Kosovo’s army

Hoyt Yee, the Deputy Assistant Secretary who covers the Balkans at the State Department, testified Wednesday at the Congressional Helsinki Commission.  In answer to a question, he said the United States strongly supports Kosovo’s goal of joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and eventually NATO, a precondition for which is having an army.  Washington will also continue to provide assistance to Kosovo to reach the goal of NATO membership. This in my book is exactly the right thing to be saying and doing.

It comes on the heels of Kosovo government approval of transforming its Kosovo Protection Force, a largely unarmed but uniformed corps, into the Kosovo Armed Forces, which will function as an army.  Belgrade has asked for a discussion of this issue at the United Nations Security Council.  My guess is the powers that be in New York will decide the UNSC has more important things to do right now.

This is, however, an important moment in Kosovo, where a NATO-led force (KFOR) has tried to provide a “safe and secure environment” since 1999 and (by mutual agreement between Belgrade and Pristina) will continue to do so in the northern four, Serb-majority municipalities.  Kosovo, independent since 2008, is gradually acquiring all the attributes of sovereignty, in accordance with the UN-sponsored Ahtisaari plan that laid out a roadmap and guidelines for the process.  Armed forces are one of those attributes.  They will be designed on the basis of a recently prepared security sector review, which looked at threats and required capabilities to respond to them.

There is a deep irony in Belgrade’s concern about the creation of an army in Kosovo.  Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independence and its continuing claim to sovereignty over its former province is the primary threat to the republic’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  Kosovo will have to size its military to meet that threat, at least for the week or so it would take NATO forces to come to the rescue.  Belgrade could undercut the argument for a 5000-person army (and 3000-person reserve) in Kosovo if it would do what the European Union will require of it before membership:  establish good neighborly relations by recognizing Kosovo and exchanging ambassadors with it.  Some Kosovars might even welcome the cost savings that would come from reducing the size of the force to meet a reduced threat.  Belgrade might also then save some money.

The issue of Kosovo’s army is one Belgrade and Pristina should discuss, along with the size and capabilities of Serbia’s army, but not at the United Nations or even in the EU-sponsored talks ongoing in Brussels.  It is high time that they meet to discuss such matters–of direct concern only to the two capitals and not really to the EU or the US–bilaterally.  I’d suggest they start with their army chiefs of staff or their defense ministers.  Neighbors, especially those once at war, need to understand each others’ security concerns and capabilities.  That is very much a part of good neighborly relations.