Tag: Balkans
Bear apparent
The Russian role in the Balkans has long been of great concern to some of my Western-oriented friends there, even though it arouses little interest in Washington, DC. Milan Marinković tries to explain why it is important:
Russian Ambassador to Serbia Aleksandr Konuzin is chiefly known for incidents he occasionally makes. His public warnings to Belgrade as to the consequences Serbia will face should it dare to join NATO no longer raise eyebrows.
The more aggressive stance Konuzin takes, the more popularity he wins among Serbs. At a recent pre-election convention of the Serbian progressive party (SNS), Konuzin was a guest together with several Western diplomats. Even though SNS declares itself pro-EU, the party stalwarts booed the Westerners in attendance but greeted Konuzin with a standing ovation.
According to opinion polls, SNS is the most popular party in Serbia and the main rival to the currently ruling Democratic party (DS) of President Boris Tadic in the forthcoming elections. SNS’s possible rise to power could afford the Kremlin an opportunity to further increase its influence in Serbian politics.
Serbia hopes to benefit from the risky tactic of balancing between Moscow and Brussels. In 2008 Belgrade sold its oil monopoly NIS to Russian state-owned behemoth GAZPROM – many believe in return for Russia’s support on Kosovo. Whatever was behind the decision, the transaction has allowed Moscow to pursue its interests in Serbia more assertively.
The monopoly in energy supplies is one of several levers Russia has at its disposal. Others include various historical ties between the two nations, most notably religious and cultural ones. Serbia is dubbed “little Russia” in the Balkans. Russophilia is widespread among Serbs, which facilitates lobbying for Russia’s interests. The most active pro-Kremlin lobbyists in Serbia are senior officials of conservative nationalist parties along with several prominent members of the dominant faction within Serbian Orthodox Church – by far the most influential (nominally) non-governmental institution in the country.
At this point, Serbia is not counted among top priorities of Russian foreign policy. Russia plans to expand its sphere of influence in concentric circles. Moscow is currently looking to consolidate its power in the former Soviet Union’s periphery in order to set the stage for a prospective “Eurasian union.”
The second phase of Russia’s geopolitical expansion would involve ex-member states of the Warsaw Pact from Central and Eastern European. Serbia – and Balkans in general – most likely are scheduled for the third round. Until then, the Kremlin will seek to maintain the level of influence it already has in Serbia and will not hesitate to augment it whenever an opportunity presents itself. Keeping Serbia out of NATO is a vital part of this strategy.
The natural counterbalance to Russian power in the Balkans is Turkey. The two countries already compete in Bosnia. Belgrade and Ankara have significantly strengthened bilateral relations in recent years, as Serbia wants to attract Turkish investment. Pro-Russian circles in Serbia vehemently oppose Turco-Serbian rapprochement as harmful to Serbia’s national interests.
Russia’s Balkan aspirations could be undermined by the country’s internal constraints. Moscow is already facing serious challenges, such as growing discontent over corruption and social inequalities, as well as seething Islamist militancy in the Caucasus region. Whether Russia will manage to regain its old glory and continue to expand its influence in the Balkans largely depends on how it deals with its own domestic issues.
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Own goal
I wrote a few weeks ago from Belgrade that “nationalism has the edge.” Milan Marinković, who lives in Niš, Serbia, writes that in Bosnia the situation is even more concerning, given its multi-ethnic/confessional fabric. Separation of religion and state there is an imperative:
Is secularism achievable in the Western Balkans? In former Yugoslavia it was. On paper, it still is. The constitutions of the states that emerged from Yugoslavia prescribe that religion should be kept separate from state affairs. But in real life the separation is difficult to put into effect.
A strong tendency of religious institutions in the Balkans to meddle in politics is understandable. For most of the region’s history, religion played a crucial role both in building and hardening ethnic (aka “national”) identities.
Since the fall of the Berlin wall, religion has significantly contributed to the upsurge of aggressive ethnic nationalism throughout the region. From the nationalist standpoint that prevails among South Slavs, in order to be recognized as a “true” member of a nation (aka ethnic group), one must belong to the relevant religious denomination. Accordingly, a Serb can be Serb only if he or she is Orthodox Christian; a Croat can be Croat only if she or he is Catholic; a Bosniak can be Bosniak only if he or she is Muslim.
This conception of national identity as rooted in religion served the purposes of political and religious elites during the wars of 1990s. There has been little change since then. Today it guarantees Serb parties votes from Serbs, Muslim parties votes from Muslims and Croat parties votes from Croats. There might be limited political competition within ethnic groups, but “nationalist” parties would prefer no competition between them.
The rigid ethno-religious concept is now a major obstacle to reconciliation among the formerly belligerent groups. The only apparent solution in a state like Bosnia, where there are three “constituent” peoples (Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs), is separation of religion and state: secularization, in a word.
In Bosnian elementary schools, as well as in Serbian and Croatian ones, religious education is a voluntary subject, but the grades children receive are calculated into their overall score at the end of a school year together with the grades in compulsory subjects. The former education minister of Sarajevo canton, Emir Suljagić, found this practice to be unjust to the children who did not attend religious education.
Not surprisingly, Suljagić is a member of Bosnia’s Social Democratic Party, which prides itself on multiethnic appeal, even if the bulk of its votes come from people who regard themselves as Bosniaks. More surprisingly, he lost thirteen family members murdered at Srebrenica in 1995, when Serb forces overwhelmed the Eastern Bosnia town and killed thousands of Bosniak men and boys.
Suljagić ’s intention was not to eliminate religious education from the schools, though he certainly could have attempted that. He only tried to establish a rule that would have put an end to unequal treatment of non-religious students, who do not attend religious instruction. But the wrath of Bosnia’s Islamic community leadership and radical Islamists forced Suljagić to resign and leave the country following a series of death threats to him and his family.
What happened to Emir Suljagić demonstrates how strong resistance to secularization is in Bosnia. Worse than that, it shows the inability – some even believe unwillingness – of Bosnian police to protect the safety of a state official – let alone an ordinary person.
In an attempt to justify his secessionist ambitions, the president of the Serb-dominated half of Bosnia, Milorad Dodik, often accuses Bosniaks of trying to make Bosnia an Islamic state. Top clerics of the Islamic community of Bosnia, led by Reis Effendi Mustafa Cerić, like to portray themselves as the “ultimate guardians” of the Bosnian state. Unfortunately, this tends to prove Dodik’s point, as does hounding Suljagić from office.
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A rose is a rose
Gertrude Stein might just as well have said “Macedonia is Macedonia.” The trouble is, the Greeks don’t like to hear it.
This is one of the least interesting problems resulting from the breakup of former Yugoslavia. Its “Republic of Macedonia,” one of six republics that constituted Socialist Yugoslavia, became independent in 1991. But Greece, its neighbor to the south, objected to the use of “Macedonia,” claiming that appellation belongs exclusively to Greece and its use by the northern neighbor implied territorial claims to Greek territory. The newly independent country entered the United Nations as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (last time I was there it was alphabetized under “T” on the voting board at the UN General Assembly).
Athens and Skopje signed an “interim accord” in 1995 supposedly regulating the issue, but Greece claims Macedonia (oops, The FYROM) has violated it while the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided last December that Greece had definitely violated it by blocking The FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. There is an opportunity to correct this injustice at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May. Efforts to resolve the issue have been ongoing since the early 1990s in UN-sponsored talks, mediated since 1994 by New York lawyer Matt Nimetz.
Macedonia already has a pretty good deal on the name issue. Just about everyone calls the country by the name Skopje prefers, and many countries (including the U.S.) have formally recognized it as the “Republic of Macedonia.” Greece does not, but why should anyone care about that?
The unfortunate answer is that Athens can veto Skopje’s membership in NATO as well as any further progress towards membership in the EU. Macedonia is already a candidate for EU membership but hasn’t got a date for the start of negotiations, which is an important milestone that Athens is holding hostage.
NATO membership is also important to Macedonia, which counts itself as part of the West and has deployed troops to Afghanistan under NATO command. Alliance membership is a goal sought by both Albanians (who constitute about one-quarter of the population) and Macedonians. It also, by the way, should end any lingering Greek fears of irredentist claims to its territory by Skopje.
The problem for Macedonia is the veto, not the name. While there is virtue in continuing the effort to resolve the name issue, it might be wise for Skopje to stop pounding on Matt Nimetz’s door this spring for a solution to a problem Athens has but Skopje does not. Skopje needs to go directly to Athens and mount a serious effort to convince Greece to allow it into NATO under the interim accord as The FYROM. The ICJ decision requires nothing less.
A Macedonian joked with me recently that he would personally push a statue of Alexander the Great that has offended Greek sensibilities from Skopje to the Greek border if Athens would allow Macedonia into NATO in Chicago. I doubt Athens is interested in the statue, but the joke points in the right direction. Skopje needs to find out what Athens needs that Macedonia can provide. If the government won’t discuss the issue of NATO membership, then Macedonia should find thinktanks and academics in Greece who will.
At the same time Skopje should be working with the Macedonian and Albanian American communities to make sure that the mayor of Chicago, once right hand to President Obama, raises this issue with the White House. So far it is studiously avowing support for Skopje but doing nothing to pry open the NATO door. Vice President Biden, when he was a senator, opposed use of “Macedonia,” which is too bad since he holds the Balkans portfolio.
Greece is vulnerable at the moment because of its parlous financial situation, but no one in Brussels or Washington wants to kick Athens while it is down. Greek Americans are well-organized and an important voting constituency. Macedonia has a “stick” it can’t really use. It needs to find some other way to put the squeeze on, or “carrots” that are attractive enough in Athens to open the NATO door. Then they can go back to not resolving the name issue at the UN for another 15 years or so, by which time everyone will have forgotten why it once seemed important.
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You decide who was responsible
So far as I can tell, these materials are not readily available in English:
1. A press release from the the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies on the appointment of General Ljubiša Diković as Serbian armed forces chief of staff.
2. The related dossier from the Humanitarian Law Center.
I am making them generally available here. Read for yourself. Whatever you conclude about Diković’s personal responsibility, the dossier is a reminder of how Slobodan Milosevic conducted the war in Kosovo in 1999. The press release raises the question of whether those who commanded then should be given major responsibilities now:
CEAS hopes that representatives of the western international community, who formally expect from Serbia to actively participate in processes of regional reconciliation and cooperation will adopt positions consistent with these touchstones and make clear to President Tadić that Gen. Diković in the role of Serbia’s Chief of Staff would be problematic. If this does not happen, it will again illustrate their willingness to subvert their credibility for expediency, undermining their own long-term interest in Serbia’s full democratization.
Both organizations raising these questions are Belgrade-based. Their courage is an inspiration.
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The longer you wait, the higher the price
The 3.5 (sometimes called four) Serb-majority municipalities of northern Kosovo are under Belgrade’s control, not Pristina’s. Milan Marinković writes from Niš:
The February 14-15 referendum in four Serb-dominated municipalities in northern Kosovo is approaching. People will be asked whether they accept the state institutions of Kosovo, headquartered in Pristina and dominated by Albanians. An overwhelming “no” vote seems assured. Its potential implications may be damaging: it could alienate Belgrade further from Europe and make it more difficult for Pristina to establish even nominal authority in the north, strengthening Kosovar Albanian nationalists and reducing the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the disputed territory.
Political leaders of the northern Serbs fear the “parallel” institutions they control might be dismantled in response to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s demand to Serbian authorities last summer. They see the referendum as a way to make these institutions more legitimate and thus fortify their own political position. The referendum could also block effective law enforcement in the north, where organized crime groups have exploited the situation to develop a highly profitable smuggling network.
With Serbia’s own spring parliamentary elections in sight and candidacy for the European Union still uncertain, the referendum could not come at a worse time for the Serbian government. Serb politicians in northern Kosovo who receive their salaries from Belgrade are now ignoring Belgrade’s appeals. On top of that, within the ruling coalition there are several factions with different approaches to how the problem of Kosovo should be dealt with. Serbian President Boris Tadić is expected to have the final word.
He and his Democratic Party (DS) are hoping Serbia will get EU candidacy so that they can win back credibility among the pro-Western part of the electorate. Somehow meeting Merkel’s demands, or nullifying them, is vital. But most of those who voted for Tadić and DS in the last elections because of their European agenda feel betrayed to such an extent that candidacy alone could hardly allay their disappointment.
At the same time, the ongoing crisis in the European Union gives rise to euro-skepticism, which the anti-European opposition parties in Serbia exploit. They insist that Serbia must give up on the European integration process, arguing that the EU sooner or later is going to dissolve. This anti-EU rhetoric is being increasingly met with approval in Serbia today.
President Tadić has limited options. He can continue what he is already doing–calling publicly on the local Serb leaders to abstain from the referendum–but that presumably will not be enough to persuade leading EU countries to reward Serbia with candidate status, unless the northern Kosovo Serbs unexpectedly decide to acquiesce to his request.
Belgrade could also threaten to stop funding the parallel institutions in the north should the referendum be held. While this would be welcomed by the West, it is hard to imagine such a radical shift in Belgrade’s policy on a “national” issue amid a pre-election campaign given the political risks it would entail.
Judging by previous experiences, whatever President Tadić chooses to do, he will wait until the last minute. What he would like most is to somehow preserve the status quo until after the election, but that could well prove to be infeasible. Serbia has so far missed several opportunities to adjust its policy on Kosovo to reality. And the longer you hesitate to do the inevitable, the higher is the price you pay in the end.
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Belgrade has to bite the bullet
I could quibble about details in the ICG’s latest report on Kosovo and Serbia. It minimizes Belgrade’s role in north Kosovo too much, it is too critical of the EU’s current posture on candidacy for Serbia, and it fails to take adequately into account the political pressure Albin Kurti is generating inside Kosovo. I disagree with ICG’s advocacy of “Ahtisaari plus,” a rubric guaranteed to face rejection in Pristina and lead eventually to partition. “Ahtisaari implementation” is a better approach.
But I won’t quibble. This is a good report full of interesting details and basically sound analysis, with some good policy conclusions. A little good will would go a long way, and good will is absolutely necessary. The problem in north Kosovo will not be solved until there is solid cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina as well as decent rapport between Pristina and the Serbs in the north. These are main messages of the report, and they are correct.
None of it is likely to happen any time soon. The referendum February 14-15 in the north on acceptance of the Pristina-based institutions will further poison an already toxic political environment. So too will Serbia’s spring parliamentary elections, especially (as ICG notes) the effort to hold them in Serb-majority areas of Kosovo. Albanian firebrand Albin Kurti will no doubt find a way to embarrass Prime Minister Hashim Thaci for not preventing the referendum and elections from happening. Northerners will continue to block routes and prevent implementation of the EU-sponsored customs agreement, unless Belgrade makes a truly concerted effort to cut them off.
ICG is at pains to suggest that Germany, the Netherlands and the UK should ease up a bit on their conditions for Serbia’s EU candidacy. My guess is that won’t happen. None of those countries is particularly anxious to proceed apace with EU enlargement. All have reasons to want to demonstrate to their domestic constituencies that they are prepared to play hard ball and not lower the bar for EU candidacy. And Serbia’s refusal to allow proper customs collection at its boundary/border with Kosovo is a serious disqualification for candidacy. A bit more consistency in the EU approach would be helpful, but I don’t think that is really the heart of the problem.
ICG has it right when it says the fundamental issue is sovereignty. This is the bullet Belgrade has to bite. It doesn’t have to recognize Kosovo or establish diplomatic relations, but it has to accept the fact that the Pristina institutions are the legitimate governing authority on the entire, undivided territory of Kosovo. As ICG quite rightly points out, Serbia cannot otherwise continue to appeal to Security Council resolution 1244, which has no provision for dividing authority and no provision for continuing the presence in Kosovo of Serbian institutions.
This does not mean that Pristina would or could govern the Serbs in the north, who under the Ahtisaari plan that Pristina has accepted have ample room for self-governance. No doubt there will be some need for additional implementation agreements to reassure the northerners that money will flow to them from Belgrade without interference and that they will get fair treatment in Pristina-based institutions, especially the courts. These are legitimate concerns that Pristina should be prepared to discuss, provided the sovereignty question is resolved.
Until Belgrade is prepared to acknowledge that it has lost the right to station security forces or other state institutions anywhere in Kosovo without Pristina’s permission, I fear we won’t see much good will or the good things it could produce. But I am glad ICG, which I have criticized sharply in the past for its reports on Bosnia, has given me good reason to offer props this time.
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