The Sunni civil wars

As Liz Sly highlights in this morning’s Washington Post, the Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has managed to ignite war in both countries.  But for the moment the war is not the one Al Qaeda would like to be fighting against the Alawite dictatorship in Syria and the Shiite-dominated proto-democracy in Iraq.  Instead it is a war between Sunni militants who want to re-establish the caliphate and nationalists–some Islamist, some secularist–who aim to change the governments but preserve the state structure in the region.

The United States has a dog in this fight.  It cannot afford to see Al Qaeda gain a base of operations in eastern Syria or western Iraq.  Washington will therefore back the revolt of the anti-Al Qaeda forces in Syria as well as the Shia-dominated government of Prime Minister Maliki in Iraq, which is getting at least some help from the Sunni tribesmen who were vital to the American victory over Al Qaeda in Iraq in 2006/7.  Ryan Crocker and Bing West were on PBS Newshour Friday saying that Al Qaeda has overreached and will no doubt be defeated in the Iraq front of this Sunni civil war.  They may well be right ultimately, but on Saturday Al Qaeda seems to have consolidated control over Fallujah, while losing control of Ramadi, the Anbar provincial capital.  It will be a while before we know the outcome of this latest iteration of Sunni on Sunni fighting.

Do the Sunni civil wars threaten state structures in the Levant?  Reidar Visser, who knows as much about this part of the world as any Westerner I know, writes:

Today, there is once more a thug [sic] of war between pan-Islamism and Iraqi nationalism, but by no means has the local population universally sided with the Islamist rebels. Despite continuing squabbles among Iraqi leaders, a considerable segment of local Anbar politicians have rushed to support the Iraqi army in its efforts against pan-Islamist elements, showing that the people of western Iraq are once more sceptical about getting too intimately connected with political movements aiming at union with Syria.

His bottom line:  “Dammit, It Is NOT Unravelling: An Historian’s Rebuke to Misrepresentations of Sykes-Picot.”

I’m not so sure.  As Reidar himself points out, Sykes-Picot was mainly concerned with control over coastal areas.  The barren interiors of Anbar and the Syrian provinces of Homs and Deir al Azour were not really an issue a century ago.  The Sykes-Picot borders had little impact there.

More importantly:  a chain is only as strong as its weakest link.  Lebanon is the weakest link.  It is increasingly suffering tit-for-tat attacks that its parlous internal security apparatus cannot respond to effectively.  The second weakest link is the separation between Kurds in Syria and in Iraq.  While Syria’s Kurds are nowhere near as concentrated as Iraq’s were, most want at least a federal unit like the Iraqi one.  But if the Syrian state collapses, the Kurds will be free to pursue union with their Iraqi brethren, who might themselves be liberated if Iraq continues to descend into chaos.

There is no real possibility of an orderly redrawing of borders in the Levant.  If it happens, it will be violent, messy, and even chaotic.  Good guys are not likely to come out on top.  Like it or not, the Americans and their Gulf friends need to do what is necessary to make sure that Al Qaeda loses the Sunni civil wars in Iraq and Syria.