Ukraine: expect worse

After many declarations of its intentions, Kiev is now trying to reassert by force its authority in eastern and southern Ukraine.  It is moving gradually and slowly, trying to avoid both a popular backlash and intervention by Moscow, which has massed troops and has threatened to use them to protect Russian-speakers inside Ukraine.

This map from the Washington Post illustrates the military deployments, which heavily favor Moscow in both quantity and quality:

But those smooth curvy lines with arrows at the end are misleading.  A conventional force-on-force conflict has not started, yet.  Moscow is trying to achieve its purposes with more or less local forces, who have been setting up checkpoints and seizing government centers.  A clash at one of these Friday killed dozens of insurgents when their Kiev-loyal antagonists set the building they took refuge in on fire.  This followed the downing of two Ukrainian military helicopters, at least one by a surface to air missile not available at your local grocery, President Obama averred.  Another Ukrainian helicopter was shot down yesterday.

What we’ve got here are escalating low intensity clashes between the Kiev government’s forces and local insurgents backed by Russia.

What counts in a clash of this sort is legitimacy.  War is always politics by other means, but especially so when major conventional armed clashes are avoided.  Moscow is denying the legitimacy of the Kiev government, claiming it was installed in a coup (even if approved in parliament) and trying to demonstrate that it lacks control over the national territory.  Kiev is denying the legitimacy of Moscow’s complaints about treatment of Russian-speakers in eastern and southern Ukraine and trying to reassert territorial control.

The Odessa fire, which killed dozens, is significant even beyond the number of lives lost because it undermined Kiev’s claims that Russian-speakers are safe in Ukraine and supported Moscow’s complaints.  I have no reason to believe the fire was set by government authorities.  It seems to have been the act of people supporting Kiev, provoked by attacks earlier in the day.  But the inability of the government to protect all its citizens detracts substantially from Kiev’s claim of legitimacy.

Still, the situation of Russian speakers in Ukraine is nowhere near what would be required to justify foreign intervention.  Moscow has made virtually no effort to ensure their safety and security by non-military means.  The OSCE observers sent with that mission were held captive and not allowed to observe anything but the facilities they were held in against their will.  They have now been released, on orders from Vladimir Putin, which suggests how independent of Moscow the insurgents in Ukraine really are.

Kiev’s best hope for a restoration of its legitimacy may lie in the May 25 presidential election.  Petro Poroshenko, a billionaire “Chocolate King” who has served as Foreign Minister Minister as well as Minister of Trade and Economic Development and Chair of the central bank, is the current front runner in the polls.  With more than two dozen candidates, a second round may well be needed for someone to get over the 50% threshold.  Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister, is trailing and thought to be trying to get the election postponed until the fall.

The Russians will not want a successful election in eastern and southern Ukraine that would confirm Kiev’s legitimacy.  We can expect a concerted effort to prevent it from happening, and to disrupt it where it does.  While the administrative apparatus of the Ukrainian state still appears to be operating in many Russian-speaking areas, Moscow has already shown that it can shut down what it wants pretty much when it wants.  It would be prudent to expect a crescendo of violence and disruption as the election approaches, with Kiev trying to use its forces to restore order and ensure the election can proceed and Moscow plus Russian-speaking Ukrainians trying to prevent it.