Day: June 1, 2020
After Suleimani
“How is the killing of Suleimani likely to change Iran’s grand strategy and Quds Force operations in Iraq and beyond? Who is Ismail Qaani, the new commander of the Quds Force, and how is he likely to approach these challenges and adapt his organization to the changed circumstances?” On May 26, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) hosted a virtual panel discussion examining the new Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leadership. The discussion examined how the killing of Suleimani is likely to change Iran’s Quds Force operations. The discussion was moderated by Hussein Ibish and featured three guest speakers:
Ali Alfoneh: Senior Fellow, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
Kori Schake: Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute
Joseph L. Votel: General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
Hussein Ibish (Moderator): Senior Resident Scholar, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
Structural Changes in the IRGC
Alfoneh outlined various transformations in Iranian foreign policy that Suleimani instituted during his command of the IRGC.
- He was able to establish a multinational Shi’a army spanning the Middle East and parts of southern Asia. This includes militias within Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
- He transformed the IRGC to a large expeditionary force. Before the ongoing wars in Syria, only a small portion of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard was deployed beyond its borders.
- Because of his personal charisma, he managed to transform clandestine operation groups within the IRGC into popular mobilization forces. In Syria, he was able to mobilize both Iranians and non-Iranians to participate in the conflict.
Alfoneh predicts that:
- Iran will continue to utilize its multinational Shi’a army because of the many successes under Suleimani. One success in particular was ensuring the survival of the Assad regime in Syria–an expressed and defined mission of the Quds Force.
- Iran will engage in a much more aggressive national security strategy. This will result in the IRGC participating in more acts of expeditionary warfare.
- It remains unlikely that a personality cult will develop around Suleimani’s successor, Ismail Qaani. He lacks Suleimani’s personal charisma.
Strategic Impact in Iraq
As the commander of the Quds Force, Suleimani led Iranian extraterritorial military and clandestine operations. Votel believes that the killing of General Suleimani is a defining moment in the US relationship with Iraq in particular. Going forward, the United States must clearly communicate its regional strategy and create better diplomatic channels to counter Iranian influence in Iraq.
Schake stressed that Iranian success in Iraq can be attributed to both Suleimani and Iran’s ability to mobilize its militias. She believes that the United States cannot be seen as a trustworthy partner for Iraq because of its on again, off again support for the Iraqi government. This indecisiveness has led to unsuccessful American foreign policy and increased space for Iranian influence. Iran’s regional campaigns have proven to be quite successful because of Tehran’s ability to nurture long term relationships.
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Stevenson’s army, June 1
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– Many nuggets from long WaPo article on Trump’s rocky May.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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