Tag: European Union
Taking score of the GCC at 40: better on economics than politics
On 05/27, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) celebrated this weeks’ 40 year anniversary of the founding of the Gulf Cooperation Council by discussing the organization’s origins, achievements, and future challenges. A Eurocentric approach to the GCC yields few results. The member states’ and region’s different dynamics make an EU benchmark counterproductive. Nonetheless, the panel agreed that this anniversary should be an opportunity to reconsider and renew the GCC’s Charter and mission. The GCC’s achievements are many. As the recent inter-GCC conflict showed, however, it faces serious challenges for the future too.
The speakers were:
Abdullah Baabood
Chair of the State of Qatar for Islamic Area Studies & Visiting Professor
School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University
Matteo Legrenzi
Professor of International Relations
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice
Emma Soubrier
Visiting Scholar
Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
Kristin Smith Diwan
Senior Resident Scholar
Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
The GCC’s origins: no ‘Gulf-EU’
Matteo Legrenzi thinks it is important to acknowledge the different factors that led to the GCC. It is true that worries about Iran were a key reason. However, Gulf cooperation had been on the rise since independence from the UK in the 1970s. Furthermore, the GCC was intended to keep Iraq out, as much as it was intended to unite against Iran. Iraq had been seeking inroads in the Gulf in the context of its Arab nationalist leadership aspirations. Keeping Iraq out of the GCC was a clear signal in the context of the Iran-Iraq War. Diwan remarked that ironically the GCC’s secretary-general’s speech this week emphasized the efforts underway to involve Iraq in the GCC more. Baabood added that the Arab state system’s instability at the time also contributed to the Gulf’s desire for cooperation. Egypt’s peace with Israel and the Arab League’s outrage at the time put regional security on shaky footings.
Emma Soubrier explained that the GCC never became a regional security system, nor was it intended to. It did achieve a strong Gulf identity alongside the prevailing Arab identity of the time. This succeeded both domestically and internationally. Abdullah Baabood commented that the GCC achieved a tariff and trade union. It managed to become greater than the sum of its parts and outperformed expectations in doing so.
Matteo Legrenzi took some time to emphasize the differences between the GCC and the EU model. The domestic organization of GCC states – where a small ruling class wields absolute power – allows quick action to be taken when leaders agree. However, GCC institutions should not be expected to develop supra-national powers. All countries freely admitted to this from the start. Because of this, certain fields see less cooperation than others. Security and defense are less integrated than trade and economics for this reason.
Facing today’s challenges
The Middle East faces a new security order today. Rather than a post-US order, this is a multipolar order in which the US plays a definite part, according to Soubrier. We should therefore not be afraid to be a little US-centric. The conclusion of the al-Ula agreement (which ended the blockade of Qatar) mere weeks before Biden took office is no coincidence, for example. The conflict surrounding Qatar is a major elephant in the room in the GCC.
Baabood acknowledged that it is unprecedented. Its scope went beyond the political to include the societal and public opinion. It hurt the Khaleeji (Gulf) identity that the GCC had so successfully helped establish. Furthermore, it went directly against the GCC common market, without using any GCC mechanisms for resolving disputes. This seriously harmed the trust the GCC is built upon. Much remains to be restored after al-Ula particularly between Qatar and the UAE. Soubrier did emphasize that the GCC leaves much room for bilateral projects and cooperation. This “integration at different speeds” is one of the GCC’s strengths.
The war in Yemen is another conflict in which the GCC might play a part. However, Legrenzi warned that the GCC should not be expected to play a role in political resolutions. Rather, its strength will be in reconstruction of the Yemeni economy, once the political disputes have been resolved. Yemeni accession to the GCC is unlikely because the monarchical model is central to the GCC.
The future
The panel concluded with discussion of the directions the GCC could and should take in the near future. Soubrier emphasized the need for more human-based security. Humanitarian issues in the region are at a peak and the disconnect between Gulf leaders’ vision and public sentiment – e.g. on the recent Gaza war – shows the need for a new focus. Legrenzi and Baabood agreed that the 40th anniversary would be a good occasion to review the GCC Charter. As Legrenzi noted, the charter is a product of the 1970s and 80s. It is full of language relating to Arab nationalism, making it a historical document rather than a modern guideline. There are some mechanisms and aspirations mentioned in the charter which never came to fruition. The GCC countries should take the opportunity to reassess their vision for the organization. This could reinvigorate the project in the process.
Stevenson’s army, May 25
-WaPo has story of how Joe Biden spends his day.
– SecState Blinken is in the Middle East.
-Iran talks back on.
– Look at the many defense and foreign policy hearings this week.
FT.com has good roundup of European defense activities.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
If you hijack an airplane, you are a hijacker
Belarus’ hijacking of a Ryanair flight crossing its territory in order to arrest a dissident journalist is a quantum jump in contemporary autocratic behavior. No doubt autocratic governments will justify it on the basis of exerting national sovereignty over their own air space. But it endangered close to 200 innocent people and set a precedent for future actions of this sort. The punishment in most countries is life imprisonment or death.
What can be done about Belarus’ perfidy? The objectives should be the freeing of the journalist and making it clear that there is nothing to be gained from state hijacking of aircraft. The US, EU, UK, and other willing countries should engage as quickly as possible with both Minsk and Moscow to determine if there is any possibility of an early release of the journalist and to convey their willingness to take further action if he is not released right away.
That effort may well fail, so here are a few ideas of next steps to pressure Minsk:
- The US, UK, and EU could expand their travel and financial sanctions on regime figures and institutions in Belarus. These could include SWIFT restrictions on transactions involving Belarusan banks.
- They could end EU, World Bank and International Monetary Fund grants, lending, and programs in Belarus.
- They could prevent Belavia, the national airline, from landing on their territory.
- They could recall their ambassadors for consultations, expel Belarusan diplomats, or break diplomatic relations with Minsk.
- They could pledge to detain for questioning about the incident Belarusan officials found on their territory, including but not limited to President Lukashenko (yes, I know heads of state are supposed to have diplomatic immunity).
- They can insist on an investigation by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
While this hijacking was manifestly a threat to peace and security, convening the UN Security Council may not be useful, as Belarus can likely rely on Russia to prevent any serious action there, even a presidential statement. After all, that’s what the US did for Israel just in the past couple of weeks to prevent a statement on the Gaza war.
I am not advocating any of the above options, just pointing them out. The trick is to craft some reasonable combination of them and other ideas. Most important is that the US, EU, and UK act together. If they do, the message will be greatly amplified.
There is a real possibility that this is the beginning of the end of Belarusan independence. Russian President Putin, while nominally backing Lukashenko’s right to do what he did, might take the opportunity to defenestrate him (figuratively if not literally), knowing that the West won’t seriously object under current circumstances. Even before this incident, the Russians were taking over. Why not take advantage of the opportunity to complete the process?
President Biden now faces a second crisis situation he doesn’t want, following on the Hamas/Israel war. He looked reasonably adept in that instance. With Belarus, he should expect the EU to play a stronger role, but he has to be prepared to lead if need be. The world will notice if the West is unable to deal with state hijacking. Let’s see what Biden can do.
Eurovision needs better singers
A few quick comments on yesterday’s Eurovision song contest, which was won by an Italian heavy metal band. Some may think this out of my lane, but the event all too clearly reflected current international realities. San Marino and Australia are represented, but not Kosovo? Israel but not Palestine? No Turkey but Greece and Cyprus voting for each other? No Bosnia, because they haven’t paid their bills? It all sounds very familiar to me.
Then there was language. The hosts said “good evening” in the languages of many countries, but everyone spoke English except, of course, a French presenter. The accents were more American than British. That is understandable in the music world. The Europe Union communicates well in a language that is not native to any of its current members! Like much of the rest of the world.
What isn’t so understandable is how a heavy metal band wins in 2021. During ten years living in Italy I never once listened to heavy metal, which in any case strikes me as a throwback. Did today’s young Europeans really sit at home during the epidemic refining their taste for rock and roll in that direction?
I heard a lot of wonderful music in the 1970s, 80s and 90s in Rome, from Roberto Murolo to Luciano Pavarotti. If you don’t know who Murolo was, here is a sample:
If you don’t know who Pavarotti was, try this:
Neither would have had half a chance at Eurovision, but I guess that is beside the point.
Eurovision isn’t meant to be high art, either folk or operatic. We used to call its category “camp.” I suppose some will hear “Ziiti e Bouni” as “artifice, frivolity, naïve middle-class pretentiousness, and shocking excess,” which Wikipedia tells me is Susan Sontag’s definition of camp:
But it sounds more “noisy and terrible” to me. “Rock and roll will never die” the lead singer shouted when given the award. Or is it already dead?
The path to ending the Kosovo conundrum
With apologies for the delay and thanks to Adam DuBard for getting it done, I am posting the report my students presented on Zoom Tuesday: Ending the Kosovo Conundrum (it is also now available on the SAIS website here). While our SAISers offered lots of interesting ideas about ways in which the EU-sponsored Belgrade/Pristina dialogue could be improved, they are not optimistic about the kind of comprehensive solution that the EU says is the objective of its Belgrade/Pristina dialogue. There is a stalemate, but it is hurting Kosovo more than Serbia, which is prepared to postpone–maybe forever–recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state.
This is understandable. Serbian President Vucic does not welcome the kind of rule of law and uncorrupt government the EU is demanding ever more insistently from potential new member states. Serbia got everything it asked for from Kosovo in the UN’s Ahtisaari Plan, which was intended as a prelude to Kosovo’s independence. Belgrade pocketed the concessions but refused recognition, even after the International Court of Justice advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law. Without the EU “carrot,” which Vucic is now disdaining, there is little hope of his changing his mind. Good neighborly relations are not going to be written on Vucic’s epitaph.
This leaves Kosovo in limbo, but not without a course of action: NATO membership is the key next step. This will require convincing four of the five EU countries that do not recognize Kosovo at least to accept it into the Alliance. Greece, Slovakia, Romania, and Spain are the holdouts, more or less in ascending order of difficulty. Cyprus is not a NATO member but cannot be entirely ignored because of its influence on Greece. That is the tail wagging the dog and will require a courageous Greek Prime Minister to get it to stop, but Greece already maintains an ambassadorial-level representative in Pristina and an office that is an embassy in all but name.
Kosovo is slated to complete the transformation of its security forces, a few of which have already deployed to Kuwait with the Iowa National Guard, into an army by 2027, with assistance from the US and UK. So there is ample time for the US and UK to convince the non-recognizing allies to accept Kosovo, even if they do not formally recognize it. NATO membership will require in addition that Kosovo meet the Alliance’s criteria:
a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority
populations; a commitment to resolve conflicts peacefully; an ability and willingness to make a military
contribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutions.
These criteria are entirely compatible with EU membership, which is further off because Kosovo will have to in addition adopt and implement the acquis communautaire, an elaborate and extensive set of legal requirements.
This then is the strategy I would propose for the Kosovo government:
- focus on preparation for NATO membership, including resolution of conflicts with Serbia on issues like missing people and financial settlements but without expecting recognition anytime soon;
- improve relations with the Kosovo Serb community, whose interests are not identical with Belgrade’s, throughout Kosovo, including by providing it with access to the dialogue with Serbia for those who are not tied to Belgrade, better economic opportunities, protection of property rights, and continued efforts to recruit Serbs for the Kosovo armed forces;
- disavow any prospect of union with Albania, because it is incompatible with NATO membership, as Ed Joseph suggests;
- build capable state institutions, including a Defense Ministry committed to civilian control;
- protect media freedom, continue cooperation with civil society, and ensure an independent judiciary;
- begin to examine objectively the pre-independence fight for liberation from Serbian rule.
Many Kosovo Albanians are disappointed in the fruits of their efforts since declaring independence in 2008. But the distance ahead to NATO membership is far shorter than the time since independence. The government now has what should be a stable majority. Sovereignty depends on governing capacity. It is time to intensify efforts to build a worthy state, leaving the question of Serbian recognition to the day there is leadership in Belgrade that really cares about EU membership and realizes its own European future depends on it. Because it does.
Stevenson’s army, May 19
-WH is letting it be known that Biden was tougher in call to Netanyahu than he has been in public. NYT says this is a Biden pattern. Politico says US officials claim they blocked ground invasion.
-Axios says Biden will waive NordStream 2 sanctions.
– European Parliament is freezing investment deal with China.
– Lobbyist’s delight: NYT says bipartisan bill for science investments to counter China is becoming vehicle for grabbag of special projects.
-Newsweek says US has 60,000-person force of undercover operators doing “signature reduction.”
-Reports: CFR has new study of major power rivalry in Africa. Georgetown group says AI can power disinformation operations.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).