Tag: United States
Hello Kurdistan!
I haven’t actually watched this video of a discussion last Friday with Namo Abulla of Kurdistan’s Al Rudaw and Tzvi Kahn of the Foreign Policy Initiative. I hope it isn’t too far off the mark. Stay tuned also for Stephen Mansfield, discussing his book, The Miracle of the Kurds:
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Scraping the bottom of the barrel
With the likes of Josh Landis predicting more of the same (fragmentation, radicalization, impoverishment, displacement) in Syria, it would be more daring than I am to predict improvement. But it is still interesting to ask what could possibly make a difference and turn things in a more positive direction?
There are two propositions on the table at the moment.
One is the UN-proposed “freeze” for Aleppo. This is intended to be more than a ceasefire. It would freeze the warring forces in place, thus preventing them from simply being redeployed to fight elsewhere, as well as initiate local governance on a cooperative basis between the opposition and the regime. Monitoring would initially have to be local, with international observers deployed in due course. In the absence of effective monitoring, the regime would be likely to use any such freeze to redeploy its forces (including intelligence cadres and paramilitaries) to the south, where the opposition is making headway. It is much harder for the opposition to follow suit, because its fighters generally focus on their home areas and its supply and logistical support is far less developed.
The second proposition is a Russian proposal for intra-Syrian dialogue. This will supposedly convene January 26-28 on the basis of the June 2012 Geneva communique, which calls for an interim governing body with full executive powers. Moscow, Tehran and the Syrian regime view this formula as allowing Bashar al Assad to remain in place and preside over a “national unity” government. The opposition and Washington say it means Bashar has to exit, or at least give up all executive power (which if implemented would mean that he would consequently exit sooner rather than later). There is no sign that this difference of interpretation has been bridged.
Separately, neither of these propositions seems likely to succeed. The Americans and Europeans are allowing both to move along, faute de mieux. The question is whether together they might be more likely to produce some sort of positive outcome.
I’m not seeing it yet. The missing ingredient is enforcement. Only if and when the international community gets together behind a UN Security Council resolution that makes it clear Bashar will suffer irreparable damage to his hold on power will he be willing to countenance a serious ceasefire in Aleppo that blocks him from redeploying his forces. This would require the Americans to be prepared to execute air strikes if there is a violation. As for creation of an interim governing body with full executive powers, enforcement would rely heavily on Russian willingness to cut Bashar’s military and financial supply lines if he transgresses. Putin has given no indication he is prepared to do that. Even if he were, Iranian support might keep Bashar afloat.
This brings us back to the inevitable: there is no diplomatic solution in Syria in the current military situation unless Washington and Moscow come to terms and agree on one, including a mutual commitment to enforcement. They certainly have a common strategic interest in a negotiated settlement. Both capitals want the Islamic State and Jabhat Nusra, the main jihadi extremist organizations, defeated. They differ mainly on whether Bashar al Assad is a bulwark against the jihadis or an important cause of their presence.
Richard Gowan suggests there might be room for the US and Russia to reach a “dodgy” grand bargain based on a trade-off between Ukraine and Syria: Moscow would temper its support for separatists in eastern Ukraine (and get some sanctions relief) in exchange for Washington backing off its demand for Bashar to step down. The trouble with this idea is that Washington has already backed off, because it gives priority to fighting the Islamic State. It might be more likely the other way around: Moscow could back off support for Asad and temper support for separatism in Ukraine in return for Washington allowing some sanctions relief.
Like Russia, Iran props up Asad because it sees him as an ally against Sunni extremism, but Tehran has also needed Asad as a reliable link in the “resistance” chain that it has forged with Hizbollah and Hamas. There is no sign Iran is prepared to abandon Damascus. Even under sanctions and with lower oil prices, Tehran is providing ample men, weapons and financing. A nuclear deal this year would make that easier to sustain, as multilateral sanctions are at least partially lifted.
Freeze, intra-Syrian dialogue, grand bargain: we are scraping the bottom of the barrel. There may be something there that will work, but the odds are not good.
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Tehran’s interest in Havana
Hamid Bayati of the Tehran Times asked me some questions about Cuba. I answered:
Q. After more than 5 decade US end his invade policy toward Cuba, how do you evaluate this event?
A. I think this is a good development. It ends a policy that wasn’t working and raises the odds of a peaceful democratic transition in Cuba, which is very much in the interest of both Cubans and Americans.
Q. US president said the policy to isolate Cuba do not have any specific results but why [doe]s Washington has same policy toward Countries such as Russia, Iran or N. Korea?
A. The Cuba embargo is a unilateral policy. Other countries don’t participate or support it. The sanctions on Russia, Iran and North Korea are widely supported and therefore have a much stronger effect.
Q. Why [do] Republicans in US criticize Obama decision to normalize relation with Cuba?
A. Some Republicans (and some Democrats) see the decision as rewarding the autocratic Castro regime. It certainly will provide the regime with some marginal benefits, but it will also encourage the private sector and relieve a good deal of individual suffering.
Q. Some experts say Obama wants to end his presidency with good events and changing diplomacy toward Cuba happened in this frame, what is your idea on this issue?
A. The President had loosened restrictions on travel and trade with Cuba a great deal already. Normalization of diplomatic relations was a natural next step. It is also a politically savvy one, as younger Cuban Americans strongly support it.
Q. Some experts say the US has been to blame for Cuba’s economic problems, which include crumbling infrastructure, low levels of foreign investment and …. Does this event (new relation between US and Cuba) help Cuba improve economy?
A. It may mean some marginal improvements in the economy, but Cuba’s economic problems are mostly due to its own mismanagement, lack of respect for property rights, restrictions on foreign investment and lack of respect for the rights of Cubans. Until those things change, there won’t be a big change in the economy.
Q. Raúl Castro, Cuba President, said this new relation does not change Cuba old policy especially on socialism, so is it possible we see change in Havana policies in coming years?
A. Everything the Castros do is done in the name of socialism. That is a bit of a joke. Raúl has allowed the growth of a vibrant private sector. That is likely to prevail over the state sector sooner rather than later, but Cubans overwhelmingly want to preserve some aspects of socialism: their free health care and education, for example. That is their right, though it is unclear whether the state will have the resources required.
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Jewish Christmas
The best part of Dan Drezner’s plaint about Gentiles horning in on Jewish Christmas traditions, like going to the movies and eating in Chinese restaurants, is this from Saturday Night Live:
We’ll be having Indian food. All traditions need occasional updating.
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Why ransom is wrong
The United States government does not allow its citizens to negotiate with terrorists who have kidnapped loved ones. Dana Milbank in this morning’s Washington Post criticizes this policy, saying:
…but the hard-line stance clearly hasn’t stopped terrorists from seizing Americans; it means only that these Americans are more likely to die.
This is sloppy thinking, on several grounds.
Extremist groups in the Middle East and worldwide kidnap Americans in far smaller numbers than might be expected, given the country’s prominence in leading efforts against them. There is no reason I know of to imagine that this is anything but the result of the policy against paying ransom. The impact is felt in two ways:
- Americans aware of the policy are more careful about exposing themselves to risk than Europeans and others whose governments do pay ransom.
- Kidnappers know that their likelihood of turning a profit on an American is significantly less than their likelihood of turning a profit on a kidnapped Italian, so they prefer to kidnap Italians.
It may be true that once kidnapped an American is more likely to be killed, but that is a small part of story. It is far more important that Americans are less likely to be kidnapped. That only four of the 23 Islamic State Western captives have been Americans is remarkable. US citizens are being more careful than others and will provide their would-be kidnappers with less benefit.
Milbank makes other sloppy errors as well. He makes no distinction between kidnapped official Americans and private citizens. The cases of negotiated exchanges he refers to all involve official Americans, sent into danger by their government. There is good reason for the US government to treat their cases differently from those of private citizens, who take risks without informing the US government and often against its explicit advice.
I am one of those who has repeatedly ignored US government warnings to travel in conflict zones. I take what precautions seem judicious, consulting widely with people who have traveled recently to the prohibited destination. I also comply with the requirements of whatever organization I am working for. I do this with care, as I have no expectation that my government will ante up or allow my family to do so. If I did have such an expectation, I might be more inclined to take more risks. That is not something you as a tax payer should want me to do.
I hasten to add that it would be difficult, even impossible, for the US government to enforce with criminal penalties its restrictions on families paying ransom. Nor do I know of a case in which they have tried to do so. Some families surely do make an effort to negotiate. But there are precious few cases in which they succeed. Milbank cites only one.
The issue of negotiation is my view distinct from the issue of ransom. The fact is that the US government does talk, when it can do so safely and out of the public eye, with kidnappers. I see no harm in that, so long as it does not convey legitimacy, finances or other benefits to criminal activity. The reason ransom is wrong is that it provides a benefit that incentivizes further kidnapping.
Even discussion of changing the “no ransom” policy is in my view a slippery slope, one that could slide quickly into heightened risks for Americans. We need to be clear and unequivocal about the official policy, even if there are families that manage to circumvent it, talk with the kidnappers, and attempt to pay ransom. Precious few are likely to succeed.
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Accountability and transparency
Accountability and transparency are today part of America’s international mantra. We want war criminals and human rights abusers in Syria, Iraq and North Korea held accountable. We want open government that allows for public participation and collaboration.
There are two problems with this stance.
Those at the receiving end of our preaching are not necessarily keen on changing their governing system so that things can be done openly and collaboratively. This is obvious for Bashar al Assad, who wouldn’t survive a week in the Syria we would like to create. Kim Jong Un might not survive a day in North Korea.
But it is also true for some of our friends. Egypt’s President Sisi is no more keen on transparency and accountability than Assad, except when it comes to his predecessor and the Muslim Brotherhood. Ditto Prime Minister Netanyahu, who blocks serious efforts to look into the conduct of the latest Gaza war and continues to surprise us with settlement initiatives in Jerusalem and the West Bank. The Burmese government we are now finding amiable has done little for transparency and nothing for accountability of the prior military regime, never mind for its own repression against the Rohingya and others.
The more profound problem is us. Whatever you think about the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques or police shootings of unarmed citizens, it is clear we are having a hard time with the idea that anyone should be held accountable if wrong was done, or even with the idea that the proceedings in which such things are decided should be transparent. We decide whether charges should be brought against the police in secret grand jury proceedings. It took years of effort and thousands of excised words to enable the release of the executive summary of the Senate Democrats’ report on a CIA program that clearly made serious errors, even if you believe it also did a lot of good.
Hesitation about accountability and transparency abroad and at home comes from the same source: we and our friends abroad know full well that it will be difficult to get people to do things we might want them to do in the future if we hold them strictly accountable in a transparent way for what their confreres did in the past. President Obama has not made it clear that what many of us regard as torture will never be used again. America’s police don’t want to be told that they have to ask questions first and shoot only when attacked with deadly force. Police unions have actually objected to training intended to teach their members how to de-escalate conflict.
The same is true abroad. Even when dictators are overthrown, their successors may not want strict accountability or even transparency. Iraq’s Prime Minister Maliki did not restore the Saddam Hussein dictatorship, but he was no less keen on security forces that were loyal to him personally. He removed dozens of military and intelligence commanders, replacing them with less professional but intensely loyal officers who proved useless when the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria seized Mosul in June. Brazil has only recently investigated abuses by the military regime that preceded the restoration of democracy there almost thirty years ago. It is not clear that anyone will be held accountable for the abuses.
Most governments treasure stability and order. They need loyal security forces. One of the good reasons for writing strict rules for them is to ensure that they don’t do things we will be hesitant to have see the light of day or hold them accountable for. In the US, it is time for a law prohibiting torture, and a national standard for how to deal with unarmed citizens. If we are going to expect better behavior of others, we need to up our own game.
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