It is still early days in the Iran war, but it’s never too early to consider the longer term consequences. Regime change is the goal. But even if the war were to end tomorrow, the impact would continue to ripple into the future. Here are a few guesses of what those ripples will bring:
Economics. So far the war has bumped up oil prices by less than 15%. But Iran has closed the strait of Hormuz to the tankers that normally carry about 20% of world supply daily. Oil prices can go to well over $100 per barrel if the blockage lasts more than a few days. In Europe, natural gas prices have jumped more than oil, but they are nowhere near their peak in 2022. Still, every dollar consumers spend on oil and gas is not spent on other products. Defense industries will accelerate, but economies won’t.
Security. Iran has been a security nightmare for Israel for a long time. But the Islamic Republic wasn’t doing a lot of damage in the US or the Gulf. If its sleeper cells haven’t succumbed to their opulent surroundings, Tehran can still trigger them. Or lone wolf attackers can act on their own. We should expect attacks on strategic installations, vital economic infrastructure, Jewish communities, or other relatively soft targets.
State collapse. Catastrophic success is a possibility. The Islamic Republic might implode, as the Iraqi state did during the 2003 American invasion. That would create a humanitarian disaster and possibly a breakup of the state. Baloch, Azeris, Kurds, and other minorities might welcome that scenario. But they will likely quarrel over the lines to be drawn for successor states. Civil war can generate chaos and emergence of extremists with grudges against the US and Israel.
Regional impacts. Iran is still trying to widen the war by attacking with missiles and drones widely in the region. The primary focus is Israel, which could suffer catastrophic losses. Iran is also focused on the UAE, but Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and even Cyprus and Turkey have been targeted as well. If the war goes long, this will damage Gulf efforts to project its orderly, air-conditioned cities as peaceful, safe, and successful. One or more of the Gulf states could decide to join the war, or decide to quietly defect and pull investments from Trump’s family.
Refugees. People flee war. Some Emiratis and Qataris have houses elsewhere and may choose to take up residence there. But they are relatively few. Many Iranians are already displaced inside the country. So too are Lebanese, due to Israeli attacks on Hezbollah. Some may decide to take their chances in Europe or eventually the US. The Islamic Republic could let people leave, creating havoc in Türkiye as President Assad did during the Syrian civil war. That would also rouse nativist politicians in Europe and the US to new levels of xenophobia.
Ukraine. Iran won’t be shipping lots of drones to Russia for use in Ukraine, but that may not matter. Tehran seems to have already transferred the technology, or the Russians stole it. More important: US missiles will also be in short supply. That will degrade Ukrainian air defenses and reduce its longer-range strikes. In addition, President Putin will feel Trump’s aggression in Iran justifies his own in Ukraine. If Trump gets to name the next leader of Iran, Putin will redouble his efforts to do likewise in Ukraine.
Opportunity costs. The Americans and Israelis have a big slice of their military forces tied up in the war. They are running out of smart bombs and getting ready to use dumb ones. Hegseth should know. Lebanese Hezbollah is already launching a few missiles at Israel. The Houthis in Yemen can do likewise, also against US ships. China or North Korea could also make trouble for the US, overwhelming its already stretched military.
Dumb moves. So far, the Defense Department seems to be at the top of its game in executing the attacks on Iran. The one big exception was an Iranian girls’ school bombed early in the war. That is still being investigated. But the CIA is apparently mobilizing Iraqi and Iranian Kurds to attack on the ground inside Iran. That risks giving the Islamic Republic an excuse to murder a lot of Kurds. It will also make non-Kurds in Iran rally around the Islamic Republic flag. Türkiye won’t like it either. It will risk arousing Erdoğan to act against Kurds, not only at home but also in Iraq and Syria. US ground troops would be an even dumber move, presaging many years of quagmire.
Domestic political support. President Trump entered this war at historically unprecedented lows in polling. Disapproval of the decision to go to war is at 59%. Approval of the war is under 40%. It is going to be hard to sustain the effort, especially if things don’t go well. An American warship sunk? A couple of hundred service people killed? Those are possible contingencies that would cut deeply into that 40% and shorten the sustainability of the American effort.
These are just some of the known unknowns. The unknown unknowns will be just as many, and more serious. Some are confidently predicting that this war will mark the end of Iran as a major regional power. That’s possible. But it is also possible that the US, even if it wins the war, will lose the peace. The Gulf monarchies and others in the region may think twice about aligning with the US in the future.
Certainly anyone who needed a clear explanation for the war would be disappointed so far: