Tag: Qatar
Stevenson’s army, October 12
I love well-argued cases that challenge the conventional wisdom, even if I don’t end up persuaded. So I like this WOTR piece “Defund Centcom”.
And Slate interviewed an author who says Columbus was motivated by Islamophobia.
Fred Kaplan says Michigan terrorist militia wasn’t particularly pro-Trump.
WSJ warns that both Georgia Senate contests may go to Jan 5 runoffs — depriving McConnell of 2 likely GOP votes as Senate organizes and counts ballots.
CFR has bipartisan report on how to deal with the next pandemic.
Jackson DIehl says Trump is destroying VOA.
Israel opposes any F35 sales to Qatar.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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More diplomacy, less force
A friend asked today what I thought of the current situation in Syria. I responded:
Predictable and predicted. The Syria commitment was not sustainable. The US needs to reduce its commitments to the Middle East to a level that serves vital interests and is sustainable. It should do that carefully, using diplomacy to ensure no vacuums are left. That can’t happen with this President.
I guess that puts me at least partly in Elizabeth Warren’s camp and opposed to Josh Rogin, who is a fine journalist but far more of an enthusiast for US engagement in the Middle East than I am.
Let me recount the reasons:
- The US is far less dependent on oil, including oil from the Middle East, than once it was.
- The spread of US unconventional production technology has made it difficult for oil prices to top $60/barrel for long. That is a price the US and world economy can and does tolerate easily.
- Other countries should, as Presidents Trump and Obama have suggested, bear more of the burden of protecting Middle East oil supplies, in particular the Chinese, Japanese, and South Koreans since they take most of the oil coming through the strait of Hormuz.
- Middle East producers should be doing more to build pipelines that circumvent Hormuz, and consumers (especially India and China) should be building strategic oil stocks for use in a supply disruption.
- American allies in the Middle East should, after many billions in US arms sales, mainly protect themselves. Israel does already. The Saudis and Emiratis as well as the Qataris should too. Needless to say, the Turks will have to after this latest brush with the US.
- Many American bases in the Middle East are too close to Iran to serve well in wartime. They will need to be evacuated if the balloon ever goes up. Better to get them out sooner rather than later.
- If you are still worried about Middle East terrorism, there is no reason to believe that the drone wars have done anything to reduce it. To the contrary, US presence in the region makes us a prime target.
- The right answer to terrorism is better governance, not drones. Find the people who are serious about improved governance and support them, not the thieves and oppressors who rule in much of the Middle East.
- If you want to counter Russian influence in the Middle East, clearly an unsustainable military presence is not the solution. Syria is going to be a big burden on Moscow. Let them deal with it.
- If you are worried about Iran, get back into the nuclear deal (aka JCPOA) as quickly as possible and try to negotiate an extension. The only serious complaint I am hearing from anyone about the JCPOA is that it expires.
The American drawdown from the Middle East should not be precipitous. It should be cautious and leave no power vacuums. That is what diplomacy is for: we need to be working on regional security arrangements that can guarantee that no one’s interests will be ignored and reasonable compromises will prevail. That effort will require serious attention to threat perceptions, regional trade and infrastructure, people-to-people relations, and traditional conflict management mechanisms in the region. Yes, more diplomacy, less force, and a lot of hard work and commonsense.
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Imbalanced Region
On September 20 the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) hosted a panel discussion entitled “Red Sea Rivalries: Middle East Competition in the Horn of Africa” to introduce and discuss a new report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) on the influence of Gulf Countries on the Horn of Africa. Opening remarks were delivered by Ambassador Johnnie Carson and Robert Malley, President of ICG. Elizabeth Dickinson, ICG’s Arabian peninsula analyst and Dino Mahtani, ICG’s Africa program deputy director outlined the report’s findings. UN advisor Nicholas Haysom, African Union Chief of Staff to the High-Level Implementation Panel Abdul Mohammad, and former Egyptian Ambassador Hesham Youssef provided commentary.
Malley described three key findings: first, the Gulf must stop exporting its conflicts to the Red Sea region; second, the Red Sea countries should negotiate collectively with the Gulf; and third, Western countries have a role to play in these conflicts but have only recently begun to do so.
Dickinson argued that Gulf competition in the Red Sea region is part of wider strategy throughout North Africa and the Sahel. Qatar and the UAE-Saudi alliance’s interventions in Sudan are related to its actions in Chad and Niger, the three countries bordering the stronghold of the UAE’s Libya proxy General Haftar. She also argued that the Gulf countries do not consider the Horn of Africa part of a different continent in which they are foreign meddlers. Rather, they think of the Red Sea as part of their region and their role in it as a natural extension of longstanding historical ties.
Mahtani emphasized that he is cautiously optimistic about the prospect of a stable dynamic between Gulf countries and domestic actors in Sudan. The killing of 120 people in Khartoum in June by General Hemeti’s forces pushed his Emirati and Saudi backers to show contrition. In July, an attempted coup by Qatar-backed members of Sudan’s military showed that Hemeti faced strong enough opposition to prevent him from ruling through coercion alone. Mahtani argued that this reality may push the UAE to compromise with Qatar on Sudan. This could lay the groundwork for future cooperation between the two countries on their overall plans for Sudan’s post-Bashir development.
Mahtani contrasted this to the situation in Somalia, where the federal government in Mogadishu is aligned with Qatar while regional political leaders receive support from the UAE and Saudi Arabia. He also described the UAE’s indirect support of al-Shabab through purchases of Somali charcoal, a significant source of funding for the militant group. In exchange, al-Shabab has increased the number of their attacks this summer and targeted a delegation of Qataris and Somali federal government employees, acting as “subcontractors for political violence.” Several panelists agreed that the Gulf rivalries have contributed to political fragmentation and violence in Somalia and will likely continue to do so indefinitely.
Both Dickinson and Mahtani emphasized the role that multilateralism can play in addressing the power asymmetry between the Gulf countries and those in the Horn of Africa. They argued that Horn of Africa countries can increase their bargaining power by negotiating jointly with the Gulf through regional multilateral organizations like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) or the African Union. The United States rarely involves itself but when it does it can make a big difference to the effectiveness of these multilateral discussions. In Sudan, the Quad talks among the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE facilitated the power sharing compromise.
Mohammad agreed that Africa’s strong tradition of multilateralism could benefit the countries of the Horn of Africa and added that it could provide an example of positive multilateral relations to the Gulf countries. He argued that while Gulf countries have weaponized the GCC against each other in recent years, adopting an African-inspired culture of multilateralism could provide a means to transcend conflict in the Middle East. Hesham agreed that multilateralism in this part of the world is important but argued that it will not solve the problem of asymmetry in the bilateral relationships between Gulf states and Horn of Africa countries.
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Peace Picks | September 9 – 13
1. Countering Violent Extremism in Libya: A Peacebuilding Perspective | September 10, 2019 12:30 pm – 1:30 pm | The SETA Foundation at Washington D.C. | Register Here
Instability in Libya after the revolution that toppled the 42 years’ authoritarian rule of Muammar Gaddafi has become a golden opportunity for extremist groups, including DAESH, Ansar al-Sharia, and Madkhali Salafis, to gain territory and influence in the country. Concerned about rising radicalism and violent extremism in Libya, external actors have attempted to address as well as exploit this emerging problem. States, international organizations, and regional organizations have strived to play a decisive role in restoring Libyan stability but their efforts have proven insufficient. Libya has been driven into a bloody civil war due to political and social fragility and external interventions. Based on an extended study and field research, Dr. Talha Köse will present a CVE model based on the peacebuilding perspective. This event will feature the initial findings and summary of the SETA Foundation’s latest field research on Libya, “Countering Violent Extremism in Libya: A Peacebuilding Perspective” authored by Dr. Talha Köse, a researcher at SETA Istanbul, and Bilgehan Öztürk, a researcher at SETA Ankara. Please kindly join us for an important discussion on the external players’ perspectives on countering violent extremism in Libya. Speakers: Dr. Talha Köse, Senior Researcher at the Strategy Program of the SETA Foundation in Istanbul and Chair of the Political Science and International Relations Department at Ibn Haldun University Dr. Karim Mezran, Director of the North Africa Initiative and Resident Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East Moderator: Kilic B. Kanat, Research Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington D.C.
2. The counter-ISIS coalition: Diplomacy and security in action | September 10, 2019 | 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM | Brookings Institution, Falk Auditorium | Register Here
On September 10, 2014, the United States announced the formation of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Since then, ISIS has lost nearly all the territory it once claimed authority over, simultaneously losing most of its sources of revenue. Even as the caliphate’s power has significantly waned, the fight continues in an effort rout out the remnants of the group. Today Coalition partners are dealing with the challenges of returning foreign fighters, securing and rebuilding territory formerly held by ISIS, and addressing the humanitarian challenges in communities who experienced ISIS’s brutality. On September 10, the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will host an event commemorating the fifth anniversary of the founding of the Coalition, discussing the early days of the diplomatic and military efforts to bring together a diverse coalition of partner nations, how their efforts were organized, and recommendations on where the Coalition can go from here. General John Allen, president of Brookings, will be joined by Brett McGurk, nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie, in a conversation moderated by Susan Glasser. Following the discussion, the participants will take questions from the audience.
3. Qatar Inside and Out: A Close Look at the Gulf State’s Politics, Human Rights, and Foreign Policy | September 10, 2019 | 2:30 PM- 4:00 PM | Project on Middle East Democracy, Suite 617 | Register Here
The tiny Gulf state of Qatar, the world’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas, is the wealthiest country in the world per capita. A close strategic partner of the United States, Qatar is home to the largest U.S. military base in the region, Al Udeid Airbase, and among the world’s top purchasers of American weapons. Criticism of U.S. policy toward Qatar has largely focused on its foreign policy, with its internal politics and human rights record receiving far less scrutiny. This relative lack of attention is curious, given the well-documented human rights abuses in Qatar, especially toward migrant workers, and the autocratic nature of its political system, an absolute monarchy. Please join us for a special Human Rights Watch-POMED event that will examine these domestic issues in the context of Qatar’s regional role and why they matter to the United States.
Speakers: Marti Flacks Deputy Director & Head of North America Office, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre Andrea Prasow Acting Washington Director, Human Rights Watch Kristian Ulrichsen Fellow for the Middle East, Baker Institute, Rice University David Weinberg Washington Director for International Affairs, Anti-Defamation League
Moderated by: Stephen McInerney Executive Director, Project on Middle East Democracy
4. Weaponizing Justice: Rule of Law and Cuba’s New Constitution | September 11, 2019 | 9:00 AM – 11:00 AM | Inter-American Dialogue, Suite 800 | Register Here
In April 2018, the Cuban National Assembly anointed Miguel Díaz-Canel as the country’s president, the first non-Castro to lead the island nation in almost 60 years. With new leadership came a new Constitution, which ostensibly reflects expanded due process protections for Cuba’s citizens. However, these constitutional rights coexist with a Criminal Code that is routinely employed by judicial authorities to silence dissent and punish political opposition. What kind of constitutionality exists in Cuba’s one-party state? What nominal rights exist, and are they respected? Does the new Constitution—effective as of April 2019—augur hopes for more freedom of expression and respect for the rule of law? To answer these questions and pursue a broader discussion on the administration of justice in Cuba, the Inter-American Dialogue is pleased to partner with the International Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights to present “Weaponizing Justice: Rule of Law and Cuba’s New Constitution.” The discussion will include a presentation of the Institute’s new report, “Premeditated Convictions: An Analysis of the Situation of the Administration of Justice in Cuba.”
OPENING REMARKS Carlos Quesada Executive Director, International Institute for Race, Equality and Human Rights (@Raceandequality)
SPEAKERS Luis Carlos Battista Cuban-American lawyer and host of the Nuestra América Podcast (@lcbattisa) and Caitlin Kelly Legal Program Officer, International Institute on Race, Equality and Human Rights
MODERATOR Michael Camilleri Director, Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program, Inter-American Dialogue (@camillerimj)
5. Pathways Out of Crisis: Views from Venezuelan Civil Society | September 12, 2019 | 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM | Woodrow Wilson Center | Register Here
As the political, economic, and social crisis in Venezuela deepens, civil society organizations are playing a vital role in resisting authoritarianism and defending fundamental rights. As Venezuela’s opposition engages in negotiations to achieve a transition, Venezuelan civil society is also advancing meaningful proposals for a democratic, peaceful solution that reflect urgent human rights and humanitarian needs on the ground. Please join us for a discussion of the latest in the country’s crisis, and of the role of the United States and the international community in supporting a peaceful return to democracy. Spanish to English translation will be provided.
Speakers: Feliciano Reyna President Acción Solidaria, Luz Mely Reyes Editor Efecto Cocuyo Marino, Alvarado Coordinator Venezuelan Program of Action Education in Human Rights (PROVEA), Beatriz Borges Executive Director Justice and Peace Center (CEPAZ), Alfredo Romero Executive Director, Foro Penal Venezolano Lowenthal Fellow, Wilson Center
6. Impact of the Arab Muslim Ban on Migration | September 12, 2019 | 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM | Gulf International Forum | Register Here
Nearly four years ago when the possibility of the current Administration was shrugged-off by many pundits and experts amongst the political elite, the already controversial Trump Presidential campaign on December 6, 2015 released a memo calling for, “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.” While the response among many to the proclamation was swift and oppositional, in some ways the eventually elected President Trump was able to deliver on parts of this promise when on January 27, 2017 the Trump Administration issued Executive Order No. 13769, effectively banning entry into the United States for those from countries including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Since then there has been a struggle in the courts in which several aspects of the travel ban have been struck down, however many restrictions on travel for individuals from these countries remain in place. In response, in May 2019 legislation colloquially referred to as the “No Ban Act” was introduced in both chambers of Congress, a symbolic yet largely ineffectual means to undo the remaining aspects of the executive order. Meanwhile, the order is not alone in a series of measures enacted under the Administration that limit the ability of individuals from GIF’s region of focus from travelling to the United States, either as immigrants, asylum seekers or refugees. Where do efforts stand to overturn the Arab and Muslim ban? How has the ban affected people from Yemen, Iraq and Iran? What allowed Iraq to eventually be excepted from the ban? Has the ban had consequences for United States Foreign Policy in the Muslim World? In what ways has the grassroots community collaborated in order to challenge the ban? While none of these questions have easy answers, Gulf International Forum and the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee are pleased to invite you to this discussion, where our assembled panel of experts will address issues related to the Arab and Muslim ban’s effect on Gulf populations, and the efforts taken to address the mandates of the Trump Administration.
Featured Speakers: Dania Thafer (moderator), Dr. Debbie Almontaser, Abed Ayoub Esq., Dr. Erdoan A. Shipoli, and Wa’el Alzayat
7. The Potential U.S.-Taliban Deal: A Step Forward for Peace in Afghanistan? | September 13, 2019 | 10:00 AM – 12:00 PM | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
After nearly a year of extensive negotiations in Doha, the United States and the Taliban have reportedly agreed in principle on a deal addressing U.S. troop withdrawal and Taliban anti-terrorism guarantees. This is intended to be just the first step toward a durable peace in Afghanistan. Next, intra-Afghan dialogues are planned to arrive at a political settlement and a permanent cessation of hostilities. Adding further complications is the upcoming presidential election—currently scheduled for September 28—with key actors disagreeing about the sequencing of the polls and the peace process. At this pivotal juncture, USIP is bringing together a panel of distinguished experts to discuss what a U.S.-Taliban agreement means for the possibility of peace in Afghanistan. Recent Taliban attacks have raised questions about whether the group is serious about a political settlement or are simply looking to be rid of foreign troops. Prospects for a sustainable, inclusive peace forged through compromise among Afghan stakeholders hang in the balance.
Nancy Lindborg, welcoming remarks President and CEO, United States Institute of Peace Ambassador
Roya Rahmani, opening remarks Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United States
Clare Lockhart, Director and co-founder, Institute for State Effectiveness Barnett Rubin Senior Fellow and Associate Director, Center for International Cooperation, New York University
Michael Semple Visiting Professor, Queen’s University Belfast, Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation and Social Justice
Scott Worden, moderator, Director of Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs, United States Institute of Peace
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Escalation as distraction
Whatever doubt there might be about the origin of recent attacks on shipping in and near the Gulf, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has claimed responsibility for yesterday’s shoot-down of a large American Navy drone. The Iranians say it violated their airspace. The Americans say it was shot down over international waters.
Both could be true, but it doesn’t matter. The significance of the Iranian move is to confirm that we are on an escalatory ladder. President Trump has so far declined, at least in public, to retaliate for the attacks on ships. We don’t really know what Washington has done covertly. Tehran is now testing Trump further with the shoot-down of the drone. The Iranians will likely continue to take steps that either they can claim publicly are in self-defense or interfere covertly with shipping oil and oil products by other Gulf countries.
The Iranian actions demand a response, one way or another. Even doing nothing is a response, as it is likely to encourage continued Iranian attacks. Tit for tat is also a possibility: certainly the US could shoot down an Iranian drone, one of which is said to have been responsible for last night’s success. Some argue the escalatory ladder could reach the point of taking out Iran’s shore-based missiles. It might in fact go much further.
The response could also be at least partially diplomatic rather than wholly military. The Iranians are claiming to be guarantors of Gulf security. They should be challenged to prove it. Once it has done, covertly or publicly, its proportional retaliation, the US should consider easing up on sanctions and allowing , Oman, Iraq, or some other relative neutral to convene a multilateral meeting on Gulf maritime security, to include Iran and the US as well as the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Even a meeting at which the parties shout at each other could serve to clear the air and begin the process of climbing down from a ladder that all too predictably leads to a catastrophic new war in the Middle East.
The current situation stems inexorably from the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. The aim should be to return to the status quo ante, which was surely better than what we are facing today. Trump will need some sort of face-saving process, but he is certainly capable of 180 degree policy and rhetorical reversal, a trick he successfully performed with North Korea. The US should also establish rapid military-to-military communications with Iran, since that could help to avoid unintentional provocations and support a diplomatic effort.
Congress needs to weigh in decisively at this point. The effort of the Administration to sell the existing Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) as the basis for war with Iran is not just a stretch. It relies on a claim of active Iranian support for Al Qaeda that is as dubious as Iranian claims that the US and its allies actively support Al Qaeda (the Iranians are particularly fond of quoting a dreadful interview with former Trump National Security Adviser Flynn to that effect).
The simple fact is that the US is not ready to go to war with Iran. Doing so would be a blatant effort by the Administration to distract attention from its all too serious domestic challenges. The Iranians might like war for the same reason: their economy is in a shambles, not only due to sanctions but also due to mismanagement. This is a perilous situation. Military strength has a role to play, but the way out is diplomatic.
PS: In case you don’t believe that Flynn bit, here it is:
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Doha impressions
I’ve been slow to write my impressions of Doha, where I spent four days last week after four days in Riyadh the week before (my impressions there are reported here). It’s fitting though that I should publish on Qatar the very day that its soccer team won the Asian Cup, defeating Japan 3-1 after triumphing in the semifinal 4-nil over arch-nemesis United Arab Emirates (in addition to beating Saudi Arabia).
The Qataris are riding high, at least in their own estimation and not only on the soccer field. They have more than survived what they term the blockade by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt imposed in June 2017. After an initial panic that emptied grocery stores, cut off family and other personal ties with compatriots, and caused a sharp fall in central bank reserves, the Doha government triggered a successful emergency response planned since the 2014 flare-up of their frictions with the Saudis and Emiratis.
The costs have been high, but the plan stabilized the situation and enabled Qatar to take advantage of its natural gas-derived wealth to make alternative arrangements and also begin to stimulate domestic production to replace imports. People recount the story of flying in 3000 cows for milk production with smiles on their faces. Saudi food supplies, which dominated the market before the “blockade,” are no longer missed.
Relations with Iran and Turkey have improved. Turkey is often credited as having prevented a Saudi invasion early in the Gulf crisis by deploying 3000 troops. The massive US air base at Al Udeid is seldom mentioned, but Qataris clearly treasure their close relations with Washington. Outreach around the world to other countries has grown. Qataris regard the Gulf crisis as a “blessing in disguise,” a phrase heard repeatedly. It compelled Qatar to diversify and strengthen its ties around the world.
The result is pride and allegiance, including (from my limited contact) among the 90% of the population that is expats. Qataris and foreign experts think the government has done well and that the country’s star is rising. Portraits of the Emir, once ubiquitous, are still much in evidence, despite government instructions to remove them. World Cup 2022 preparations are said to be going well. Criticism of labor conditions on the many construction projects has declined, as accidents have proven much less common than some had predicted. The $6-7 billion of direct World Cup spending is only a drop in the bucket, as the government is building another $200 billion or so in new infrastructure. That’s on top of already lavish spending over the last two decades.
The ideological underpinnings are not, of course, democratic. Qatar is an autocracy that does not permit political organizations of any sort. But a lot of people we talked with are convinced that the traditional system of tribal consultations enables the top to hear from the bottom and the bottom to register its discontents. There is talk of elections this year or next for a newly empowered Shura Council, which now issues legislation on behalf of the Emir. But there are also concerns that elections will give the largest tribes dominance that the current system does not permit, thus reducing the diversity of voices and narrowing the political base of the monarchy.
Why did tiny, non-democratic Qatar support the Arab Spring and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood? The most common answer is that Doha supported the political forces it thought Egyptians, Syrians, Yemenis, Tunisians, Libyans, and others wanted. It has dialed back on that support and blocked private financing of radical groups, monitored by the US Treasury.
Doha claims to be a strong supporter of economic and military integration through the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose work has been disrupted. But Qataris want to conduct an independent foreign policy, not one dictated by Saudi Arabia or least of all by the UAE, which is believed to still resent Qatar’s choice to remain independent and not join the other sheikhdoms. Bahrain is the paradigm for what the Qataris do not want: a country forced to follow in the Kingdom’s footsteps wherever it goes.
What about Al Jazeera, the TV news channels that spare only Qatar and not its Gulf neighbors from criticism? Qatar’s neighbors view Al Jazeera Arabic in particular as promoting rebellion and extremism. At least some Qataris are willing to contemplate modifications in editorial policy, but all assume Al Jazeera is not going away, as the Saudis and Emiratis would like. Though said to be privately owned, it is under the government’s thumb and can be reined in when and if need be.
At times in Doha and Riyadh, I felt I was in a hall of mirrors: both claim leadership in modernizing the Arab world, both see the Gulf conflict as a struggle over what one Saudi termed “seniority” in the region and many Qataris termed Saudi/Emirati “hegemony.” In both Saudi Arabia and Qatar these days conservatism is bad, diversity is welcome, dialogue and consultation are promoted, and freedom to organize political activity is restricted. These are absolute monarchies with the deep pockets required to buy their way into the 21st century.
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