The longer you wait, the higher the price

The 3.5 (sometimes called four) Serb-majority municipalities of northern Kosovo are under Belgrade’s control, not Pristina’s.  Milan Marinković writes from Niš:

The February 14-15 referendum in four Serb-dominated municipalities in northern Kosovo is approaching. People will be asked whether they accept the state institutions of Kosovo, headquartered in Pristina and dominated by Albanians. An overwhelming “no” vote seems assured.  Its potential implications may be damaging:  it could alienate Belgrade further from Europe and make it more difficult for Pristina to establish even nominal authority in the north, strengthening Kosovar Albanian  nationalists and reducing the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the disputed territory.

Political leaders of the northern Serbs fear the “parallel” institutions they control might be dismantled in response to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s demand to Serbian authorities last summer.  They see the referendum as a way to make these institutions more legitimate and thus fortify their own political position.  The referendum could also block effective law enforcement in the north, where organized crime groups have exploited the situation to develop a highly profitable smuggling network.

With Serbia’s own spring parliamentary elections in sight and candidacy for the European Union still uncertain, the referendum could not come at a worse time for the Serbian government. Serb politicians in northern Kosovo who receive their salaries from Belgrade are now ignoring Belgrade’s appeals. On top of that, within the ruling coalition there are several factions with different approaches to how the problem of Kosovo should be dealt with.  Serbian President Boris Tadić is expected to have the final word.

He and his Democratic Party (DS) are hoping Serbia will get EU candidacy so that they can win back credibility among the pro-Western part of the electorate. Somehow meeting Merkel’s demands, or nullifying them, is vital.  But most of those who voted for Tadić and DS in the last elections because of their European agenda feel betrayed to such an extent that candidacy alone could hardly allay their disappointment.

At the same time, the ongoing crisis in the European Union gives rise to euro-skepticism, which the anti-European opposition parties in Serbia exploit. They insist that Serbia must give up on the European integration process, arguing that the EU sooner or later is going to dissolve. This anti-EU rhetoric is being increasingly met with approval in Serbia today.

President Tadić has limited options. He can continue what he is already doing–calling publicly on the local Serb leaders to abstain from the referendum–but that presumably will not be enough to persuade leading EU countries to reward Serbia with candidate status, unless the northern Kosovo Serbs unexpectedly decide to acquiesce to his request.

Belgrade could also threaten to stop funding the parallel institutions in the north should the referendum be held. While this would be welcomed by the West, it is hard to imagine such a radical shift in Belgrade’s policy on a “national” issue amid a pre-election campaign given the political risks it would entail.

Judging by previous experiences, whatever President Tadić chooses to do, he will wait until the last minute. What he would like most is to somehow preserve the status quo until after the election, but that could well prove to be infeasible. Serbia has so far missed several opportunities to adjust its policy on Kosovo to reality. And the longer you hesitate to do the inevitable, the higher is the price you pay in the end.