The view of Tehran from Rome

So, you might ask, how did the Italians react to my presentation today at the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) on the Iranian nuclear program?

My co-presenter, Riccardo Alcaro, made a number of interesting points:

1. A military attack would end International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and the information they provide, making uncertainty about it much greater and increasing the difficulty of repeated military action after the first effort.
2. There is an important distinction between Israel’s concerns, which focus on the existential threat of Iranian nukes as well as the need to maintain Israeli strategic superiority, and American/European concerns that have more to do with an unstable Middle East.
3. Europe has played a constructive role at several important moments in dealing diplomatically with Iran and will likely continue to do so, even if it cannot lead the effort.

Riccardo views Israel’s concern with the existential threat as exaggerated.  He also notes that nuclear weapons have never really given any state enhanced regional capability to compel others to do as the nuclear state wants. I think he is basically correct about this.  Nuclear weapons contribute to the frame in which power relations are determined, but they do not provide a practical diplomatic or military tool.

Questioning focused on the legal basis for military action, the significance of proposals for a nuclear-free (or WMD-free) zone in the Middle East, the reaction of Sunni Arabs to a military attack on Iran, and whether American aversion to containment might moderate after the U.S. election.

In response, I offered a few thoughts.  Harold Koh (the State Department legal advisor) will surely write a good memo on the legal basis, but it is also possible it would be fixed after the fact, as the intervention in Kosovo was.  The Americans simply don’t have the kind of prohibition on military action without UN approval that several European countries have in their constitutions.  The nuclear free zone is a lovely idea with no practical impact; it will be a consequence of peace in the Middle East, not a cause of it.  The Muslim Brotherhoods that have been the big political winners thus far in Tunisia and Egypt are still developing their relations with the United States.  The Sunni street, which is admittedly more important after the Arab spring than before it, may not respond sympathetically to Iran.  The successful use of force has its own logic.

On containment, the Americans will certainly turn to it if their efforts to prevent Iran getting nuclear weapons (including military action) fail.  What other choice would they have?  In that case several Sunni Arab states may decide to develop nuclear weapons, unless the Americans provide a credible nuclear umbrella.  But that is precisely what the Americans do not want to do.  I can’t say failure to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons is not an option, since it always is a possibility.  But its consequences could be devastating to American hope of turning attention away from the Middle East to Asia and the Pacific.

The Iranian embassy official present, first counselor Ahmad Hajihosseini, averred that Iran is a victim in all this talk about nuclear weapons and complained that no Iranian was on the panel.  I of course would welcome an Iranian speaker at Johns Hopkins, as IAI would in Rome.  And I don’t think it was so bad an idea for Tehran to get a report on this discussion among Americans and Europeans.