Tag: sectarianism
Nationalism is rising, but sectarianism won’t fade quickly
The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) June 9 organized a discussion on issues of nationalism and sectarianism in the Middle East. The Sectarianism, Proxies & De-sectarianization project (SEPAD) co-organized; its director Simon Mabon joined the panel as an expert on Saudi Arabia. Together with two experts on Lebanon and Iraq, respectively, he assessed the state of sectarianism and nationalist projects in these three countries. Iraq and Lebanon are experiencing grassroots protest movements to overcome sectarianism while Saudi Arabia is seeing a major top-down drive through the Vision 2030 project spearheaded by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). Should these be understood as attempts to let national identity overcome sectarianism in politics? If so, can we expect them to be successful? The panel agreed that these issues are unlikely to be solved quickly or by MbS’s preferred economic means, but a clear shift in political thinking is occurring in the younger generations.
The speakers were:
Geneive Abdo
Visiting Fellow
AGSIW
Simon Mabon
Chair in International Politics
Lancaster University
Director
Richardson Institute
Director
SEPAD
Maha Yahya
Director
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Kristin Smith Diwan (moderator)
Senior Resident Scholar
AGSIW
Two protest movements and one grand vision
As Simon Mabon explained, SEPAD analyzes the events in the modern Middle East and tests the theory that secularist national identities are replacing sectarian political identities. The focus for his talk lay on the three countries Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. As Abdo and Yahya indicated, Lebanon and Iraq are experiencing major protest movements that attack the corruption, lack of accountability, and cronyism in their countries. Both have democratic systems that reserve political positions and parliamentary representation to specific sectarian groups. In practice, as Yahya said, this “turned the relationship between individuals and their state into one that is mediated by sectarian community.” The political system has become a way to divide the cake among power brokers, who in Lebanon are referred to as ‘mafia’.
The protest movements in both of these countries self-identify as secular. As Abdo underlined, Iraqi protesters are overwhelmingly Shia and use Shia religious symbolism (such as references to the martyrdom of Shia Imam Hussein) in their demonstrations. Moreover, the Shia clergy in Iraq openly supports and collaborates with the protest movement. In this younger generation there is a clear division between personal religious identity and political identity. It is in the latter that desectarianization has occurred. Furthermore, the protesters emphasize that their agenda is issue-based.
Maha Yahya noted that Lebanon differs. The current protests go beyond clear-cut issues (such as the Whatsapp-tax that triggered the current protest movement) and aim at a complete overhaul of the sectarian political system. The individual controversies and issues that abound in Lebanese politics are seen as symptoms of a broken regime.
The situation in Saudi Arabia might appear unrelated. The Arab Spring saw some demonstrations in the Shia East of the country, but nothing on the scale of the other two countries discussed here. MBS is seeking to transform and modernize his country under his ambitious ‘Vision 2030’ project. Funded by billions of petrodollars, MBS wants to wean Saudi Arabia off its reliance on oil and modernize its economy. His vision includes relaxation of the strict religious laws for economic and political purposes. MBS hopes to transform Saudi citizenship to a secularist, civic nationalism in which both Sunni Wahhabi and Shia groups participate. According to Mabon, the ambitious pace and huge investments that go along with this show that MBS believes he has a ‘magic switch’ that can achieve this transformation of identities.
Sectarianism won’t go away easily
The panel agreed it would be naïve to think that deep-seated sectarian social and political systems will go away quickly. Vision 2030 aims to remove sectarian divisions by offering everyone a seat at the economic table, and therefore a stake in the state. The systems of marginalization and othering cannot be undone with a ‘magic switch’ and some ‘bread and games’, and centuries of repression cannot so easily be erased. Investing hundreds of millions into shopping malls in Shia areas could be seen as tokenism and introduces new issues of gentrification and marginalization along class lines. Nonetheless, a less cynical view could see these as the first steps towards change according to Mabon.
In Lebanon and Iraq, a major obstacle is the lack of unity within the protest movements. Groups and proto-parties are forming, aiming for Iraqi elections planned for October and Lebanese parliamentary elections to come in 2022. However, the grassroots movements have not yet coalesced into clear protest parties. Yahya and Abdo agreed that in both Lebanon and Iraq the political system discourages new parties, and the existing political establishment is unlikely to disappear in one electoral cycle. Yahya is cautiously optimistic in the medium term about the grassroots developments in Lebanon. Abdo indicated that Iraqi proto-parties are also emerging and receiving donations. However, there is a serious debate on whether the protesters should boycott the elections or try to get as many seats as possible. Iraq’s 2018 elections had an official turnout of 44%, although the real number is estimated to have been as low as 20%, meaning that turnout is already a critical issue for the established elite’s legitimacy. Moderator Diwan pointed out that boycotts in the region (such as in Bahrain or Kuwait) haven’t generally been a successful way to challenge entrenched elites.
Watch the recording of the event here:
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The future of the Islamic State
The Atlantic Council March 4 hosted an event to discuss the group’s current activities and prospects of an ISIS resurgence, including the Caliphate’s impact and demise (2014-17), as well as current and future ISIS activities not only within Syria and Iraq but throughout the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
Speakers:
Mohammed Abu Rumman
Expert, Politics and Society Institute; Former Jordanian Minister of Youth and Culture
Borzou Daragahi
Journalist and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Andrew Peek
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council; Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iran and Iraq
Mara Revkin
National Security Law Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center
Banan Malkawi (Moderator)
Jordanian-American Researcher and Lecturer
Resurgence Unlikely:
Moderator Banan Malkawi described the ISIS insurgency as a watershed moment for violent extremism. We need to ask “What are the key expectations for the future of the Islamic State as an organization?” The consensus was that an ISIS resurgence is unlikely, though all the speakers acknowledged the threat that the group still poses within the remote pockets where they continue to operate.
Revkin discussed her experiences doing fieldwork in Iraq, noting that conversations she has had with Iraqis suggest there is no easy way to accurately assess the threat ISIS poses to Iraqi society. Just counting weapons and people involved in ISIS activity will not work without examining the socioeconomic and political environment that the group is operating in today. There are multiple drivers of instability in Iraq, only few of which are directly attributed to ISIS. An ISIS resurgence to their 2014 capacity is nearly impossible because of the violence they committed against Sunni communities. They just don’t have the necessary levels of public support.
Sectarian Divisions and Deal Making:
Peek agreed. The viability of a ISIS resurgence is limited, because Sunni politics is marked by pragmatism and deal making. An ISIS resurgence is more likely to happen in Syria than in Iraq, but the chances of either are still limited as long as the Syrian Democratic Forces (and their partnership with the United States) remains strong. “It is a dark time for Sunnis in the Levant,” he said.
Daragahi explained the structure of ISIS and noted the group thrives in ungoverned areas. Its social media and internet strategy has shifted into darker, more secure corners of the internet. ISIS has had to redirect its thinking and recruitment tactics in order to continue to survive. It exploits failed states, whether in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sub-Saharan Africa or other pockets of the world. Thriving on grievances is how the group has managed to stay alive, albeit in a lowered capacity.
The rise of Salafi jihadism and sectarianism have been the keys to ISIS survival, according to Mohammed Abu Rumman. Some of the theories that have emerged in recent months regarding the group and their external support from partners and governments were shot down by both Daragahi and Rumman. ISIS will continue to operate in ways that ensure its survival, but the group will likely remain self-funded.
The international community and governments that have been working to delegitimize ISIS should continue, as countries such as Iraq and Syria still face threats from the group and feel the residual impact from its time in power.
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