Tag: United States
Stevenson’s army, January 2
– Politico lists the many significant elections coming up in 2024
– Politico’s China watcher details how Xi is maneuvering around those elections
-New poll shows US sees foreign policy as bigger election issue than usual
– Politico says Biden’s trade policy hasn’t worked
-FT says conscription issue is causing rift in Ukrainian politics
– WSJ has wrenching story on destruction in Gaza
I was ill yesterday, so missed posting this New Year edition:
– Israel announces some troop withdrawals from Gaza.
– NYT has long piece with some details of Biden’s 14 calls with Netanyahu and of US advice at various times.
– For 2d time, administration bypassed Congress on weapons to Israel.
– NYT notes many retired officers now work for venture capitalists
– China committee chairman explains plans for 2024
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, December 29
– Sarah Binder explains what happened/didn’t happen in Congress this year
– Axios has word of latest Bibi-Biden phone call
– USA Today has DOD report on extremism in the military2
– Here’s Maine Secretary of State ruling barring Trump from ballot
– UK sends warship to Guyana, Venezuela responds
– WSJ revisits Marine transformation
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Vucic got what he wanted and then some
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s Progressive Party won an absolute majority in national parliamentary elections, with double the vote of the main opposition coalition yesterday. His party also won a plurality in the Belgrade city council. The election was “free” in the sense that all registered citizens could vote, but far from “fair.” The government exploited media control, pressure on voters, abuse of institutions and public functions as well as forged signatures and phantom voters. Elections in Serbia are stolen before election day. Elected autocrats are all the rage these days.
Stronger and more recalcitrant
The new parliament replaces one in which Vučić’s party had only a plurality. He gained that in an election that much of the opposition boycotted. The election thus strengthens his hold on power, which is going eleven years. If it sticks together, the one-quarter of the parliament that the main opposition coalition, Serbia Against Violence, gained will give it a platform for its anti-violence, anti-corruption, anti-inflation messages. But it will not be able to block legislation or exert substantial influence on foreign and defense policy, which is the prerogative of the president.
We can expect ontinuation of Serbia’s current strong lean towards befriending fellow autocrats in Russia, China, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Hungary. While the Progressives ran on a nominally pro-Europe ticket, they have done little to move Serbia closer to the European Union. Instead they have successfully straddled the East/West divide. Vučić pursues a “non-aligned” hedging policy that flirts with both in order to extract valuable concessions from Moscow, Beijing, Brussels, and Washington.
Some might hope Vučić would use his victory to settle Serbia’s conflict with Kosovo and move definitively in the Western direction. That isn’t going to happen. He has locked himself into intransigient opposition. He refuses even to acknowledge Kosovo’s de facto independence. This would be easy to do. He could turn Milan Radoicic, who led a failed terrorist rebellion in northern Kosovo September 24, over to the Pristina authorities. Serbia recognized the validity of their judiciary in the 2013 Brussels agreement that Vučić has been trying to get Pristina to respect. But he won’t do that. Or anything else to make amends for sponsoring a well-equipped armed rebellion intended to lead on to a Serbian military invasion.
Europe and the US will do nothing
The US, UK, and EU could in the aftermath of this flawed election their pressure on Vučić. They say they want Serbia solve its problems with Kosovo, adhere to Ukraine sanctions against Russia, and speed reforms required for EU accession. But the five EU member states that don’t recognize Kosovo will prevent any push on Kosovo issues. Hungary will block any pressure on Russia questions. The EU as a whole is much more concerned with Ukraine and will let Serbia slide.
The Americans are still claiming that they’ve convinced Serbia to embrace the West. This is laughable but no one in Washington these days wants to tell the would-be emperors they have no clothes. They prefer to pretend that agreements Serbia has renounced in writing are legally binding. “They are being written into the requirements for accession” State Department officials like to explain. That is fine with Belgrade, which knows full well accession is a distant horizon, at best.
I might have some hope for the UK, which isn’t committed to the American pipedreams and isn’t constrained any longer by the EU. But London hasn’t been vocal in denouncing Serbia’s current behavior. It is likely shy of offending Brussels and Washington and anxious to protect its own equities in Belgrade.
What’s the then some?
Vučić’s party wasn’t the only one to do well in yesterday’s elections. Some ultra-nationalists and outright pro-Russian parties did too. That gives Vučić an “Après moi, le déluge” argument. If you are not nice to me, look what might come next!
Some in Kosovo might hope that now at least Pristina can be relieved of the “consequences” the EU mistakenly levied in response to its deployment of mayors to municipal buildings and police to northern Kosovo, where they blocked an armed rebellion. We’ll have to wait and see, but I doubt Pristina will get satisfaction. The EU has developed a habit of favoring Serbia that is going to be hard to break. The US is not far behind.
President Vučić has won his cake. Now he’ll eat it. That’s not good news.
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Stevenson’s army, December 18
– Netanyahu brags that he has blocked a Palestinian state.
– Semafor says US is considering attacks on Houthis.
– WSJ says US & Israel knew of Hamas funding but didn’t act.
– David Ignatius reports on the West Bank.
– Critics see problems in DOD drone program
-New NDAA includes provision requiring congressional action to pull out of NATO. [I sympathize with the intent but am unsure of its legality.]
– Lawyers urge SIOP for economic conflict with China
– Atlantic notes history of changing Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases
– On the 250 anniversary of the Boston Tea Party, Smithsonian has history.
Semafor editor suggests these newsletters for following China: Flagship Senior Editor Prashant Rao recommended Sinocism, The Wire China, ChinaTalk, and WSJ China for all your in-depth China-watching needs.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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A Palestinian state yes, recognition now no
A bad idea is making the rounds in discussions of the Gaza war. People I respect are recommending that the United States formally recognize a Palestinian state.
I support the idea of a Palestinian state. But now is not the time for the US to recognize one. Doing so could have catastrophic consequences for President Biden in the 2024 election. Those who want to see him re-elected should lay off this premature idea and focus instead on a ceasefire.
The alleged diplomatic advantages are spurious
It is true that 139 other states have recognized Palestine. But that has made little difference. None of those recognitions has contributed an iota to the welfare of Palestinians or incentivized Israel to negotiate seriously. Nor would US recognition. It would however strain relations with Israel and reduce American leverage on Prime Minister Netanyahu. Even Israelis who want an early end to the Gaza war would not understand American recognition while Gaza is in chaos and the West Bank in nascent rebellion.
American recognition would not, as alleged, convince Palestinians “that the United States is finally matching its talk of peace with meaningful action.” So long Washington continues to veto UN Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire in addition to shipping massive amounts of arms to Israel, Palestinians will rightly perceive that America is supporting their adversary.
US recognition is not required to name an ambassador to deal directly with the Palestinians. Washington had such an ambassador to the Palestinians for decades before President Trump closed the consulate in Jerusalem that housed him. The US should name an envoy and station her in East Jerusalem.
Most Palestinans would not welcome a US effort to bolster the PA. Especially in the West Bank, where the PA has ruled for a long time without any democratic legitimacy. There Palestinians would regard US recognition as helping a decrepit and corrupt entity. Seventy-five per cent of West Bankers support Hamas control of Gaza (twice the percentage of Gazans!). Many Gazans would regard US recognition of the PA under current conditions as laughable, if any are still capable of laughing.
The domestic political consequences could be severe
Support for Israeli military action in the US was only 50% in November. Younger people, people of color, and Democrats are less supportive. A lot of Americans would support a ceasefire, but there is no evidence they would care much about diplomatic recognition.
Moreover, the post-war situation in Gaza will be challenging. Vast amounts of aid will be required even as Hamas remnants continue to create chaos. No one no one will be able to suppress the disorder entirely. If the PA is unable to handle Gaza–and there is no reason to believe it can–then Washington will have put its recognition chip on a losing proposition. Biden, whose approval numbers are low and declining, would not benefit from the perception he had erred. Recognition could provide the Republicans with a forceful critique and sway independents, now evenly split on the Gaza war, in the wrong direction.
The right approach is to await better conditions
Recognition should wait until after the war, renewal of the Palestinian Authority as a democratic entity, a return of relative calm to the West Bank, and relief of the inevitable suffering in Gaza. Once order is restored, recognition should be on the table, but not before. We can hope that by then Israelis will have chased Prime Minister Netanyahu from office and installed a government ready to deal with the renewed PA. That would open the door to recognition without opening the door to Donald Trump.
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A cold shoulder might get more results
This is one of those moments in the Balkans when what is not said is more important than what is said. The Americans and Europeans have so far failed to publish the results of their announced investigations of the September 24 failed Serb uprising in northern Kosovo. On that occasion, Serbia sent a well-armed group to ambush the Kosovo police, killing one officer. The Serbs also tried to draw the police into a firefight at a monastery compound. The perpetrators intended this incident to provide an excuse for Serbian military intervention. Presumbly the goal was to seize the four Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo.
No doubt
There is really no doubt about what happened and why. The only real question is who authorized this terrorist plot. It was either Serbian President Vučić or not. I have no evidence on that issue. But we know that Vučić usually makes all the really important decisions in Belgrade. If he did not make this one, that is only a marginally better reflection on his rule than if he did.
Ever since the failed plot, Vučić has cozied up even more than usual to anti-democratic forces in the region and beyond. His besties lately have included Bosnian secessionist Dodik, Hungarian would-be autocrat Orban, illegitimate Belarusian chief of state Lukashenko, Azerbaijani dictator Aliyev, as well as Russian and Chinese autocrats Putin and Xi. Here is Vučić siding with Putin in Ukraine.
He intends to follow Aliyev’s lead in taking Nagorno-Karabakh back by force. When geopolitical circumstances permit, he will do likewise with Kosovo.
Vučić did belatedly fire his security and information agency chief Vulin. But he did it in response to US sanctions, not the September 24 events. Milan Radojičić, a close political ally of Vučić as well as Kosovo political and criminal kingpin, has taken responsibility for the plot. The authorities arrested but quickly freed him. The courts will take their time getting around to a trial.
Nor should Serbia try him, since his September 24 crimes were committed in Kosovo. He should be handed over to the Pristina authorities.
So why the silence?
Some diplomats will attribute the silence to preoccupation in Washington and Brussels with the Gaza war. That certainly merits priority and slows high-level decisions on other issues. But the State Department and the EU foreign policy apparatus are both geared to deal with problems worldwide, not just today’s top issues.
More likely they have hesitated because of the Serbian parliamentary elections this Sunday, which won’t bring big surprises. President Vučić would not have called an early poll if he thought he would lose it. There is ample evidence he is using the government’s media dominance, state institutions, patronage, and largesse to ensure a friendly outcome. But no one in Washington or Brussels at this point should want to help him.
The EU has another handicap. It requires consensus for any serious reaction. Most of its 27 members might be ready to do something. But Hungary and perhaps now Slovakia will be prepared to block consensus on sanctions on Serbia.
I might also hope that the State Department is re-evaluating its policy in the Balkans and needs a bit more time to get it right. It has officials devoted to the notion that he has succeeded in getting Serbia to embrace the West. It is sometimes easier at State to change personnel than minds, but it takes time.
Here are three nudges
Maybe Brussels and Washington need a nudge in the right direction. They no doubt have this Kosovo government preliminary report on the September 24 plot. But to my knowledge no one has published it outside Kosovo.
I offered a summary more than a month ago. It is high time that someone make it widely available. Along with the investigation the EU has promised. Read please, and tell me whether Serbia has embraced the West.
Or try this statement from Serbia’s Prime Minister reneging on commitments the US and EU say are legally binding:
Meanwhile, the EU has levied “consequences” on Kosovo that are long past their sell by date. Some Europeans are anxious to say so:
Note that it is the same police who foiled the September 24 plot that the US and EU have wanted withdrawn from northern Kosovo. That would have been a big mistake.
Hedging only works if we play the game
Serbia’s foreign policy relies on hedging between East and West, in the tradition of the non-aligned movement founded in Belgrade in 1961. This makes sense for Serbia, which thereby extracts value from both directions. The game is to lean hard one way and see how much the other side will ante up for you. Vučić has been leaning hard towards the East and collecting bounty from the West. Don’t take it only from me–read what people in Moscow are saying.
But if the West refuses to play the game, the hedging fails, and Serbia lands in the arms of Putin and Xi. That is no great loss to the West, which hasn’t gained much for all the goodies it has rained on Belgrade. Let’s assume though that Vučić is sincerely committed to hedging. A cold shoulder would then make him do a bit more to please the West. Wouldn’t that be nice?
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