Hang together, or hang separately

Hadi Bahra, of the Syrian Coalition political office, is anxious to call attention to UN Security Council resolution 2118, which not only provided for removal and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons capability, but also endorsed

…fully the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 (Annex II), which sets out a number of key steps beginning with the establishment of a transitional governing body exercising full executive powers, which could include members of the present Government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent.

The problem is that the Russians are far from agreeing that this should be the over-riding purpose of a “Geneva 2” conference.  Nor is Bashar al Asad preparing to send a delegation to the January 23/24 Montreux/Geneva conference empowered to hand over all executive authority.

The Syrian Coalition is right to insist, but the question is what it should do if it doesn’t get its way, as it won’t.  Does it still go to Montreux/Geneva, or does it refuse?

Refusing would mean stiffing John Kerry, endangering American and other Western support and handing a propaganda victory to Bashar al Asad.  That’s not a good outcome.

Attending means daring the Syrian regime to show up, gaining a bully pulpit for the opposition’s own interpretation of UNSC resolution 2118, and giving the Americans some satisfaction.  Many in the opposition hope the regime will not take the dare and embarrass itself by not showing up.  That would be a satisfying outcome, but just for that reason unlikely.  The Russians will deliver the Syrians, just as the Americans will deliver the opposition.

What will happen at Montreux/Geneva, assuming both sides do turn up?  The Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG) recently ran a simulation intended to find out.  The simulation focused on establishing a ceasefire, forming a transitional government and accountability for wartime abuses.  To make a long story short, the Syrian opposition was fragmented going in and the pressure of negotiation made things worse.  A unified Syrian government delegation with strong Russian support had a field day reinforcing the notion that President Asad is indispensable.  The Americans and Russians conspired to keep Asad symbolically in place while a technocratic government took over.  Only a walkout–not something that will gain any points with the international community–saved the opposition from getting its clock cleaned.

Simulations are just that.  They are not reality.  PILPG spins the outcome in positive directions:  the opposition needs to come to Geneva 2 unified around its own plans for security, transitional governance and accountability.

That does not appear likely.  Pressed hard on the battlefield, the opposition continues to shatter. While the Syrian National Coalition is reported to be meeting Monday in Turkey to elect its president (or re-elect the current one), other groups are meeting in Spain.  The Islamic Front fighters have not supported either group as yet, and it is unclear whether they will turn up in any form Montreux/Geneva.  The extremists associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Jabhat al Nusra are uninterested in the talks.  Syrian Kurdish attitudes are divided.

There is a lot of preparatory work still to be done.  Hang together, or hang separately.