursued there. There was even one report on Facebook that the police station was burned down by demonstrators. On Tuesday, they banned Twitter (and continue to do so) while today they took down Facebook for a few hours.
In the political arena, the most interesting development is the Wafd party’s calls for a national unity government. As Issandr Al-Amrani at the Arabist blog and the Middle East Institute’s Michael Dunn observe, it is possible that this is in some way on behalf of the government, noting that the presidency remains untouched in their demands. However, like everything else, it is too soon to tell what is really going on. A few conclusions can be drawn.
1. The regime today is significantly less stable and confident than it was two days ago. Even though the protests today were smaller, the government reaction showed how worried they were. For much of the day the Sadat metro station, which is the Tahrir square stop, was being bypassed by trains, even though it is one of the two transfer points for Cairo’s two metro lines. This had a big impact, and when I took the metro home from work, I heard many people talking about the protests that might not have if they hadn’t had to change their route home.
2. The number of people willing to go into the streets is much higher than previously thought, and there is broad support. Perhaps most surprisingly, there was significant coordination of protests outside of Cairo and Alexandria, which is extremely rare.
3. What role for the Muslim Brotherhood? They have been very coy, initially calling for its members to refrain from participating in the protests on the 25th, but then saying individuals could participate without the organizations endorsement. It seems that they were caught by surprise as well, and are not sure how to react. A popular revolution to sweep Mubarak from power was definitely not in their plans for a gradual, growing role in the politics of the country.
4. Class divisions don’t matter as much as they used to. Egypt is a very atomized society in many ways, with huge gulfs between the elite, the upper middle class, the middle class, and the roughly 60% of the country that lives on less than $2 per day (mostly in the rural areas). Most of the protesters seen on Youtube or on the news were not protesting out of any personal economic need for increased food subsidies, but for a more democratic society, and removal of the emergency law which gives the government almost unlimited powers.
5. The period of relatively robust economic liberalization is over for now, which may slow down economic growth (and eventually come back to bite the regime). There had been much talk about reducing the extremely expensive energy subsidies in the next year, but clearly that will not happen now. The stock market ended down over 6% on the 27th, and the Egyptian pound reached a 6-year low versus the dollar on Monday. If the protests continue, the many investors that just a few days ago were enthusiastically touting Egypt may begin to look elsewhere.
So when will we know more? Friday. There are calls for massive protests after Friday prayers, which is traditionally when it is easier to mobilize people, since it is the first day of the weekend. If there is an even larger turnout than we saw on Tuesday, which is certainly possible, anything is in play: a Tunisia-style month of protests leading to an eventual unseating of Mubarak, or brutal suppression of dissent and a period of quiet.
If things do calm down again, there are several potential flash points that it will be important to watch. The NDP has still not officially named their presidential candidate for the September 2011 presidential elections. When they do, and if it is either Hosni Mubarak or his son Gamal, as is widely expected, look to see a revival of the protests. One friend whose father works for the government said that he thinks the scale of the protests means that the NDP will have to put forward a new candidate to at least pretend to reform. Other demands of the protesters could be met. Egypt currently spends around LE 13 billion on food subsidies, which it could easily increase without completely blowing a hole in its budget, although it would pay for it with an increased deficit, which it has been trying desperately to curb.
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Pristina and Belgrade need to move ahead
The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly has adopted a vigorous but reasonable resolution calling for a serious investigation of organ trafficking and inhuman treatment in the aftermath of the NATO/Serbia war. While I had concerns about the uncaveated and incautious way in which Council of Europe rapporteur Dick Marty presented his allegations, it seems to me appropriate that EULEX, the European Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, be charged with determining the facts, bringing any charges that may be appropriate in Kosovo, and ensuring the protection of witnesses.
At the same time, the re-run of elections in some Kosovo municipalities has apparently confirmed Hashim Thaci, accused in Marty’s report of directing the organ trafficking operation, as the winner of Kosovo’s parliamentary poll. To govern, he will need to form a majority governing coalition that includes Serbs and other minorities as well as at least one other Albanian political party. Kosovo Albanian voters appear disinclined to block Thaci from a new mandate because of the organ trafficking allegations, though his political rivals may well try to unseat him by forming an alternative majority.
In some societies, Thaci would be expected to resign while being investigated, but the more usual practice in my experience is to continue in office unless an indictment (a formal charge) is brought to court. I imagine that is what Thaci will do, though I hasten to add that I have not been in touch with him and believe that the decision on this issue belongs entirely to Kosovars, whose interests are most immediately at stake, not internationals.
The question is whether Thaci’s remaining in office will weaken Kosovo’s negotiating position vis-a-vis Serbia in the talks on practical issues that the General Assembly has called for, and that the EU is prepared to facilitate. Belgrade has said it is still prepared to meet with Thaci, but that doesn’t mean it is a good idea from the Kosovar perspective.
If the talks were best held at a political level, I would have doubts. But that is not the case. Pristina and Belgrade need to focus in the first instance on issues that are likely to be best dealt with below the political level. Looming in the background there will always be the issue of status, which the Kosovars regard as resolved in favor of independence and sovereignty but the Serbs would like to re-open, at least for the northern municipalities that they control.
The distance between a practical issue and a status issue is rarely more than a sentence or two. It would of course resolve a lot of things if Belgrade were to accept the facts and recognize Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state, albeit one in which Serbs have legitimate interests. But Belgrade is not going to do that, so the best we can hope for is some confidence-building progress on other issues. That can be achieved at the technical level, often between officials in the respective administrations.
Of course some might argue that miscreants may be present at that level as well, but that is true for both sides. It seems to me that if Albanian Kosovars are prepared to meet with Serbian officials, Serbian officials should be prepared to meet with Kosovan officials, whatever their ethnic group. It is time to get things moving, before Belgrade begins to get distracted by its own electoral cycle.
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A charm of powerful trouble
That’s Shakespeare’s description of the witches’ brew in Macbeth, but it seems apt for what may be brewing in parts of the Arab world these days. Today’s big demonstrations in Egypt aiming to spook President Mubarak and derail his effort to give the presidency to his son follow closely on yesterday’s naming of a Lebanese prime minister (albeit a wealthy, Sunni one) by Hizbollah. We need hardly mention the uprising in Tunisia, whose outcome is still in doubt despite (or maybe because of) the vows of the army chief to defend the popular will. And the pot may still boil over in Algeria or Libya.
To me, there is nothing surprising about people discovering the will to rebel and overthrow oppressive or unrepresentative political systems, however difficult to predict it may be.
What is interesting to watch is the differentiated reaction to events in the West. How is what’s happening in Lebanon less democratic than what’s happening in Tunisia? You’d think from Washington’s reaction that the devil himself had ceased power in Beirut, when all that has happened is naming of a government that can gain a majority in parliament. Hizbollah is not a legitimate democratic political party, since it runs its own army and terrorist cells as well as social services. But does anyone doubt it would be successful politically in Lebanon even without its military dimension?
Washington’s enthusiasm for popular revolt in Tunisia, which otherwise doesn’t count for much in the West, is palpable. We rarely send an Assistant Secretary of State off to ensure free and fair elections in the aftermath of a popular revolt. You’d think we hadn’t spent several decades helping former President Ben Ali avoid the popular will. But I guess there is little else you can do when your man has fled the country. I do hope however that we are keeping an eye on the army chief and trying to ensure that he protects, rather than expropriates, the popular will.
Egypt is a different case altogether. You can watch one tidbit that demonstrates considerable police discipline, and somewhat less than complete determination on the demonstrator side, here:
The blogotwittersphere may be enthusiastic, and critical of Al Jazeera for downplaying today’s events. But official Washington is not going to welcome in Egypt anything like what happened in Tunisia. I do hope however that President Obama will find the gumption to tell President Mubarak that the legitimacy of the succession depends in large part on how open and fair the process is. How it is handled will determine more than anything else whether the result is “Like a hell-broth boil and bubble,” or something more like a democratic opening in the Arab world.
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Israelis are from Chelm
It is going to be really hard to say anything new or interesting about the Palestine Papers released by Al Jazeera. The Guardian gives a clear and concise video account of what it believes it has found in them–and they’ve had more time to read them than anyone else besides AJ.
Matt Duss has an admirable, and admirably short, piece at the Wonk Room, emphasizing how the leaked papers demonstrate the overbearing strength of the Israelis (supported by the U.S.) and the weakness of the Palestinians, which will now be exacerbated because the publication of the papers will embarrass the Palestinian Authority and empower Hamas.
And Michael Collins Dunn at the Middle East Institute graces us with this bit of good common sense: “I suspect the key is going to be finding out not just what’s in the headlines but what the documents actually say.”
Of course the problem is that by the time serious people figure out what the papers actually say others will have exploited them for journalistic and diplomatic purposes, making what they actually say pretty much irrelevant.
So here is my quick take: the papers tell us more about the Israelis than about the Palestinians. They demonstrate what we already knew and commented on, namely that the Israelis have a lot better alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). But that is only true in the near term.
In the long term, not only are we all dead, but in the next generation or the one after that there will no longer a Jewish majority in the territory Israel governs, unless a separate Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and Gaza. This is how I put it in November:
Continuing to build Jewish settlements in the West Bank is making it hard to picture a viable two-state solution. Netanyahu says he wants the Arabs to accept Israel as a Jewish state, but his pursuit of his BATNA is putting the country into a demographic trap: the more settlements he builds, the harder it gets to picture a viable Palestinian state, which is an indispensable component of a two-state solution, and the more likely it gets that Israel/Palestine will end up as a single state, which eventually won’t have a Jewish majority.
So Israel and Palestine are careening towards an outcome neither wants, with leadership on the Israeli side that doesn’t want to take the risks required to prevent it and leadership on the Palestinian side that lacks any means to prevent it. Slo-mo train wreck.
So in a way, the papers show an Israeli leadership that, though strong, is not bold and is therefore losing in the longer term a game in which it is dominant in the shorter term. Surely if I knew my Chelm stories well, I’d be able to dredge one up at this point to demonstrate the point through Jewish folklore, in which the residents of Chelm think of themselves as smart but do foolish, self-defeating things. Instead I grabbed this one from Wikipedia:
One Jewish Chelm resident bought a fish on Friday in order to cook it for Sabbath. He put the live fish underneath his coat and the fish slapped his face with his tail. He went to the Chelm court to submit a charge and the court sentenced the fish to death by drowning.
Anyone notice the resemblance to the Israeli negotiators?
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Adult supervision needed
The New York Times reports that President Karzai has agreed to convene Parliament Wednesday, after making a genuine mess of things by trying to get changes made in the results of last September’s elections. Somehow I have a feeling we have not heard the last of this story, but even thus far it tells us something about Afghanistan.
The President had good reason to be unhappy with the outcome of the September parliamentary elections: due to insecurity in the parts of the country where they live, Pashtuns are underrepresented, especially in Ghazni province, and some of his favorites did not get in. The last parliament had become increasingly aggressive in questioning ministers, claiming it had ultimate responsibility for constitutional interpretation, and in general exercising some oversight of the executive branch. This is not fun for any president, especially one who lacks a strong power base of his own and is fighting a counter-insurgency war with allies he regards as fickle while he tries to negotiate a political settlement with the enemy. A little support in parliament would be nice.
What Karzai tried to do was use a panel of judges he appointed expressly for the purpose to outflank the internationally supported electoral commissions that were supposed to have final say on the election results. Normally I might cheer a president who is feisty enough to tell the internationals where to go, but that would not have been the appropriate reaction in this instance. It is hard always to credit the rule of law arguments (“integrity of the electoral process” and all that) my colleagues make, but every once in a while something is so blatantly abusive that we should, if only because the Afghans who did vote are entitled to the parliament they voted for.
So what does this story tell us about Afghanistan? It tells us that the international intervention there needs to maintain its vigilance and act when necessary to counterbalance abuses.
But it also tells us that the Afghans have their own balancing mechanisms–President Karzai apparently backed down after a very long lunch with the people elected to the new parliament, who had been threatening to open their session without him. Maybe, just maybe, the adult supervision that is needed can come in the future a bit more from Afghans than from the foreigners.
We’ve got our own politicians to keep on the straight and narrow. As well as an ex-spy and his friends to rein in.
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Darkest hour before dawn, or just a flop?
Laura Rozen reports in detail on the failure to make progress on nuclear issues in the P5+1 talks with Iran in Istanbul. The press will no doubt say this is a flop.
I certainly wouldn’t argue it is success, but note the absence of more threatened sanctions, the “open door” to further, unscheduled discussions, and the updated fuel swap proposal left on the table for the Iranians to take back to Tehran. This smells to me like the beginning of a negotiation, not the end of one, at least on the P5 end.
The sticking point seems to be recognition of Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium. This is a complicated legal issue that I won’t pretend to elucidate. Suffice it to say that I don’t know of any country that has given up enrichment technology once it has acquired it, even if it may have stopped enrichment or limited its extent. We may not worry anymore about Brazil or Japan acquiring nuclear weapons, but it is not because they have given up their enrichment technology.
Iran won’t either–that is quite clear. The P5+1 are trying to finesse this issue with the avowedly pragmatic swap agreement, which would remove stocks of enriched uranium from Iran and limit the extent of enrichment. But the Iranians are wanting an acknowledgment of their “right” to enrich even as they give up the enriched material. This doesn’t strike me as an insoluble problem–and it has appeared in the recent past that Hillary Clinton was flexible on the issue.
That said, the P5+1 will want to be certain that Iran has seriously abandoned its nuclear weapons program before agreeing, either explicitly or implicitly, to Iran’s continuing to enrich. That would require more intrusive inspections and a more serious statement by Tehran of its commitment. Other countries have moved in this direction–Argentina, Brazil, Libya and South Africa are not such bad analogues.
It is impossible to be hopeful that Tehran will go in their direction. Two factors weigh heavily in the direction of keeping the Iranian nuclear weapons option open: a fragmented but nationalist political leadership that makes it difficult for any one component to compromise without being sharply criticized by others; real regional incentives to gain the power and prestige that some think would accrue to Iran as a nuclear weapons state, or even as a potential nuclear weapon state.
Tehran also had reason to be belligerent and recalcitrant during this particular meeting. The murders of its nuclear scientists, the apparently successful Stuxnet attack on its centrifuges, and Israel’s apparent assessment that Iran would not be able to get nuclear weapons until 2015 have combined to lessen the likelihood of a military attack.
That said I doubt this is the end of the negotiations. Too much is at stake for Iran, Israel and the P5. Before reaching any solid conclusion, let’s wait for Acting Foreign Minister Salehi’s reaction to what the Iranian delegation brings back from Istanbul.
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