What next?
In addition to today’s post on the Iraqi protests, I would recommend Rend Al-Rahim’s appearance on NPR this morning as well as my own appearance Monday with Namo Abdulla, Raed Jarrar, and Mazin Al-Eshaiker on CGTN’s The Heat, available below for your listening and watching pleasures. Bottom line: the likelihood of some sort of authoritarian takeover, by coup or martial law, is increasing dramatically:
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Iraq explodes
Escalating Protests
The current protests in Iraq have been the bloodiest since 2003, with over 300 people killed and thousands injured. The October protesters started off demanding services, but quickly escalated to broader grievances against the Prime Minister, his cabinet, and the Iraqi democratic system as a whole. These protests should not be a surprise to the Iraqi government nor the international community. The government has been eroding for 16 years. Layers of grievances have led to the current protests.
President Barham Salih has said Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi will resign once the political parties pick a replacement, but it’s highly unlikely this would quell protests. The demonstrations are not backed by, nor do they back, any political party. There is no leadership for the government to negotiate with. Ideas, demands, and slogans are being churned out. The basic demand is for an upheaval of the political system.
Underlying Issues to Broader Instability
Two years after the fall of ISIS, Iraq is still unstable. The government lacks the ability to meet the basic needs of its citizens. An estimated $160-$275 billion is needed to rebuild, but a mix of mismanaged resources and corrupt politicians has left the country with vital infrastructure still destroyed, high levels of unemployment, and a lack of services, especially in health and education. Despite having the world’s fourth largest oil reserves, Iraq’s cities face frequent power cuts, making life unbearable for many. The only option separate from the national power grid is to purchase electricity from privately owned generators, but that is unaffordable for most Iraqis.
There are still roughly 1.67 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in post-ISIS Iraq. Most of those who could voluntarily move back to their place of origin have likely already done so, yet authorities are closing and consolidating IDP camps, causing conditions in the remaining ones to deteriorate.
Civil documentation is a major barrier to IDPs re-integrating into communities as well as returning home to their places of origin. Strict Iraqi laws make life difficult for an estimated 80,000 families, who lack legal documentation. Without proper paperwork, these Iraqis lose access to available public goods and freedom of movement. Although international aid is provided to IDPs, it is not nearly enough for them and other Iraqis in dire need of basic commodities. Corrupt politicians take the money for themselves. The mishandling of IDPs adds to the perception that the Iraqi government is corrupt and ineffective.
The Islamic State remains a serious threat for both Iraq and Syria. ISIS fighters have moved into the valley of a remote mountainous region in northern Iraq that is not patrolled by either the Kurdish peshmerga or the Iraqi army. This allows them free movement, mainly at night, and the ability to go to local cities, farms, and villages to shake down the population and extract resources. Currently, there are only a few hundred ISIS militants in the area at most, but it could be the beginning of a new territorial caliphate if they are able to consolidate power and create a base for nearby sleeper cells to flock to.
What’s Next?
The Prime Minister has lost the support of Iraqi students, unions, and even the army. It is difficult to predict what will happen in coming weeks, but the protests have continuously increased in size and intensity, a trend that will likely endure. The government has lost the confidence of the Iraqi people. Replacing current politicians will not address the grievances protestors have. A new mandate is needed to move forward and reestablish Iraq.
Iraq exploding with a wide range of problems that could push the government over the edge at any moment. A military coup by either the Iraqi army or the Iranian backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is a possibility, but how will the people respond to rule by either as both have used unnecessary force against the protesters? Civil conflict would be devastating for Iraq and could be the perfect opportunity for ISIS to reestablish its caliphate.
The protests are not going to just disappear. The Iraqi people will continue to persist despite the violent reactions from security forces. There seem to be no “good” options for Iraq now and in the immediate future.
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The nuclear race has begun
As Iran steps up its enrichment of uranium, the harbingers are clear:
- Turkish President Erdogan is asking questions out loud about why his country doesn’t have nuclear weapons,
- Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince is making it clear the Kingdom won’t be left far behind,
- Israel is lying low with its 100 or more warheads somewhere between ready and almost ready to launch, and
- North Korea is successfully resisting American pressure to give up its dozen or so nukes, making it clear to the whole world that Washington is a toothless tiger when it comes to nuclear nonproliferation.
The nightmare many of us feared in the 1970s and 1980s of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East has begun.
The trigger was President Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (aka Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) and reimposition of sanctions have released Tehran from its obligations, which it is gradually and deliberately breaching. Turkey, which has long relied on the American nuclear umbrella and NATO, has cozied up to Russia–even purchasing its advanced air defense system–as relations with Washington worsened over how to deal with the Syrian Kurds. Erdogan has no doubt heard the talk about removing American nuclear weapons from Turkey and has drawn the obvious conclusion: if the American umbrella won’t protect you, get your own.
The Saudis increasingly view President Trump as unreliable, especially vis-a-vis Iran. They would be fools not to try to keep pace with the Turks in the race with Iran for nuclear weapons capability. What they can’t develop themselves, they’ll buy. The once prevalent and now quaint notion that no nuclear-savvy country would sell its crown jewels disappeared with Pakistani nuclear merchant A.Q. Khan. The Saudis can pay any price if need be.
The Middle East had gotten used to the Israeli nuclear capabilities, which have been regarded for decades as a deterrent for use only as a last resort. They play little roll in the balance of power beyond ensuring that Israel will continue to exist. The same cannot be assumed about Iranian, Turkish, and Saudi capabilities. Multi-sided games are much more complex than one- or two-sided ones. We can be thankful for the modus vivendi between nuclear India and nuclear Pakistan, but it is no harbinger for a four-sided nuclear standoff in the eastern Mediterranean. And the subcontinent’s standoff may not last forever, since at least Pakistan regards nuclear weapons as useful in warfighting, not just the last resort.
We have at least a few years, perhaps even a decade, before this race reaches some sort of equilibrium. In the meanwhile, the push and shove will be made all the more dramatic by US withdrawal from the Middle East. Its interests there have declined markedly with the development of advanced oil and gas recovery technology and the continued reduction of the US economy’s dependence on energy, especially in the form of hydrocarbons.
The big challenges for American diplomacy today are to slow the Middle East nuclear arms race and build some sort of regional security structure in which the Turks, Iranians, Saudis, and ultimately Israelis can work out their differences without resort to either the proxy wars they are already engaged in or the nuclear exchanges that will all-too-soon become possible. US withdrawal from its over-exposure in the Middle East is inevitable and desirable. But the risks are colossal. Diplomacy can reduce but likely not eliminate those risks.
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Stevenson’s army November 5
– Russia is sending mercenaries to Libya.
– With US absent, rest of Asia looks to trade deals with China.
– Tariff rollbacks likely part of US-China trade agreement.
– NYT says Pompeo “in peril,” losing trust at State.
– NYT has deeper look at Iraqi protests against Iran.
– The most important presidential election news: NYT poll shows Trump strong in battleground states; 2/3 of Trump 2016 and Dem 2018 voters say they’ll vote for Trump in 2020.
– Departing official criticizes Trump Syria policy.
– Former officials argue realists wrong about Syria.
– Academics say Trump quid pro quos aren’t normal.
– WaPo says many migrants are funded by microfinance programs.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, November 4
Fred Kaplan has a savage critique of Jim Mattis and his new memoir.
On this 40th anniversary of the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, Iraqi protesters are threatening a Iranian consulate. Max Boot offers some analysis.
Boris Johnson is blocking a parliamentary report on Russian interference in Brexit vote.
NYT says Federal officials are investigating numerous Chinese thefts of US biomedical research
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Syria’s detainees and missing
I missed this statement when it first came out November 1, but glad to publish it now:
Statement to the UN Regarding the Constitutional Committee Releasing detainees and revealing the fate of missing persons should be the utmost priority of the Constitutional Committee
The Constitutional Committee held its first session by late October among celebrations by the international community and anticipation among Syrians. In the meanwhile, the Syrian Government continues to detain Syrians and refuses to reveal the fate and whereabouts of tens of thousands held in captivity. Moreover, the Syrian government continues to hold mock trials lacking the minimal standards of justice without even committing to the measures and regulations outlined in the current Syrian law and constitution.
The UN Special Envoy to Syria have failed to ensure the release of any detainee as outlined in the UN resolution 2254 (2015) which clearly calls for the release of any arbitrarily detained persons, particularly women and children.
We, the undersigned Syrian victims’ associations and organizations, call upon the UN to ensure the implementation of the confidence-building measures outlined in the UN Resolution 2254 (2015). We call upon the UN to explicitly declare that releasing detainees and revealing of the fate of missing persons remain to be its absolute priority and the priority of its special envoy for Syria Mr. Geir Pederson. We call upon them to ensure that before commencing in constitutional discussions which we only see as a delay mechanism while our children remain in prisons and secret detention centers.
We call upon the UN, in the name of victims and their families, to pressure the Syrian Government into granting immediate access to independent international investigation committees to prisons and detention centers in Syria. The UN must also guarantee transparent and public legal proceedings to all detainees regardless of the allegations made against them.
As we, the undersigned Syrian victims’ associations and organizations, have lost faith in political parties contributing to the Constitutional Committee. We call upon the UN Special Envoy to Syria to adhere to our rights and to apply all necessary measures to champion our demands in releasing detainees and revealing the fate of missing persons before proceeding with constitutional clauses discussion. We also hold civil society members accountable for the consequences of compromising the rights of victims if the demands of families and victims’ associations were overlooked.
Signatory Organizations:
Association of Detainees & The Missing in Sednaya Prison
Caesar Families Association
Families for Freedom
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