Bear hug

Milan Marinković of Niš continues his series on the new government in Belgrade: 

Last week Serbian defense minister Aleksandar Vučić spent a few days in his first official visit to Russia. After meeting with Russian deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin, who previously served as ambassador to NATO, Vučić told media the two sides agreed to engage in defense industry cooperation. The project would involve joint participation in the international market. In relation to this, Vučić announced that Serbia was going to open a factory for manufacturing complex military systems.

The agreement is currently in the preliminary stage. An expert team should be formed soon to work out specific details. In Serbia analysts are divided on potential effects of the cooperation. Some believe it could benefit Serbia’s defense industry, which is already a successful exporter of military equipment to third-world countries.  Others are more cautious due to insufficient information and fear that Russia will obtain too much influence in Serbia.

The likely strengthening of military ties between Russia and Serbia is not a surprise. Shortly after becoming defense minister, Aleksandar Vučić said that Serbia, as a “militarily neutral“ country, will not join NATO or any other military alliance, but remains free to develop bilateral relationships with anyone. He praised good cooperation of the Serbian army with the Ohio National Guard, but criticized his predecessor for neglecting “other parts of the world” – notably Russia. Although Vučić’s narrative suggests that Belgrade is planning to keep on walking a thin line between East and West, for the moment it appears to be tacking East.

It is not only in defense affairs that Russo-Serbian relations are on the increase, but also in the economy. Russia says it is seriously interested to take part in vital infrastructure projects in Serbia as a major investor. The Serbian government has admitted it may have to sell several state-owned monopolies in order to reduce the ever growing budget deficit and public debt. Instead of private companies – either foreign or domestic – the most likely candidate to buy some of these is the Russian state. Russia is also frequently mentioned as a potential buyer of the steel factory in the town of Smederevo, which Serbia recently re-nationalized following the withdrawal of U.S. Steel from ownership of the factory.

Serbia is thus slowly but surely getting sucked into Russia’s sphere of influence.  Being almost devastated economically, Serbia is in no position – and generally has no reason – to antagonize any country, and certainly not one like Russia, which is a force to be reckoned with even when at its weakest. Serbia needs good relations with Moscow.  But having a good relationship is quite different from building a strategic partnership. If Serbia is still committed to European integration, as its government claims, then it must seek major allies among leading EU states as much as in the Kremlin.

A big part of the orientation towards Russia is based on populism.  Serbs love Russia, including many who also support the country’s bid for EU membership.  Vladimir Putin would no doubt win presidential elections in Serbia by a large margin if he were eligible to run.  At the same time, the ongoing economic crisis is making the EU look less attractive in the eyes of the Serbian public – as evidenced by latest opinion polls.

Russia’s deep pockets may help save Serbia in the short-term. The question is whether Serb affection for Russia will be good or bad for Serbia and its European ambitions in the long run.