Time to withdraw US bases in the Gulf

The US bases in the Middle East are a key issue in the present confrontation with Iran. Here they are:

The knee jerk reaction is to say they have to stay. But it is time to reconsider. Donald Trump has already lost this war. We need to consider our options for making sure we don’t lose the next one.

Too close

The Iran war has demonstrated that many US bases are too close to Iran for comfort. The Iranian coast lies less than 150 miles from Bahrain, where the US Fifth fleet headquarters. The bases in Kuwait are even closer, as are those in the UAE. Iran has many missiles that can fly that far and much farther:

It also has lots of drones that can reach well beyond the Gulf:

American defenses against these weapons are good, but not perfect or unlimited. They are also expensive and take a long time to manufacture. It is time to put more distance between US bases and Iran.

What to move

The bases inside the Gulf have proven less than useful in the current war. They are especially vulnerable. Iran has managed to destroy important assets like their vital radar installations. The naval assets that enforce the blockade and have proven important in the current war are those in the Arabian Sea, outside the strait of Hormuz:

They can control shipping in and out of both the strait and the Bab al Mandeb (the strait between Yemen and Djibouti and Eritrea). That’s why the British and American base at Diego Garcia is so important. US bases in Turkey and Europe also provide places from which the US can project air power.

Pulling back is not pulling out

Any US pullback from the Middle East risks leaving the perception of a vacuum. It could encourage Gulf states to reconsider their de facto alliances with the US and hedge by accommodating Iranian interests. That is already happening and isn’t entirely avoidable.

But it could get worse. The US would need therefore to discuss planning for a pullback with the Gulf states and reach an understanding with them on burden sharing. US commitment to their defense would need to be spelled out more clearly than previously.

The US could require in return Gulf commitments to their own defense as well as to pipelines for oil and gas exports that circumvent both the strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandeb. The Gulf Cooperation Council, in which all six Arab states of the Gulf are represented, should be encouraged to coordinate its members’ oil and gas export infrastructure as well as their defense plans.

The flies in the ointment

The reasons the Gulf countries have not built oil and pipelines that circumvent the two choke points are important. The UAE has coastline outside the strait of Hormuz and is doubling its pipeline to Fujairah on that coast. But Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait do not have that option. They have not wanted to trust Yemen, which has been embroiled in a civil war for 10 years, or Oman to let their products cross their territory unmolested. Yemen is dicey. But there should be a price that would ensure Omani cooperation.

Another possibility is a pipeline through Iraq and Syria to the Mediterranean. But Iraq and Syria are already rebuilding an old pipeline to carry Iraq’s oil to Europe. The Gulf monarchies’ main customers are increasingly in East Asia. So export from the Arabian Sea coastline of Oman is a better bet.

Offshore balancing

Advocates of “offshore balancing” have long advocated that the US take that approach in the Middle East. Opponents fear that would enable Iran to dominate the region. But Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan are already signaling with their newly concluded Mecca Joint Defense Agreement resistance to both Iranian and Israeli dominance in the region. Allowing the powers that be in the region to reach their own equilibrium, with US backing for its friends in the background, is worth a try.

Provided, however, that it does not lead to a nuclear arms race in the region. That could be catastrophic.