Month: March 2021

Peace Picks | March 21 – March 25, 2021

Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream

1. Defense Project Series: Ending the War in Afghanistan- a discussion with counter-terror expert David Kilcullen | March 22, 2021 | 3:00 PM – 4:00 PM ET | Belfer Center | Register Here

Speakers

Dave Kilcullen: Lieutenant Colonel, Australian Army Reserves

Dave Kilcullen, strategist/scholar/author, discusses the war in Afghanistan, the Taliban and ISIS, and how the United States and its allies might help Afghanistan forge a future of hope and promise vice a return to the dark days of the 1990s.  With the agreed deadline for American withdrawal from Afghanistan looming on 1 May and Taliban attacks ramping up, President Biden is faced with a difficult policy decision to stay in the war or leave.  Join Bill Rapp as he moderates this important discussion with the famed counter-terror expert.

2. Iraqi diaspora mobilization and the future development of Iraq | March 22, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Atlantic Center | Register Here

Speakers

Amb. Feisal Al-Istrabadi: Founding Director, Center for the Study of the Middle East

Dr. Abbas Kadhim: Director, Iraq Initiative, Atlantic Council

Dr. Oula Kadhum: Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Birmingham

Dr. Marsin Alshamary (moderator): Postdoctoral Research Fellow, The Brookings Institute

The Atlantic Council hosts a discussion surrounding the upcoming report, Iraqi Diaspora Mobilization and the Future Development of Iraq. Authored by Dr. Oula Kadhum, postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Birmingham, the paper explores Iraqi diaspora mobilization before and after the 2003 invasion and fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein, looking at ways in which members of the diaspora have sought to help in the rebuilding of their country of origin, at both the elite and grassroots levels, as well as investigating changes over time. The discussion will touch on the paper’s key recommendations, considering the obstacles that have hindered diaspora mobilization, beyond the ethno-sectarian system.

3. The Politics of Mass Violence in the Middle East | March 22, 2021 | 4:00 PM – 5:00 PM ET | Wilson Center | Register Here

Speakers

Laura Robson: Professor of History, Penn State University

Laila Parsons: McGill University

Ussama Makdisi: Rice University

Christian F. Ostermann (moderator): Director, History and Public Policy Program, Wilson Center

Eric Arnesen (moderator): Professor of History, The George Washington University

4. In a Consequential Year for Iraq, What’s Next? | March 23, 2021 | 9:00 AM – 10:00 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here

Speakers

Lise Grande: President and CEO, U.S. Institute of Peace

Ambassador Matthew Tueller: Ambassador of the United States to Iraq 

Ambassador Fareed Yasseen: Ambassador of Iraq to the United States

Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman: Kurdistan Regional Government Representative to the United States 

Sarhang Hamasaeed (moderator): Director, Middle East Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace

As Iraq marks the 18th anniversary of the 2003 U.S.-led war that set in motion consequential changes, the country is eyeing what a Biden administration might bring while the country prepares for national elections in October. Meanwhile, His Holiness Pope Francis made a historic visit to Iraq earlier this month and injected much needed messages of hope, coexistence, and peace into an environment dominated by frustrations with the pandemic and its financial consequences, public grievances with governance,  continued U.S.-Iran tensions and attacks on coalition forces, and the ongoing threat of ISIS. Join USIP for a discussion of key developments in Iraq and the outlook for U.S.-Iraq relations under the Biden administration. The panel will share their insights on the Pope’s first-ever visit to Iraq, examine the country’s current challenges, and explore areas where policymakers and the international community can support Iraq.

5. Women’s gains in Afghanistan: Leadership and peace | March 23, 2021 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here

Speakers

Minister Hasina Safi: Acting Minister for Women’s Affairs, Government of Afghanistan

Fatima Gailani: Member, Afghan Negotiating Team

Lt. Colonel Natalie Trogus: Former Advisor, Afghan Ministry of Defense

Ambassador Paula Dobriansky (moderator): Vice Chair, Scowcroft Center for Strategy & Security, Atlantic Council

For Afghanistan to rebuild and for peace to be sustainable, the country will require a diversity of ideas, experiences, leadership, and action — from all of its people — to move forward. Such progress is impossible without the dedicated, long-term involvement of women, which allows for shifts in both long-held beliefs and practices, including those of the Taliban. This will ultimately allow peace to be not only enduring, but create a shared vision of Afghanistan’s future that puts Afghan women at the center. Join the Atlantic Council for a conversation on how Afghan women and their US partners have worked to improve women’s leadership opportunities in Afghanistan, what these improvements mean for Afghan women, and the critical role women play in Afghanistan’s aspirations for long-term peace.

6. Africa’s Global Reset: Foreign Relations in a Post-Pandemic Era | March 23, 2021 | 9:00 AM – 10:00 AM ET | CSIS | Register Here

Speakers

Andrew Alli: Partner and Group CEO, SouthBridge; former CEO of Africa Finance Corporation

Akunna Cook: Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Bogolo Kenewendo: Former Minister of Investment, Trade and Industry of Botswana; Non-Resident Fellow, Center for Global Development

Ambassador Koji Yonetani: Assistant Minister for African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Judd Devermont (moderator): Director, Africa Program

The Covid-19 pandemic is dramatically changing relationships between African governments and external partners, creating opportunities for a reset in relations and a recommitment to strategic issues. Longstanding grievances stemming from African countries’ status in international affairs, racism against their citizens abroad, and the zero-sum premise of global power competition have reached a boiling point. The pandemic is prompting regional governments to demand more equitable vaccine distribution, debt relief, and targeted investment in key economic sectors. It’s time to pause and identify the trends reshaping the region as well as implications for African governments and their foreign partners. Join the CSIS Africa Program on March 23, 2021, for a virtual livestream event examining the state of Africa’s foreign ties and key strategic issues to watch for, including Covid-19 recovery, debt relief, anti-discrimination, democratization, and climate change.

7. Anti-Coercion Instrument: How can Europe best protect itself from economic coercion? | March 23, 2021 | 8:00 AM – 9:00 AM | European Council on Foreign Relations | Register Here

Speakers

Colin Brown: Head of Unit, Legal Affairs/Dispute settlement (trade, sustainable development and investment), European Commission

Sven Simon: MEP; Member of International Trade Committee, European Parliament

Marie-Pierre Vedrenne: MEP; Vice-Chair of International Trade Committee, European Parliament

Jonathan Hackenbroich (moderator): Head of Task Force for Strengthening Europe against Economic Coercion, ECFR

The European Council on Foreign Relations is delighted to invite you to our webinar on how Europe can strengthen itself against economic coercion. Powerful countries revert to economic blackmail to change European foreign, economic, or financial policy. China has threatened Germany and Sweden with dire economic consequences over excluding Huawei from their 5G networks. Russia is looking into expanding its sanction toolkit. Turkey’s President Recep Erdogan called for boycotting French products over a speech by Emmanuel Macron. Under Donald Trump, the US used various measures of economic coercion, even directly against allies. Now, Europe needs to rebuild strong transatlantic relations especially around economic statecraft.

8. Unmasking Influence Operators: What Are Best Practices for Attribution? | March 25, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here

Speakers

Marianna Spring: Disinformation and social media reporter, BBC

Elise Thomas: OSINT analyst, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue

Emerson T. Brooking: Resident senior fellow, Digital Forensic Lab, Atlantic Council

Olgo Belogolova: Policy manager for influence operations, Facebook

A growing community of researchers are investigating influence operations, but research standards for conducting investigations are not widely shared. This event will explore one of the thorniest investigative challenges – identifying who is behind an influence operation.

9. Defending democracy against its adversaries | March 26, 2021 | 11:00 AM – 1:00 PM ET | Brookings Institution | Register Here

Speakers

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya: Leader of Democratic Belarus

Bob Dean: Senior research fellow, Clingendael Institute

Kara McDonald: Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State

Gerard Steeghs: Director, Multilateral Organizations and Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of the Netherlands

Thomas Wright: Director, Center on the US and Europe, Brookings Institution

Constanze Stellenmüller (moderator): Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution

Liberal democracy — representation, the rule of law, and human rights — is the foundation of the trans-Atlantic alliance and a rules-based international order. The Biden administration has placed democracy at the heart of its policy agenda; in the words of its March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, “Democracy is essential to meeting all the challenges of our changing world.” Yet democracy is under threat worldwide from populists and rising authoritarian powers. Still, civil societies continue to fight for their rights. In Belarus, a pro-democracy movement led by teacher-turned-presidential-candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is bravely protesting the fraudulent August 2020 election, despite violent repression by the government of Alexander Lukashenko. Brookings will host Tsikhanouskaya for a keynote address that examines democracy and human rights in Belarus.

10. ‘The Last Shah’: A book event with Ray Takeyh | March 26, 2021 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM ET | American Enterprise Institute | Register Here

Speakers

Ray Takeyh: Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

Eric Edelman: Counselor, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Kenneth M. Pollack: Resident Scholar, AEI

Colin Dueck (moderator): Visiting Scholar, AEI

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Stevenson’s army, March 21

– NYT’s David Sanger assesses the Biden policies toward Russia and China.
– Fred Kaplan thinks US side ill-prepared for Anchorage.
– WaPo writer sees personality cult in India’s Modi.
-The Hill sees looming battle over defense budgets.
– CRS has backgrounder on Afghanistan troop withdrawal issues.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Stevenson’s army, March 20

– WOTR has two provocative pieces worth your time. One, by some SOCOM veterans, argues for using irregular warfare insights in strategic planning.
-The other, by some China analysts, questions several “myths” that dominate mainstream
 China policy debates,
– How does a nominee win confirmation in a bitter fight? Colin Kahl, named to be USD{P}, the #3 post in DOD, is being opposed by many Republican Senators, including Susan Collins, ostensibly for nasty partisan tweets but really because he supported JCPOA. Sen. Manchin continues to say he’s undecided, but he may be the deciding vote. Kahl’s supporters have obtained a favorable letter from several well-known supporters of Israel.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Stevenson’s army, March 19

– Grandstanding in Anchorage: both sides [US & China] prolonged the photo op to make their talking points
– Administration plans to reach out to Palestinians and already is talking to Israel about Iran.

– WSJ says China will ban Tesla use by officials as a security measure.
– Sen. Cruz lifts holds on State nominees after getting promises on Nordstream 2.
Politico has more background on the project.
Even NYT goes for clickbait.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Stevenson’s army, March 18

There are many causes of US political polarization. The two main parties have become more ideologically different; many people stay inside a partisan media bubble for their news; and there has been a “Big Sort,” with people increasingly living in like-minded communities. NYT dramatizes this with city maps showing what it calls “partisan segregation.”
Tom Edsall shows how partisan alignment is occurring with other issue and identity alignments.  [Read through the culture war commentary to get to the poli sci stuff. Like this.
And this.]
Russia has recalled its ambassador from Washington.
NYT has good summary of Biden’s emerging policy toward China.
NYT also explains why “free trade” is no longer politically popular.

DNI has new report on domestic extremism.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Elucidating a tragic moment in the Balkans

I received this note from the Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade this morning:

March 17, 2021 marks the 17th anniversary of the March violence in Kosovo. During two days, March 17 and 18, 2004, Albanian protesters attacked Serbs, Roma and Ashkali, their property and Orthodox religious buildings throughout Kosovo.

In the March violence, 23 people lost their lives, 954 people were injured, almost 900 houses were completely destroyed or severely damaged, 36 Orthodox religious buildings were demolished and burned, and about 4,000 people were displaced.

Attached was this report by Isidora Stakić, which I find enlightening:

The retreat of the Serbian army and police from Kosovo in June 1999 meant liberation for Kosovo Albanians from Serbian rule and repression, and for Kosovo Serbs it meant the beginning of a new reality marked by the unwillingness and inability of UNMIK and KFOR to protect the personal safety of Serbs, Montenegrins, Bosniaks and Roma people, but also by the prevailing conviction of Kosovo politicians and the public that the priority is independence, followed by solidarity with the Serbs who stayed in Kosovo.[1]

The post-war reality was not easy for Kosovo Albanians either; much of their expectations of liberation came under pressure from the difficult economic situation and faintly observable justice for the thousands of civilians killed and a large number of missing. The then-new government of the Republic of Serbia made a step forward by discovering mass graves in Serbia, but the right-wing political parties, that were part of the government, managed to marginalize the question of the responsibility of the Yugoslav Army and Ministry of Interior for war crimes and influence Kosovo Serbs not to take participation in building a new political system in Kosovo. The killings and disappearances of Serbs and Roma, frequent until the end of 2000, would take place in the presence of KFOR and UNMIK, leading both the remaining Serbs and most of the Albanians to a conclusion that post-war perpetrators had the tacit consent of the international community to create Kosovo without Serbs.[2]

What were the triggers?

The March violence (17 and 18 March 2004) was preceded by three events. The first occurred on the 15th of March in the village of Čaglavica/Çagllavicë, when 18-year-old Serb Jovica Ivić was shot at and wounded in the abdomen and arm. Ivić claimed that the attackers were Albanians.[3] In response to this attack, Serbs from Čaglavica/Çagllavicë blocked the Priština/Prishtinë-Skoplje/Shkup road, a vital route for Albanians, and threw stones at Albanians’ vehicles.[4] This provoked anger of the Albanian community and strong condemnation by its political leaders who accused Serbs of endangering freedom of movement, and UNMIK of being passive towards the blockade.

At about the same time, in several cities in Kosovo, the associations of KLA veterans organized protests over the arrest of former KLA commanders charged with war crimes. These protests were directed, above all, against UNMIK, whose representatives made the arrests. In speeches during the protest, UNMIK was described as a neo-colonial force that “supporting organized crime and continuing the same politics applied by Serbia“.[5]

The third event took place on the afternoon of March 16, when three Albanian boys drowned in the Ibar/Iber river in the Serb-majority municipality of Zubin Potok. Immediately after the accident, the Kosovo media reported on this tragic event as an ethnically-motivated crime, stating that the boys jumped into the river because they were being chased by Serbs with a dog. The media were appealing to the statements of the fourth, surviving boy and the only eyewitness of the accident, but it turned out that the boy talked about Serbs with a dog cursing at them from a nearby house – which scared him and his friends – and not about Serbs chasing them.[6] Later, after investigating the incident, the international prosecutor concluded that the offered evidence did not support the existence of a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed.[7]

Although there was a possibility, on the day of the accident, that it was an ethnically motivated crime, the media couldn’t know that beyond any doubt and they were obliged to report professionally, following the known facts. Instead, Kosovo media – and TV stations in particular – reported sensationally, recklessly, emotionally and biasedly.[8] As the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media noted in his report, the media did not intentionally incite the violence that would follow the strangulation of the boy, but “had it not been for the reckless and sensationalist reporting, events could have taken a different turn.“[9]

The March violence in numbers

The March riots began in the morning of 17 March with a gathering of Kosovo Albanians in the southern part of Mitrovica/Mitrovicë and soon spread to many other towns in Kosovo. On March 17 and 18, 2004, 50-60,000 Kosovo Albanians took part in the violence, targeting Serbs, Roma and Ashkali, their property and Orthodox religious buildings. The participants in riots would use rocks and Molotov cocktails, set fire to people’s property and shoot at buildings, expel, intimidate and beat people. During the riots, the protesters would clash with UNMIK police and KFOR soldiers, and in some places with Serbs. The violence involved mostly younger men who spontaneously took to the streets. Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimates that the riots were both spontaneous and organized: although most of the protesters joined the riots spontaneously, there is no doubt that Albanian extremists worked to organize and accelerate the spread of violence.[10]

In the March violence in Kosovo, 23 people lost their lives: Macedonian Jana Tučev, nine Serbs – Dragan Nedeljković, Slobodan Perić, Dušanka Petković, Borivoje Spasojević, Borko Stolić, Dobrivoje Stolić, Slobodan Tanjić, Zlatibor Trajković and Nenad Vesić, and thirteen Albanians – Fatmir Abdullahu, Ferid Çitaku, Bujar Elshani, Kastriot Elshani, Isak Ibrahimi, Alumuhamet Murseli, Agron Ramadani, Nexhat Rrahmani, Arben Shala, Gazmend Shala, Ajvaz Shatrolli, Esat Tahiraj and one Albanian from Priština/Prishtinë whose name the Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) failed to identify.[11]

Among the victims, there were two women: Jana Tučev, who was shot dead with a firearm in her apartment in northern Mitrovica, and Dušanka Petkovic from Uroševac, who was a heart patient and died in KFOR base the day after she was kicked out from her house. Four of the Serbs were killed by Albanians with firearms, two were burned in their homes, the cause of death of one of them is unknown, and one disappeared during the evacuation. Two of the Albanians were killed by KFOR members, three lost their lives in clashes with KFOR and Serbs, one was killed by a UNMIK policewoman when he attacked another person with a knife, one was killed by a sniper by Serbs, and the reason of the death of the other Albanians is unknown.[12]

The April 2004 report by the UN Secretary-General stated that 954 people had been injured in the March violence, including 65 international police officers, 61 KFOR members and 58 members of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS).[13]According to the data collected by the HLC in months after the March violence, about 170 Serbs were seriously injured, 150 of them by beatings at their homes, while 20 were attacked outdoor.[14] About 800 Serbian, 90 Ashkali and two Albanian houses were completely destroyed or severely damaged, and 36 Orthodox religious buildings were demolished and burned.[15]

After the March violence, about 4,000 people, having lost their homes, were displaced – some of them for the second time, since they had already been displaced in 1999.[16] Older people found themselves in a particularly difficult socio-economic situation, as well as the others who lost in these riots all the property they had been acquiring all their lives. Immediately after the violence, many people who lost their homes were accommodated in containers provided by the international community and where the living conditions were very poor.[17] The displaced Serbs were largely dissatisfied with the damage assessments made by Albanian institutions, pointing out that the material damage they suffered was much greater.[18] Also, they complained that the help they used to receive from the Government of Serbia was insufficient or that they were not getting it at all.[19]

In January 2006, 1,231 of approximately 4,000 displaced persons after the March violence still had the status of displaced persons.[20] By June 2007, 897 previously destroyed or damaged residential buildings had been rebuilt, out of the intended 993.[21]

Actions of security institutions: KFOR, UNMIK police and KPS

Kosovo’s security institutions – both international (KFOR and UNMIK police) and local (KPS) – have failed to protect people and their property. According to the HRW report, members of the international forces interviewed after the March riots showed a lack of self-criticism and unawareness of their mistakes, shifting the blame to each other, but also justifying themselves by lack of material and human resources, inexperience in suppressing protests, surprise factor, lack of coordination, etc.[22] Members of KFOR were unable to prevent the attacks, but mostly acted as rescue teams, helping Serbs evacuate. They would leave unsecured houses behind, and in the presence of KFOR, Serb and Ashkali houses in several municipalities throughout Kosovo were destroyed and looted.[23] UNMIK police have also shown that they cannot control the situation and have no authority.[24]

The Kosovo Police Service (KPS) acted without command and instruction, so the conduct of KPS members varied from place to place. Some police officers sided with the protesters and participated in the destruction of property or they would arrest Serbs and Ashkali who were trying to defend themselves, ignoring at the same time the Albanian violence. Most KPS members were passive observers and wouldn’t interfere even when Serbs were being beaten by the protesters. The third group includes police officers who acted professionally in an effort to facilitate a safe evacuation, which some Serbs see as indirect participation in the expulsion, while others point out that this saved their lives.[25]

Solidarity

Most Kosovo Albanians who did not take part in the riots passively watched what was happening. However, there were also bright examples where Albanians tried to help Serbs by providing shelter in their homes, calling the police, helping them reach KFOR bases and other safe places, but also standing in front of Serb houses preventing protesters from destroying them.[26] In some cases, however, not even the solidarity of the neighbors was able to stop the wave of violence.

“When a group of Albanians came in front of our house, they started setting it on fire, and I was hiding in a toilet hole. I heard two of my neighbors, Albanians, telling them that I was a good man, that I had done nothing wrong to anyone, but it didn’t help. An Albanian who works in the mosque came and chased the two away. After that, they started setting the fire,” said the Serb M.I. from Kosovo Polje/Fushë Kosovë.[27]

The behavior of Albanian political leaders did not help stop the violence. Even when they called for an end to the violence, those calls seemed insincere and forced.[28]

Violent reactions in Serbia

The events in Kosovo provoked protests in several cities in Serbia, which soon became violent. Protesters in Belgrade set fire to Belgrade’s Bajrakli mosque on the night between March 17 and 18, shouting “Kill Shiptar”, “Kill, slaughter, let Shiptar disappear” and “Let’s go to Kosovo”.[29] Until the protesters broke through the police cordon, the police had an order not to use force.[30] The Bajrakli mosque, thanks to its construction, was not completely burned, but its interior was largely destroyed, including the library and art objects. Protesters in Niš set fire to Islam-aga’s mosque and it was even more severely damaged than Belgrade’s mosque.

In Novi Sad, rioters broke shop windows, destroyed and set fire to bakeries owned by Albanians and other Muslims, and broke windows to the Islamic Center premises. The police were mostly passive, standing aside while the protesters stoned the houses in Roma and Ashkali communities,[31] although Roma and Ashkali were not in any way involved in violence against Kosovo Serbs, but they themselves were also victims of the violence. 

Trials

According to the UNMIK statistics from 2008, 242 people have been charged for the March violence (206 before local and 36 before international prosecutors), and additionally, 157 people have been charged before courts for misdemeanors.[32] International judges and prosecutors dealt mainly with cases involving serious crimes such as murder, attempted murder, incitement to national hatred and causing general danger, while the most common offenses before domestic courts were: participation in a group that committed a criminal offense and aggravated theft.[33]

The trials of these indictments were accompanied by a number of problems and difficulties, including defaulting witnesses, changing the testimonies of witnesses, procrastination of the police in submitting reports, postponing the main hearing, disregarding ethnic motives, imposing minimum sentences or even sentences below the prescribed minimum, the too frequent imposition of suspended sentences, etc.[34]

Out of a total of 399 indictees, 301 were convicted by April 2008. According to the OSCE, 86 persons were sentenced to prison (including suspended sentences), and the maximum sentence was 16 years in prison.[35] The March violence never happened again in Kosovo, thanks in part to KFOR, UNMIK and the Kosovo police.


[1] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Communities in Kosovo 2003 and 2004, p. 6, available at http://hlc-rdc.org/wp-content/uploads/editor/file/Etnicke_zajednice2003-2004..pdf

[2] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, p. 2, available at http://www.hlc-rdc.org/images/stories/pdf/izvestaji/FHP_izvestaj-Etnicko_nasilje_na_Kosovu-mart_2004-srpski.pdf

[3] Human Rights Watch (2004) Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 16, available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/kosovo0704.pdf

[4] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, p. 4.

[5] Human Rights Watch (2004), Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 18.

[6] OSCE (2004) The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo, p. 4-5, available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/8/30265.pdf

[7] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, p. 5.

[8] OSCE (2004) The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo, p. 3.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Human Rights Watch (2004), Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 26-28.

[11] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Secretary-General of the United Nations (2004) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations

Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 30 April 2004, p. 1, available at https://unmik.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s-2004-348.pdf

[14] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, p. 4.

[15] Ibid.

[16] OSCE (2007) Eight Years After: Minority Returns and Housing and Property Restitution in Kosovo, p. 33, available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/e/26324.pdf

[17] Many HLC interlocutors talk about poor living conditions in container settlements. For further details see: Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] OSCE (2007) Eight Years After: Minority Returns and Housing and Property Restitution in Kosovo, p. 34.

[21] Ibid., p. 33-34.

[22] Human Rights Watch (2004), Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 22-26.

[23] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., p. 2; See also: Human Rights Watch (2004), Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, p. 22.

[26] Many HLC interlocutors talk about Albanians who helped Serbs. For further details see Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo.

[27] Humanitarian Law Center (2004) Ethnic Violence in Kosovo, str. 21-22.

[28] Ibid., p. 3.

[29] BBC News in Serbian (2019) 15 Years After: Who is Responsible for the March Violence in Kosovo, 17 March 2019. Available at https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/balkan-47569978

[30] Human Rights Watch (2005) March 2004 Violence against Albanians and Muslims, available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/serbia1005/4.htm

[31] Ibid.

[32] OSCE (2008) Four Years Later: Follow up of March 2004 Riots Cases before the Kosovo Criminal Justice System, p. 3-4, available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/4/32701.pdf

[33] Ibid., p. 23.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

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