Tag: Russia
Turkey has always lain between East and West
On 11 February, 2021 the Wilson Center held an event to discuss a new book by Onur Isci, Turkey and the Soviet Union during World War II: Diplomacy, Discord and International Relations. This book is a reinterpretation of Turkish diplomacy in World War II (WWII) and Cold War era and details the deterioration of relations between Turkey and Russia. Co-panelists Suzy Hansen and James Ryan discuss the relevance to the way the West views Turkey today.
Speakers:
Christian F. Ostermann (moderator): Director, History and Public Policy Program, Wilson Center
Onur Isci: Assistant Professor, Bilkent University
Suzy Hansen: Author, New York Times
James Ryan: Assistant Director, Center for Near Eastern Studies, NYU
Turkey abandoned World War II neutrality
Onur Isci discussed Turkey’s role in World War II. Where other scholars have argued that Turkey played and exploited its neutral position, Isci argues otherwise, noting that Turkey pursued survival rather than strategic positioning. The downfall of Turkey’s relationship with Moscow came when Turkey targeted a Soviet reconnaissance plane that crashed in March 1943. Fear of an imminent Soviet threat emerged at the forefront of Turkish politics, shifting Turkey’s focus towards strengthened Transatlantic partnership.
In response to a question that Ryan posed to Isci, he noted that Turkey was constrained by their neutrality and they ultimately paid the price for it. By amplifying their fear of the Soviet Union they chose a path that was no longer neutral in order to position themselves more closely with the West.
Looking to the Past in Discussing the Present
Ryan emphasized that the idea that Turkey has a natural alliance with the West, particularly with the United States, is a myth. This can clearly be seen today and will influence how Turkey’s future political and diplomatic choices play out.
Many Americans view Turkey during the Cold War as an adamant and strong Western ally. Hansen agrees that this is not the case. A focus on Turkey’s historic relationship with Russia is pivotal to the understanding of modern day events. Isci suggests that the recent declassification of many documents has allowed scholars to gain access to government archives from the post-WWII and Cold War era, drastically shifting knowledge on Turkey and it’s foreign policy. The relationship between Turkey and Russia has been tumultuous at many points over the last century, but both countries have been cautious. Even at points when tensions have been at their peak, they have never gone to war.
Isci, Hansen and Ryan all argued that the history of Turkey is neither black nor white. Viewing Turkey as either pro-West or pro-Russia is a mistake that fails to recognize the nuances of Turkish history and its relationship with both the West and Russia.
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The problem no one really wants to solve
Ten years after its internal conflict started, Elizabeth Thompson of American University hosted a panel on what the the Biden Administration might be able to do about Syria. Conditions there are dire. US policy has been disappointing. What can a new president do to establish a legitimate government able to rebuild? Mustafa Gurbuz, also of American University, moderated.
Hadeel Oueis of BBC Arabic reminded what has gone wrong in Syria. The Assad regime responded brutally to protests, which pushed them in the the direction of militarization and Islamicization, as militia groups and Islamists had advantages in financing and organization. Peaceful change was quickly ruled out. Today, the best prospects are in the Northeast, where the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control security and the autonomous administration governs in a decentralized way, with strong participation by women as well as checks and balances.
Amy Austin Holmes of the Council on Foreign Relations suggested we don’t know what to expect from Biden about Syria specifically, a subject neither he nor his people have addressed except for humanitarian imperatives, but if he wants to reclaim US credibility and moral authority bold steps are needed on three issues concerning vulnerable people:
- ISIS still a big problem, especially at the Al Hol camp. Washington should take back its own citizens from there for trial in the US and establish a timeline for other countries to take back theirs.
- Christians and Yezidis still under threat. Hundreds of thousands have fled the Turkish intervention in northern Syria intervention and should be enabled to return home.
- Kurds, and in particular Kurdish women, have been excluded from diplomatic talks on Syria. They play strong roles in northeastern Syria in both the SDF forces and in the civilian autonomous administration. Biden has given women important roles in his own cabinet, and it has been demonstrated repeatedly that women’s participation in peace talks leads to improved outcomes.
US forces are likely to remain in northeastern Syria to work by, with, and through the SDF, which has demonstrated significant capacity to overcome Arab/Kurdish tensions.
Dafne McCurdy of CSIS underlined that Syria will not be a top priority for Biden but that its humanitarian crisis ranks high, especially with Samantha Power at USAID. The situation is dire, but the US can have a positive impact because it is the biggest donor. It will need to focus on two priorities:
- Renewal of cross-border assistance in western Syria: The UN Security Council will vote in July on whether to keep open the one remaining authorized border crossing for aid to Idlib. If it fails to do so, the US may still be able to use nongovernmental organizations to ship aid across the border, but not at the scale that the UN is capable of.
- Reform of aid to regime-controlled areas, which Assad has used to reward supporters.
Humanitarian aid is not political, but stabilization assistance is, especially in an area of geopolitical competition. The US needs to buttress local authorities who stand up to outside meddling. But US goals have not been clear, because they are limited to one part of Syria and therefore disconnected from a nation-wide strategy. President Trump’s erratic policy did not allow stabilization to play its proper role in geopolitical competition.
Aaron Stein of the Foreign Policy Research Institute agreed that Syria is not a high priority for the Biden administration. The Syrian opposition won’t be a strong factor in its decisionmaking. The main issues will be humanitarian assistance and counter-terrorism. Washington needs to be talking with the Russians, who are in a strong position in Syria. Sanctions work to impoverish the Syrian regime, but they have been ineffective in producing a sustained political outcome. Some eventual sanctions relief in exchange for release of political prisoners is a possibility. The proliferation of arms and the large numbers of fighters will be problems for many years.
Idlib is essentially a stalemate, with Russia and the regime on one side and Turkey on the other, along with the HTS al Qaeda offshoot who are trying to soften their image. The best outcome is the status quo from the US perspective, but it leaves the US dependent on designated terrorist groups in both northwestern (HTS) and northeastern Syria (the PKK, which is the core of the SDF). The US is stuck with bad options.
Joshua Landis, University of Oklahoma, views Assad as having won militarily, as he now controls 65-70% of Syria’s territory but he wants it all. Washington wants political change and has used aid as a tool to feed the opposition as much as regime has used it against the opposition. Assad will focus in the immediate future not on Idlib, which is hard, but on northeastern Syria, because it is a soft spot. He may go after Tanf, which is important to trade links with Iraq and Iran. The Syrian people are pawns in larger geopolitical struggle
Trump used Turkey against Iran and Russia, thus limiting what Assad could do in the north. Biden is likely to be less friendly to Turkey but won’t want to undermine the Turks in Syria. Some Americans are talking about a federal Syria, with Idlib and the northeast remaining outside Damascus’ control as the US presses for regime change there. But in the end the big issues for the Americans are pulling Turkey out of Russia’s orbit and dealing with Iran. Biden might toughen on Iran in Syria because of the nuclear deal, where he will need to soften.
Bottom line: Syria is not a problem Washington will focus on, as there are no good solutions. But they are likely to keep troops there. If the Americans were to withdraw, the Kurds would be sitting ducks and would have to make a deal with Damascus. Their civilian and military organizations would crumble. At least now in the northeast there is a military command under a civilian government. In the northwest, military and Islamist forces rule under Turkish control.
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Stevenson’s army, February 10
– NYT says Israeli intelligence reports it would take 2 years for Iran to build nuclear weapons, given recent problems.
– Army Times sees great danger from drones. Defense One suggests ways to counter them.
– Politico says SecDef Austin is hiring talented civilians.
– Defense One urges rethinking our various national stockpiles.
-AEI analyst has good summary of US ideas about China.
– EU diplomat humiliated by Russians.
– NYT says many in France say American “woke leftism” threatens French culture & society.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Requiem for Syria, but some hope for US diplomacy
Pro-democracy protests began in Syria nearly 10 years ago. In response, the government escalated violence, which sparked the Syrian civil war. The subsequent humanitarian catastrophe has killed almost half a million people and displaced an estimated 12 million others.
On February 4, Brookings Distinguished Fellow Itamar Rabinovich and Carmit Valensi, research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, discussed their new book, Syrian Requiem, which details the long-developing divisions in Syrian politics, surveys the various actors who fought in Syria directly or through proxies, and examines the policy choices that the conflict currently presents to the United States and others. The speakers at the event are listed below:
Speakers:
Susan Maloney: Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy
Steven Heydemann (moderator): Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy
Itamar Rabinovich: Distinguished Fellow, Foreign Policy
Carmit Valensi: Research Fellow and Syria Program Manager, Institute for National Security Studies
Origins of the Crisis
Both structural and proximate factors have contributed to the ongoing crisis in Syria. Rabinovich identified flaws in US foreign policy under both Obama and Trump as some of the key proximate causes for the depth of the crisis in Syria. In particular, he argued that Obama’s refusal to arm the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in 2012 and 2013 severely hampered the opposition’s ability to combat the regime. Jouejati similarly identified the failure to arm the FSA as a critical mistake, while also arguing that Obama should have responded more forcefully when Assad crossed his infamous red line regarding the use of chemical weapons. Jouejati pointed to this sign of weakness as a clear signal to Russia that the US would allow Moscow free reign in Syria to dictate the outcome of events.
Rabinovich also noted several structural factors that he believes will continue to generate instability in Syria. First, the artificial borders originating from the notorious Sykes-Picot agreement have created an inherently flawed state. Second, the autocratic nature of the Syrian state under Assad will continue to foster reciprocal resistance and violence. Valensi pointed to Assad’s continued use of violence and repression in reclaimed territory, as well as his focus on strengthening the state security apparatus prior to reconstruction, as evidence that the Assad regime will continue to engender opposition.
Assad’s Prospects
With substantial support from Russia and Iran, Assad has made significant military advances since 2015. However, all of the panelists believe that Assad’s prospects for consolidating control over the country remain dim. Valensi points to three key signs that Assad will struggle to bring the entire country back into the fold. First, even after the military successes of the past few years, Assad still only controls 60% of the territory. Second, both his military success and his ability to maintain control over conquered territory is largely predicated on either physical or monetary support from Russia and Iran. Should that support begin to wane, Assad’s ability to control territory will diminish. Finally, Assad does not have the resources to reconstruct the country, and both Russia and Iran are unlikely to have the necessary capacity or willingness to provide enough financial support.
Jouejati added another critical sign of Assad’s long-term instability. The COVID-19 pandemic and the collapse of the Lebanese economy have severely exacerbated the economic crisis in Syria. Even in the heart of regime-controlled territory, state subsidies for bread have decreased and people complain of long lines for fuel. As a result, Assad is currently witnessing a worrying decline in support from even his most loyal followers.
Paths Forward
The multitude of stressors on the Assad regime suggests that the US may have some leverage to promote an end to the Syrian civil war. However, while all of the panelists believed that the US has more leverage in Syria than has commonly been acknowledged, they differed on precisely where the US should apply pressure. In particular, the panelists debated which actor is the most promising for asserting influence on the Assad regime. Valensi argued that the new Biden administration should attempt to boost the UN diplomatic process through UN Resolution 2254, despite Heydemann’s critique of the UN process as the example of “zombie diplomacy” par excellence. Jouejati favored US support of a Russian-led diplomatic process, arguing that Russia has indicated a softening of its support for Assad. Heydemann, however, expressed concern that Russia has sent these signals before without ever in fact wavering in its support for the Assad regime.
However, the panelists did agree that the limited US military presence remaining in Syria provides significantly more leverage than many people have recognized. However, they did not advocate for a more expansive military presence, instead arguing that even limited presence and military action can be used strategically. Valensi pointed to Trump’s limited strikes in response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons as evidence that limited engagement need not necessarily be a prelude to full intervention.
To watch the event in full, please click here.
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America is back, but where and how is not yet clear
President Biden today in two appearances at the State Department–one for the staff and one to address foreign policy–was anxious to say that America is back to diplomacy, to the defense of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and to cooperating with allies. His foreign policy will, he said, benefit Americans, whose security and welfare will be primary goals.
He is clear enough about Russia and China. He’ll be much tougher on the former than Trump, calling out its repression and even murder of dissidents and countering cyberhacking and election interference, while seeking areas of common interest like the already extended limits on strategic nuclear weapons. On China, the policy will be similar to Trump’s in aiming to compete as well as cooperate, but with more attention to human rights and less inclination to trade wars, though the tariffs don’t appear to be coming down yet.
In the Middle East, Biden was clear about one thing: he wants a negotiated end to the war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen and will cut off American support to the Saudis and Emiratis. So much materiel has already been transferred that this make take some time to have a logistical impact, but the psychological impact will be immediate. The Hadi government the Saudis and Emiratis have backed is going to have to cut a deal or step aside so someone else can. It is unclear what the Houthis will be willing to yield, as they currently have the upper hand in much of the fighting, but we’ll find out soon enough.
Biden has also made it clear he is prepared to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Nuclear Deal) if Tehran does likewise. But the sequencing of the respective returns, and precisely what they amount to in terms of sanctions relief and nuclear reversal, are still unclear. So is any future nuclear agenda: the Iranians have so far refused widening, deepening, or prolonging the JCPOA.
On the rest of the Middle East, Biden has left things unclear. He has said little or nothing about:
- Syria, where the US still has forces pursuing ISIS, protecting oil wells, and cooperating with Kurdish-led insurgents regarded as terrorists by NATO ally Turkey,
- Palestine, though he has renewed diplomatic contacts with the Palestinian Authority and will presumably return to the two-state goal Trump tried to obliterate,
- Iraq, where US forces were drawn down to 2500 by his predecessor,
- Libya, where the UN has been making some apparent progress on ending the civil war.
- Egypt, where President Sisi has imposed a renewed autocracy at least as ferocious as either of his two immediate predecessors.
Each of these countries is at least as important to the United States as Yemen, but it is unclear what “America is back” means to them. Americans are tired of these longstanding messes, whose resolution is hard to tie directly to American security and welfare, even if we know that withdrawal from them could be costly.
America is really good at getting in, especially if can be done with warplanes and troops. It is much harder to get out, which requires diplomacy. But at least we now have a president who believes in diplomacy and is prepared to back America’s diplomats.
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Navalny is in prison but his video is free
This 2-hour flood of facts and photos from Alexei Navalny (subtitled in English) reveals the sources and disposition of Vladimir Putin’s enormous wealth. It has already been watched by more than 80 million people. Are you one of them?
Hard to add much, especially as Russia is beyond my expertise. But I do hope that Navalny is right that voting can still un-do this mega-theft. Many Russians are already taking to the streets to protest against his arrest:
What will Washington and Brussels do?
Added February 2: Only denunciations so far, but here is Navalny today in court, where he was sentenced to more than two years in prison for parole violations, some while he was outside Russia recovering from President Putin’s nerve poison attempt to assassinate him:
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