Day: February 15, 2021
Arms trafficking: more breach than observance
An event at the Atlantic Council on February 4 discussed the measures and mitigation techniques for illicit transfer of arms and weaponry around the world. The event was prompted by a report published by the Atlantic Council, authored by investigative journalist Tim Michetti, which followed materiel procurement by a network of militants operating in Bahrain, specifically activities carried out by Iran. The report can be read here. The prompting questions for the discussion were based on how to prevent and disrupt the flow of international illicit weapons flows as well as strengthening arms embargos. Further topics of discussion analyzed specific examples of illicit transfers of weapons in different regions, as well as the policy implications and a road map to alleviate these weapon flows.
Speakers:
Time Michetti: Investigative Researcher on Illicit Weapon Transfers
Rachel Stohl: Vice President for Conventional Defense, Stimson Center
Jay Bahadur: Investigator, Author and Former Coordinator of the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia
David Mortlock: Nonresident Fellow, Global Energy Center
Norman Roule (Moderator): Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Challenges:
Moderator Norman Roule opened the discussion noting that the major concern revolves around Iran’s transfer of illegal weaponry throughout the Middle East, while also noting the consequences for regional geopolitical relations, reaching East Africa as well. Iran has provided weapons to Syria, which provoked a sort of “forever war” with Israel, as well as provided precision weapons and missiles to the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
Tim Michetti’s report on Illicit Iranian Weapon’s Transfers analyzes the mode of entry, either by land or by maritime means. The report analyzed the weapons in comparison to those that were taken from regional conflicts in order to trace the materiel back to Iran. This work established a guide for how materiel from different regions could be traced back to actors based on their characteristics, which are unique to each country that they are manufactured in. Michetti’s report on Bahrain is one of many examples of the illicit weapons flows in the Middle East and sets the stage for future investigations on how the linkages between illicit weapons and where they end up can be made.
Jay Bahadur discussed an illicit weapons seizure by the Saudi Arabian navy in the Arabian Sea in June 2020 that discovered Chinese- made assault rifles and missiles, along with other weaponry that was believed to be manufactured in Iran. This seizure was not the first of this type, as the Saudis have intercepted multiple ships in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea since 2015, many of which have been traced back to Iran, where the weapons originated. These weapon transfers have exacerbated the conflict in Yemen, while also potentially destabilizing East African countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea.
Historically, disrupting commercial trafficking of small arms and light weapons has been a secondary priority to counterterrorism, but according to Jay Bahadur this approach ignores the overlap that often exists between arms trafficking and terrorism.
International Regulation
According to Rachel Stohl, the Arms Trade Treaty and the Firearms Protocol form the international legal framework for weapons transfers. Several voluntary groups and committees exist as well, in the United Nations and elsewhere. Synergy among these groups and treaties can improve transparency and responsibility in the global arms trade. The treaty mechanisms are only meaningful if they are implemented and signatories held accountable. In the Middle East and Horn of Africa, fewer than than 20 percent of countries are parties to the international treaties. Stohl emphasized the need to hold countries and industry actors accountable, as the consequences of illicit weapons transfers coincide with other illicit activities such as terrorism, trafficking, and illegal trading of goods.
David Mortlock noted that the international systems in place to combat illicit weapons transfers depend on member-state governments to uphold them. Sanctions should be considered to hold governments accountable. They can increase the operational costs for groups transferring weapons illicitly, but the UN and European Union have not wanted to sanction Iran to the extent the United States has. As noted by Roule, the United States, particularly the Trump Administration, had a vastly different perspective on countering Iran compared to the rest of the international community.
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Stevenson’s army, February 15: earmarks edition
– NYT reports that the Taliban have encircled several Afghan cities.
– FT columnist says Bitcoin rise means reduced role and influence of the dollar.
– Military authors describe legal efforts to limit civilian casualties.
– Punchbowl explains return of earmarks:
Democrats are bringing earmarks back. And they’re trying to clean them up.
Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the new chairs of the House and Senate Appropriations panels, will announce in the coming weeks that Democrats will reinstate earmarks — also known as “member-directed spending” — in next fiscal year’s spending bills.
Democrats say they will be transparent and disclose the details of each earmark — who requested it, and which entity would get the money. Members cannot request earmarks for entities to which they have financial ties. And Congress will not allow earmarks for for-profit institutions, such as private companies. Earmarks will be limited to state and local governments and nonprofits that carry out quasi-government functions. There will be limits on how much of each spending bill can be allocated toward earmarks.
Some lawmakers, including House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-Md.), have been arguing for years that Congress should bring back earmarks. The idea is to give members of Congress a personal stake in spending bills.
Hoyer and other pro-earmark lawmakers also argue that no one knows the needs of a state or congressional district better than the people who represent them in Congress.
DeLauro, who publicly supported reinstating earmarks in her campaign for the Appropriations gavel, is expected to make a formal announcement as soon as next week, when Congress returns from the Presidents’ Day recess.
“Chair DeLauro has been clear that she supports Member-directed funding for community projects,” said Evan Hollander, communications director for the House Appropriations Committee, in a statement. “She is working through the details of a reformed process, and will share additional information with Members and the public in the coming weeks.”
“Chairman Leahy has been clear about his intent to restore congressionally directed spending in a transparent and accountable way as part Congress’ constitutional power of the purse,” said Jay Tilton, press secretary for the Senate Appropriations panel.
How will this impact D.C.? This is a big deal for a lot of reasons. This will rejuvenate a whole line of business for lobbying shops. Appropriations lobbying was once a very lucrative corner of the influence market — that will come back now.
Here’s a question worth pondering: will House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy allow his lawmakers to take earmarks, or will he use this as an opportunity to try to set Republicans apart? Rule 30 of the House GOP rules ban Republicans requesting earmarks. But there are many Republicans who will want to change that given the shifting politics.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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What Kosovo needs now is not only Serbian recognition
Kosovo’s early elections have produced, as expected, a clear victory for Vetevendosje (VV or “Self-Determination”). According to preliminary results, it has won close to 48% and a commanding lead of something over 50 seats in the 120-seata Kosovo Assembly.
This is Albin Kurti’s moment. The still young, articulate VV leader had a couple of months in the Prime Minister’s chair last year. The Trump Administration didn’t like his insistence on reciprocity with Serbia or his skepticism about Trump’s bizarre choice of an American envoy. Washington took advantage of a squabble within his coalition to bring him down. That isn’t likely this time around, not only because of VV’s strong showing at the polls but also because Trump is gone. The Biden Administration will at least try to be respectful of Kosovo’s democracy.
That however won’t save Albin from a bigger challenge: constructing the kind of majority in parliament that will enable election of a new president as well as a strong position in negotiations with Serbia. Both in practice require a two-thirds majority. Part of the difference will come from ethnic minority parties, but at least one more Albanian-based party will be needed. Two obvious candidates both have a bad history with VV: the LDK, running a poor third in yesterday’s election, brought down Albin’s short-lived coalition last year and VV has been a stern critic of the second-place Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), in particular its now-indicted former President Hashim Thaci. Ramush Haradinaj’s Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) will not have enough seats to get VV to two-thirds, but it would be step in that direction.
Kosovo’s parliamentary system has often produced long inter-regna. Albin could cut this one short by acting unilaterally, but that might make forming the necessary coalition later more difficult rather than less. Negotiations with Serbia and electing a new president will not be top priorities for VV. Albin would prefer to focus on his campaign priorities: jobs and justice. That will not be easy, as Covid-19 has hit the Kosovo economy hard and reform of the justice system is a long-term project. The Americans and Europeans will be trying to get Pristina to engage as soon as possible on the dialogue with Belgrade, which faces presidential and likely parliamentary elections by April 2022 (and possibly earlier). No serious negotiations with Serbia will be possible after the end of this year.
Though the EU aims at it, there is little prospect of a “final” agreement within that timeframe. Serbian President Vucic has made eminently clear he will not recognize Kosovo before his re-election, if then. Some interim confidence-building steps might be possible, focused on missing people from the 1999 war and implementation of the several dozen existing agreements between Belgrade and Pristina, few of which have been executed to the satisfaction of both capitals. In any event, Pristina will need to be ready to walk away from a bad agreement in order to get a good one. Albin would do well to match Vucic’s reluctance.
A more comprehensive agreement is however needed. Serbia’s refusal to recognize its erstwhile “autonomous province” leaves Kosovo in international limbo with unclear and unmarked borders, enabling Serbia to undermine its statehood, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. But it also leaves Serbia without the “good neighborly relations” required for EU membership. The two capitals would do well to contemplate seriously the much-mentioned German/German solution, which entailed UN membership for the German Democratic Republic as well as ambassadorial-level representation in both capitals but no formal recognition. No one who knows Kosovo would expect the longer-term outcome to be like Germany’s (i.e. re-incorporation of Kosovo into Serbia).
If Kurti, either as leader of VV or prime minister, is even modestly successful in using the next couple of years to deliver on “jobs and justice,” Kosovo will find itself in a far stronger position to negotiate successfully with Serbia. A stronger economy and a judicial system that can handle both inter-ethnic crime and high-level corruption would make both Washington and Brussels more unequivocal in their support. Success would also enable a stronger position on reciprocity with Belgrade. Albin Kurti has big shoes to fill: his own.
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